AMBUSH AT VLADIVOSTOK



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SCHLAFLY & WARD

Questions for Americans:

Why does President Ford deceive us about U.S. military weakness?

What about Kissinger's surrendering to the Soviets—who is right, Ford or Reagan?

Why did Kissinger confess his surrender goals to Admiral Zumwalt? "The day of the United States is past and today is the day of the Soviet Union. My job as Secretary of State is to negotiate the most acceptable second-best position available."

What is the difference between the agreement Ford signed at Vladivostok and the one he *thought* he signed?

Why are the Russians working for Ford's election?

What were the two crucial lies Kissinger told to get Congress to ratify SALT I?

Why did Kissinger scrap 550 Minuteman missiles and 496 Polaris missiles while the Soviets were increasing their forces by about that same number?

How long has Kissinger displayed his "surrender syndrome"?

What did Kissinger reveal in his "deep backgrounder" about who was in the smoke-filled room at Vladivostok?

Why did Kissinger put security risks on the National Security Council staff?

What will America do the next time there is an oil embargo?

What if the Soviets put their new SS-20 missiles in Cuba?

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About the Cover —



On the left: Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and hence dictator of the U.S.S.R. and Commander-in-Chief of all Soviet nuclear and armed forces. The most powerful man in Russia.

On the right: Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the U.S., and hence ex officio director of some 2,000 KGB agents in the U.S. One of the most powerful men in Washington, D.C., and a close friend of Henry Kissinger.

In the middle: Gerald Ford, the target of the Ambush at Vladivostok.

The cover picture is from **Soviet Life**, May 1976, the large, expensively-produced magazine which is published by the U.S.S.R. Embassy and is the Soviet Union's chief propaganda organ in the United States.

The picture was taken at the Vladivostok Conference in November 1974, but was resurrected and published in May 1976 (18 months later) in order to help Gerald Ford be renominated and reelected.

This book tells what happened to Ford at Vladivostok to make him so valuable to the Soviets — and why Brezhnev and Dobrynin look so happy.

Ambush at Vladivostok

Phyllis Schlafly

and

Chester Ward

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Pere Marquette Press

Alton, Illinois

By the same authors:

The Gravediggers, 1964

Strike from Space, 1965

The Betrayers, 1968

Kissinger on the Couch, 1975

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chapter I

THE CHANGED AGENDA

Surprise is always the key to a successful ambush. If you want to trap a military convoy, you plan to catch it so unalert that, before it can react to resist, you can decimate it with automatic weapons' fire, rockets, and grenades. In TV westerns, the bad guys hide along the sides of the trail so they can successfully bushwack the good guys. It's a sneaky but time-tested stratagem, elementary and simple. Throughout the centuries it has worked. Remember the Trojan Horse. Remember Pearl Harbor.

Remember the brilliant and daring Israeli commando raid on the Fourth of July, 1976, which rescued the 104 hostages from terrorists at the Uganda airport. The commander explained afterwards: "The element of surprise was achieved so the operation was not especially difficult in execution." Yet it was a raid conducted from an Israeli base more than 2,300 non-stop miles away.

In armed, physical conflict, history proves that surprise is usually decisive. Soviet strategic doctrine, always pragmatic and realistic, demands that every attack must be initiated with the advantage of surprise. This dedication to surprise is not merely theoretical; all Soviet armed forces are designed with a built-in capability of achieving surprise with overwhelming power. Soviet conventional forces, for example, are designed to overrun NATO defenses quickly before reserves could be brought up.[1]

In the grand strategy of the Soviet Union, however, the use of armed force is only one means of conquest. Another,-which involves far less risk and expense, is conquest by negotiation. Although the West has become accustomed to surprise in Soviet military strategy (*e.g.*, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), we continue to be taken totally by surprise when the Soviets use it in their negotiating strategy.

Total surprise was just one of the things that happened to Gerald Ford at Vladivostok. The ambush of the American President was accomplished by a many-splendored plan — by the acting out, with smashing success, of a scenario brilliantly conceived and exquisitely executed. This involved extensive pre-conditioning of the target, Gerald Ford. Physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, he had been softened up for the capture. Here is how the entire performance was stage-managed.

First there was his physical exhaustion and mental fatigue caused by jet-lag. Almost everyone feels this even after a relatively short flight, say from New York to Los Angeles, across only three time zones. Big corporations have learned by bitter experience not to permit their executives, after a trans-Atlantic flight, to enter into serious negotiations until after at least a day for mental and physical recuperation. At stake in their conference is usually only a few million dollars of Other People's Money (their stockholders).

For President Ford, Henry Kissinger scheduled the Vladivostok Conference with the Kremlin leaders at the tag-end of a 17,000-mile trip which spanned not only the American continent but the vast reaches of the Pacific — the time-zones of half the globe. The trip also involved major political and ceremonial responsibilities for a very new and inexperienced

President. It was the first visit of any U.S. President to Japan. This involved audiences with the Emperor, conferences with the Premier and Cabinet officials, public appearances, news conferences, airport interviews, sightseeing, and the myriad other burdens imposed by a formal state visit.

After Japan came a trip to Korea, and the same hectic pressurized type of engagements with the ROK President and officials in Seoul.

At long last, Air Force One left South Korea for Vozdvizhenka, a secret Soviet military airport some 64 miles from Vladivostok. Upon deplaning, Gerald Ford was met by Brezhnev and other Kremlin officials. The scenario-like quality of the meeting, and Kissinger's directorial part in it, was fortunately preserved by *Time's* White House correspondent, Hugh Sidey:

> There was just a hint at Vladivostok that he [Kissinger] was seducing Gerald Ford to walk the same primrose path of summitry that Nixon trod. ... On the Asian tour Kissinger was as much like Sol Hurok as he was a U.S. Secretary of State. It was his production. He was constantly at Ford's elbow, whispering in his ear so much that other White House aides complained.
>
> But not Ford. The Secretary has instructions for the President on how to talk and act. At the ramp in Vladivostok when the new President met the Russians it was like a movie scene. They were all there in their fur hats, shaking hands and slapping backs and grinning as if it were a class reunion. And it was, in a way. These were Henry Kissinger's boys, drawn together in part by his wit and wisdom.[2]

The Russians and the Americans rode from the airport by luxury train to the Vladivostok resort area of Ussuresk where the conference was to be held. *Then* President Ford was confronted with the great surprise. *Until the conference was actually under*

way, he had not the foggiest notion that he was to negotiate a strategic arms limitation pact. The conference continued under marathon pressure for more than nine hours, ending after midnight. A scheduled dinner was cancelled while the participants ate sandwiches and drank vodka. The atmosphere was *so* cordial. An AP Dispatch described the Brezhnev-Ford relationship:

> "Ford and Brezhnev reportedly got along very well with each other, with the Soviet leader bear-hugging the President," one U.S. official said.
>
> The two "hit it off famously," he said. "They are two tough guys who are fundamentally politicians. They talked real tough, but in the end they drank their vodka and really meant it."[3]

With his jet-lag, his physical exhaustion, his mental fatigue, Brezhnev's bear-hugging, the intensity of the negotiations, the complexity of the subject of strategic nuclear weapons systems, and his own total inexperience in major negotiations, Gerald Ford did not catch on to what was happening. Nor apparently had he caught on even six days later when, after his return from Washington, he gave a nationally-televised news conference. This is how, on December 2, 1974, President Ford described how he entered into the Vladivostok Agreement:

> My meetings in Vladivostok with General Secretary Brezhnev were a valuable opportunity *to review Soviet-American relations* and chart their future course. Although *this was our original purpose,* Secretary Brezhnev and I found it possible to go beyond this get-acquainted phase. Building on the achievements of the past three years we agreed that prospects were favorable for more substantial, and I may say,*very intensive negotiations* on the primary issue of limitation of strategic arms. In the end, we agreed on the general framework for a new agreement that will last through 1985.

So there it is! If the sole scheduled purpose of the Summit at Vladivostok was merely "to review Soviet-American relations" and to "get acquainted" with jolly old bear-hugging Brezhnev, then why not do it at the tag-end of a 17,000-mile trip? Why worry about the mind-boggling effects of exhaustion and jet-lag? Why not have a few vodka toasts in an atmosphere of genial relaxation?

Above all, with such an innocuous agenda, why worry that the Soviet side was loaded with military experts, generals, and foreign policy experts, and was in constant communication with more experts and authorities in Moscow? Why worry that the new, inexperienced, non-elected President Ford had no military experts with him, no member or representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and no Secretary of Defense. Why worry that the conference room was located some 64 miles from and completely out of touch with Air Force One, with its mass of sophisticated communications equipment?

Each of these items, however, assumes momentous significance once the informal let's-get-acquainted agenda was changed to include negotiating a 10-year strategic arms control agreement. In describing this agreement at a news conference in Vladivostok on November 29, 1974, Henry Kissinger himself conceded that it involved our "national survival." That was an understatement because it involves not only our national survival in peace and freedom, but the personal survival of all 210 million Americans.

In the 1972 SALT I Treaty, the United States guaranteed thát we would build no anti-missile system to defend our population against incineration by Soviet multimegaton missiles. As Dr. Kissinger aptly described it, SALT I guaranteed enemy missiles a "free ride" against the American people. Thus, Part

I of the Kremlin strategy of conquest by negotiation was this stripping us of all active defenses against incoming missiles.

Part II of this Kremlin strategy was SALT II, put over on an unsuspecting U.S. President in the controlled environment of Vladivostok. The Soviets had two negotiating objectives at Vladivostok: (1) *terms* which would preserve to them the decisive advantages they had gained in the SALT I Interim Agreement (which purported to limit offensive weapons, but which actually put no limits on the Soviet buildup of a first-strike disarming capability), and (2) *language* which would appear to the American people and Congress to grant us "essential equivalence" in strategic power and remedy our SALT I concessions.

But the Soviets wanted even more out of Vladivostok. They looked upon that conference as the opportunity to "co-opt" the services of the one man who could sell lopsided arms agreements to the American people.

chapter II

TO CAPTURE A PRESIDENT

Americans are unlikely to learn very much about what went on in that smoke-filled room near Vladivostok, where Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger for the United States, and Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko for Russia met alone for some nine and a half hours with only two interpreters — and no advisers — present.[4]

Ironically, but certainly unintentionally, the *New York Times* played a large role in making its own prophecy self-fulfilling. The fact is that Brezhnev and Gromyko were never "alone" in representing Russia during the conference; they were continuously supported by Anatoly Dobrynin, the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Washington, ex officio head of the KGB in the United States, and Henry Kissinger's closest friend in the U.S. capital. Also, during the first and longest session of the conference, the Soviet side was supported by two generals sitting at Brezhnev's side. After that, they were immediately available to Brezhnev for consultation, just outside the door of the conference room. So the *Times*' statement that there were "no advisers" present was totally wrong as to the Russians.

Equally misleading (although not demonstrably false) is the statement that there were "only two interpreters" present. The obvious implication is that this means one interpreter for each side. No experienced negotiator would go into a summit negotiation involving "national survival" without a skilled, expe-

rienced, and fully trustworthy interpreter to represent his side. No competent President, even if inexperienced, would put his country at such a disadvantage unless for some reason his judgment were not functioning properly. But if there were two interpreters present during the conference, they were both representing and working for the Russians.

Did the failure to have a U.S. interpreter present actually disadvantage the United States? Here is what happened. The only official statement of the results of the Vladivostok Conference was a "Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement" dated November 24, 1974. After reciting that "agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions," this statement set out the now-famous guidelines in five numbered paragraphs, ranging in length from one to five sentences. Such brevity in the basic guidelines left the substance of the agreement shot through with major ambiguities. The key term for limitation of forces was "strategic delivery vehicles." But this term was left totally undefined! No agreed meaning was assigned to the term "strategic" or to "delivery vehicles." It was provided that "the new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972," but there was no stated agreement on *which* provisions were "relevant."

In the normal course of major international negotiations, an *aide-memoire* setting forth the more specific points underlying the basic guidelines is published. But this did not happen in the case of the ultra-secret negotiations in the smoke-filled room at Vladivostok. In the nearly two years after the "agreement," not a single memorandum explaining the Joint Statement of November 24, 1974 has been made public. Because no American interpreter was

present for our side in the secret proceedings, we have no document to rely on. With only a Russian interpreter present, language difficulties were not recognized contemporaneously with the making of the agreement, and there has not yet been a reconciliation between Russian and American texts.

Do the ambiguities in the guidelines agreed upon at Vladivostok really disadvantage the United States and not Russia? We don't have to guess about that. We have more than four years' experience under the SALT I agreements which has provided substantial evidence that the Soviets have been violating both the letter and the spirit. Some 13 different types of violations have been detected.

Henry Kissinger, in his capacity as National Security Adviser to the President (until November 3, 1975), and through that as czar of the entire U.S. intelligence community, was able to cover up most of these violations. He put a "hold" order on all reports of Soviet violations so that they could not reach any other Cabinet officers or even the President himself. A number of these reports did nevertheless finally reach President Ford before his trip to Vladivostok. Kissinger convinced Ford, however, that these were not "violations," but merely resulted from what Kissinger characterized as "ambiguities."

Ford admitted in his televised news conference on December 2, 1974, upon his return from Vladivostok, that "alleged" violations had been reported, but said that it was his intention to submit to the SALT I Consultative Commission these "ambiguities" for analysis to determine whether there had been actual violations. (This Commission is composed of Soviet and U.S. representatives and has only the power of discussion and recommendations of procedures; it has no power to adjudicate violations.)

By means of exploiting these "ambiguities," the Soviets have been able to evade all the safeguards that Dr. Kissinger assured Congress were included in the SALT I agreements. Although it would superficially appear that both sides have an equal opportunity to exploit "ambiguities" or loopholes, experience has proved that it doesn't work out that way in deals with the Soviets. No ambiguities were allowed in the SALT I agreements except those the Soviets wanted. They were deliberately designed to fit the ongoing research, development, and production programs of the U.S.S.R. There are some 14 major loopholes in the SALT I agreements,[5] but let's examine three of the major ones.

First was the great opening for mobile missiles. The SALT I Interim Agreement only restricted adding new *fixed-base* ICBM launchers. The Soviets rebuffed all our efforts to restrict mobile ICBM launchers, too. Why? Within several months after the signing of SALT I, the Soviets began testing the new SS-16 ICBM, which could be deployed in the mobile mode. In other words, the loophole had been designed to fit a system they had ready for deployment. The United States had not then, and has not now, any such system.

Second, the U.S. SALT negotiators purported to believe that, by prohibiting the enlargement of ICBM silo dimensions by more than 15 percent, we had achieved a safeguard against the Soviets' converting any of their more than 1,000 "light" missiles into "heavy" missiles. Immediately after the signing of SALT I, the Soviets started testing three new types of ICBMs, and each type was far more powerful than the older type it replaced.

Third, SALT I restricted merely the number of *launchers* — not the number of missiles. This per-

mitted the Soviets to have any number of spare missiles for "reloads." This loophole had been ignored by the U.S. representatives because all existing ICBM types were "hot-launch" missiles. The inferno of flames at the blast-off would damage the inside of the launcher tube so that it would require extensive and time-consuming repairs before a reload could be inserted. Immediately after SALT I was signed, the Soviets unveiled a "cold-launch" or "pop-up" type of launch for three of their four new ICBM types. A gas generator furnishes the power to pop the missile up out of the silo before the rocket engines are ignited for the blast-off, thereby preserving the silo for reuse.

That's the way the SALT I "ambiguities" worked. *Only* the Soviets could take advantage of them because the "ambiguities" were pre-crafted to fit Soviet strategic weapons programs almost ready for deployment. The United States was in no position to exploit any of these three major loopholes. We had no mobile missiles even in research, much less under development or ready for production. We had no "heavy" missile types under engineering development which could be launched from existing silos. The proposed M-X missile was a concept only, and cannot be developed, produced, or deployed until the mid-1980s. The proposed 12A warhead for our Minuteman III missile is almost as far into the future. It really is no "heavier," anyway; it is to be the same size and weight as existing warheads, but will carry slightly more explosive power because of further miniaturization of the trigger and fusing systems. And we have no cold-launch-type ICBMs whatsoever and are not even developing any.

Gerald Ford in the Vladivostok smoke-filled room, therefore, must have known that he should be

wary of "ambiguities." But the Soviets had stacked the cards against him. They had set up the conference so that he would have no military advice at all, and no advice whatsoever except for Henry Kissinger's. Gerald Ford, understandably, did not know enough about strategic weapons systems to spot ambiguities or loopholes in an agreement which was supposed to "control" those arcane weapons. He did not really understand one of the two basic guidelines which he and Brezhnev "agreed" upon and signed. As reported by the Gannett News Service out of Washington on December 3, 1974:

> President Ford at his press conference last night misspoke himself several times and gave the impression that a limit had been set on the number of warheads that each nation can put on its missiles.
>
> This is not the case. What has been agreed is that each side can have a total of 2,400 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Of the 2,400 missiles, each side would be allowed to arm 1,320 with multiple warheads.

Analysis of the official text of the news conference confirms the fact that President Ford very probably *thought* that the 1,320 figure set a limit on the number of MIRV *warheads* each side could have, whereas the limit actually was on the number of *missiles* on which each side could mount MIRV warheads. Several times he spoke of "the limits of 2,400 on delivery systems and 1,320 on MIRVs." In answering questions, he kept insisting that "on the MIRVing we are equal," and that "the Soviet Union is limited as to delivery systems and as to MIRVs within the delivery systems." Only in reading a prepared statement at the start of the news conference did Mr. Ford state the provisions of the Vladivostok Agreement accurately.

It would have been a great accomplishment for our country if President Ford had indeed secured

the agreement he apparently thought he had. If the Soviets had actually been limited to "1,320 on MIRVs," they could have MIRVed only a total of 165 of their 313 SS-18s, and no SS-17s or SS-19s. That is, they could have mounted MIRV warheads on only a total of 165 missiles instead of the staggering total of 1,320. As it is, on their 1,618 ICBM force they can have up to 8,554 MIRV warheads of two to three megatons *each*, whereas on our 1,054 ICBMs we can have only 3,162 MIRV warheads of about 170 kilotons each. SALT I precludes our adding more.

Ironically, even if Gerald Ford had actually obtained from the wily Soviet bargainers equal numbers of MIRV warheads instead of equal numbers of missiles on which MIRV warheads could be mounted, he would still have been victimized by the Vladivostok trap. Like many ordinary Americans, he believes that equal numbers mean equality. Suppose we hypothesize for a moment and imagine that the agreement was that each side could have a limit of 1,320 MIRV warheads. Since the Soviet SS-18 MIRVs carry three megatons each, 1,320 Soviet MIRVs would deliver 3,960 megatons of explosive power. Our most powerful MIRVs (the Minuteman III) are 170 kilotons, or 170/1,000 of one megaton. Therefore our 1,320 MIRV warheads would deliver only 224.4 megatons. Translating from megatons into tons of conventional explosive power equivalent, this means that the 1,320 Soviet MIRV warheads would deliver 3,735,600,000 *tons more* than our 1,320 MIRV warheads.

What do these numbers mean? For the purpose of a disarming strike, those 1,320 three-megaton Soviet MIRVs could destroy, with high confidence, some 1,000 of our 1,054 land-based missiles (assuming a

1,500-foot Circular Error Probability, which is realistic in this time frame). Our MIRVs, on the same type of disarming mission, could destroy at most only about 528 of their 1,618 ICBMs. Thus, after an "exchange," the Soviets would have a surviving ICBM force of about 1,000 missiles, whereas we would have surviving only about 50.

Actually, an "exchange" would be even worse than this. The Soviet figures provide them with a reserve of some 266 warheads for degradation factors, whereas 200 should be sufficient. The U.S. figures allow no reserve for degradation and probably exaggerate the hard-target kill capability of our 170-kiloton MIRVs. One expert computation estimates that it would take 1,500 of our MIRVs to destroy 434 Soviet ICBMs.[6]

But Gerald Ford didn't know the difference between what he called "a limit of 1,320 on *MIRVs*" and a limit of 1,320 on the number of *missiles* which can be MIRVed which, as we have seen, would allow the Soviets up to a total of 8,554 warheads (because of the massively greater throw-weight of the Soviet missiles).

Let us continue for a little longer to suppose that Gerald Ford had indeed secured the agreement at Vladivostok that he *thought* he had signed, namely, a limit of 1,320 on MIRV warheads instead of a limit of 1,320 on missiles which can be MIRVed. Here is what he would have let us in for.

First, we would have to scrap 110 Minuteman III missile warheads and replace them with either a single-warhead version or a MRV-warhead version. This is because we have already deployed 550 Minuteman IIIs with 3-MIRV warheads. Only 440 of those would bring us up to the limit of 1,320 MIRV warheads which Ford *thought* was the limit.

But we have no single warheads or MRV warheads with sufficient yield or explosive power to replace the three 170-kiloton MIRVs carried by each of the 110 Minuteman IIIs that would be beyond the MIRV limit Ford *thought* he was imposing. To make use of the throw-weight available in a Minuteman III, it would take a 3-megaton single warhead or a 3-MRV warhead of 500 kilotons each.

It just so happens that we have no such warheads, and would have to design, research, develop and produce them from scratch. The real rub, however, is that we would have to *test* them. But four months earlier, at the 1974 Moscow Summit, Henry Kissinger had conned Richard Nixon into a Nuclear Threshold Test Ban Treaty which set the threshold for tests at 150 kilotons. Without tests, there could be no reliable warheads. Also, scrapping and replacing 110 warheads would cost scores of millions of dollars and take years of time.

These complications in our land-based ICBMs are as a molehill compared to the mountain of complexities we would face in SLBMs. At the time of the Vladivostok Conference, the United States was just completing the so-called "conversion" of 31 Polaris missile-launching submarines to Poseidon submarines *so that they could carry the larger, MIRVed Poseidon missiles.* This cost us on the order of $8,000,000,000 and seven years. Yet every single one of our Poseidon submarines — with their 16 Poseidon MIRVed missiles and at least 160 MIRV warheads — would be in excess of the Vladivostok agreement that Ford *thought* he signed. We would have to reconvert all 496 Poseidon missiles with their 4,960 MIRV warheads to non-MIRV warheads. (Actually, more than 4,960 warheads would have to be scrapped because an undisclosed number of Posei-

don boats carry 16 missiles with 14 MIRVs each — with the negligible yield of 17 kilotons.)

If this were the Vladivostok Agreement, we would have the truly enormous task of researching, designing, producing, testing, and deploying new-type single warheads of a 3- to 4-megaton yield, or MRVs with about a 500-kiloton yield. (It is not practicable to mount more than three to five MRVs on a single missile because they cannot be delivered to separate targets. This is what distinguishes them from MIRVs.)

So what a mess Gerald Ford would have let us in for *if* he had secured the agreement he thought he had signed! There is even one more major defect in his supposed agreement. An agreement limiting each side to 1,320 MIRVs would be almost impossible to verify by national means. From an inspection point of view, the actual Vladivostok agreement is bad, but at least it is theoretically workable by counting as MIRVed all *types* of missiles which have been tested several times with MIRVs. This would not work under an agreement that limited MIRVs (instead of missiles that can be MIRVed) because 1,320 MIRVs could be fitted on as few as 165 SS-18s, or 220 SS-19s, or 330 SS-17s, and the Soviets have many missiles in excess of those numbers.

The purpose of this discussion is not to fault Gerald Ford because he is not an expert on nuclear strategic weaponry. Such expertise would indeed be a valuable asset for a President, but it would be too much to expect from a political leader.

But it is not too much to expect of any President to have enough common sense, enough of a recognition of his supreme responsibility for our national survival, so that he would not let himself be rushed, pressured, and psyched into a critical conference on

strategic arms *without having the protection and backup of our most prestigious and loyal military leaders.*

To make a fair appraisal of Gerald Ford's performance as steward of our national security, two key questions must be considered: (1) Were the developments within the secret conference room at Vladivostok such as to warn a reasonably prudent man with Mr. Ford's responsibilities that the Soviets might be planning to outmaneuver him? (2) Was it prudent of Mr. Ford to rely exclusively on Henry Kissinger and to proceed with negotiations without the benefit of expert strategic and military advisers?

chapter **III**

INSIDE THE SMOKE-FILLED ROOM

My first responsibility to our people is to assure that no nation can ever find it rational to launch a nuclear attack or to use its nuclear power as a credible threat against us or our allies.

— *Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967.*

No President ever expressed his overriding responsibility so accurately or so eloquently. Whether President Johnson fulfilled that responsibility is another matter.

On entering the smoke-filled conference room at Vladivostok, Gerald Ford had no way of knowing that this greatest of his responsibilities to the nation was soon to be invoked. He had then no clue that a highly sophisticated yet brutal psychological attack would be mounted against his perception, his acumen, and his common sense. No average American would have been alert for signs that a carefully conditioned environment had been prepared to numb his senses and deaden his instincts.

Yet, as soon as the subject shifted so suddenly, so strangely, from the agreed agenda of a relaxed get-acquainted chat to an agreement on weapons of nuclear terror, should not alarm signals have sounded in his consciousness? Granted that he had been made vulnerable by jet-lag and by physical and nervous exhaustion from his 17,000-mile high-formality trip, should not some warnings have penetrated his consciousness?

The answers to these questions can be developed only by discovering, as the *New York Times* phrased it, "what went on in that smoke-filled room near Vladivostok." Since the *Times* had warned us that we were highly unlikely to learn the answer to that question through regular news channels, the accurate, authoritative information would have to come from a source who was in that room the entire time. Although that was improbable, it did happen. The Highly-Placed Eye-Witness Source himself, Dr. Henry Kissinger, revealed "what went on." Overconfident in intimate gatherings, he sometimes talks too much; and this was one of those times.

Immediately after the Vladivostok Conference, Kissinger jetted to Peking where high-level Chinese officials entreated him to heed their warnings that detente was not an alternative to nuclear war, but an essential preparation by the Soviet Communists for the launching of nuclear war. Then he rushed back to Washington to join with Gerald Ford in selling the Vladivostok guidelines to Congress, the media, and the American people.

Kissinger's first move in the sales and promotion campaign was his familiar tactic of conducting a "backgrounder" conference for his most consistent supporters in the press and television. According to the well-understood and accepted rules of "backgrounders," information derived from the official presentation can be used by reporters as "background" for their own stories, but the material cannot be directly attributed to the official who gives the information. Henry Kissinger for years has shrewdly used such semi-secret press briefings to counter criticism of his projects.

By December 3, 1974, a mounting storm of criticism attacked the Vladivostok guidelines because of their failure to constrain the massive Soviet advantage in

throw-weight. Not surprisingly, Dr. Kissinger opened his "backgrounder" with the pert quip that "throw-weight is a phony issue," and followed this up with a slickly deceptive pontification about the non-significance of throw-weight. For about 30 minutes he added other plausible myths to the store of misinformation he has doled out to invited members of the media and which they pass along to the public, such as the asserted greater "vulnerability" of Soviet land-based forces and the alleged superior "flexibility" of U.S. nuclear forces.

Dr. Kissinger has used the "backgrounder" as his principal ploy in selling his policies to the national media and in disarming his potential critics. "Backgrounders" are highly valuable to those invited on both a personal and a professional basis. The non-attributable "inside" information they pick up there not only "enriches" their marketable stories, but enriches them, because it adds to their individual prestige and thereby makes their columns or reports more salable. It gives them a sparkling sense of overconfidence which laces their second-hand misinformation with verisimilitude.

In extremely important situations, Henry Kissinger surpasses the "backgrounder" with an even higher classification: he solemnly warns his rapt audience that he is taking them into "deep background." Revelations which follow are not only not attributable, they are not repeatable. They are sacrosanct. They are above leaks of any kind. If classified information were involved, they would be called "top-secret eyes-only." The media accepts these Kissinger-conditions. Witness the fact that the *New York Times* reporters present did not pass the "deep background" information on to their editors, which explains why the *Times* lead editorial had all its facts wrong about who was present in the Vladivostok smoke-filled

room. Secrecy is ensured by strict sanctions: if a reporter is even suspected of leaking "deep background" revelations, he is cut out of that elite partnership with the Secretary of State and loses his "inside" avenue to important developments. There is one other protection for Kissinger; he is confident that the media representatives he invites do not have the expertise necessary to fit into the big picture the jigsaw segments they pick up in his "deep backgrounders."

It is necessary to know these things about Dr. Kissinger's procedures; otherwise it would not be credible that he would make the revelations he did about the Vladivostok Summit. Here is how Henry Kissinger himself described what really went on in that smoke-filled room:

> When the Vladivostok meeting started, there were two generals sitting behind Brezhnev. Whenever we started getting concrete, they started slipping little pieces of paper to him, or butting into the conversation one way or another.
>
> At the first break Dobrynin came to me and asked to confine the meeting to three people on each side — which got rid of the two generals.
>
> After that, whenever numbers came up, we would explore the numbers and then he [Brezhnev] would take about a 45-minute break, either to consult the two generals and on at least two occasions, to consult Moscow — probably to consult the Inner Group, which could have included Podgorny, Kosygin and Grechco. . . .
>
> As to consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there was none during Vladivostok. We were in touch with Schlesinger. We were reasonably confident that JCS would approve, and we were not disappointed.

And that's the way it was inside the smoke-filled room at Vladivostok. We have it on the authority of the Authentic Source himself.

With that much specific information about the Russian conferees and their advisers, it is possible to formulate high-confidence answers to the twin questions, "would they if they could, and could they if they would?" Would such distinguished leaders of the great Soviet Union do such a dastardly thing as to set a cynical trap for the U.S. President and trick him into a conference governing the national survival of his nation, with all the cards inexorably stacked against him?

Every American age 35 or older should know the answer to that. Back in October 1962, young President John F. Kennedy went on national television and radio to broadcast the Cuban Missile Crisis warnings. After describing how the Soviets had sneaked their nuclear missiles into within 90 miles of our coast, and had targeted them so that they could have killed scores of millions of Americans, he bitterly described an especially dirty trick that two high Soviet officials had tried to put over on him. They had made a personal, official call on him in the Oval Office of the White House. Their mission was to give our President personal as well as official assurance that the Soviet Union had not deployed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba. It just so happened that, while they were giving this assurance, President Kennedy had in his desk drawer the famous reconnaissance photographs of the offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba which our U-2 plane had taken on October 14.

Thus it was that, to an intent television and radio audience of scores of millions of Americans, the President of the United States publicly denounced as lies the statements made directly to him by two important Soviet officials. Their names? Andrei A. Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister, and Anatoly Dobrynin, U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the United States

— members No. 2 and No. 3 of the Soviet negotiating team dealing so deviously with Gerald Ford in the smoke-filled Vladivostok conference room. If they would attempt to deceive President Kennedy to deter him from taking action to protect the lives of scores of millions of his people who were in imminent danger of nuclear incineration, what is your opinion of whether they would be too "honorable" to assist in trapping another U.S. President into an ambush of stacked negotiations?

The third man on the Soviet team at Vladivostok was Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Back on May 15, 1963, Joseph Alsop (who has enjoyed highly authoritative intelligence leaks during his entire career, especially during the term of his close friend Jack Kennedy) wrote in his column:

> The Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, who is not a Presidium member, nonetheless attended all the Soviet leaders' meetings with Fidel Castro, even though the most important meetings were otherwise restricted to Nikita S. Khrushchev and two other Presidium members, Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksei N. Kosygin.

The Soviet meetings referred to were the ones which planned the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. When Alsop wrote this, the name Brezhnev was almost unknown in the United States, and no one foresaw the ouster of Khrushchev more than a year later.

So the same Leonid Brezhnev, who welcomed Gerald Ford with bear-hugging and vodka at Vladivostok, was one of the three co-conspirators who plotted and carried out the secret emplacement of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba in order to ambush not only a U.S. President, but scores of millions of Americans.

It is thus most uncomfortably clear that, if the three principal Soviet negotiators at Vladivostok had been willing to try to ambush and deceive the President of the United States when he was Commander-in-Chief of a strategic nuclear force 10 times more powerful than that of the U.S.S.R., they would certainly be willing to ambush a later U.S. President when the strategic balance was reversed and Brezhnev had become the most powerful man in the world. The ethical view is the same, and the pragmatic view is now vastly more in the Kremlin's favor.

So they would if they could ambush an American President. They had the will, or the ill-will.

To assure a successful trap, the Soviets also needed expertise in nuclear negotiations. Anatoly Dobrynin is by far the most experienced SALT negotiator in the world. He was into SALT two years before it acquired its cute acronym. The SALT idea originated with former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who conceived it as the only method of preventing America from acquiring an anti-ballistic missile defense to protect our population as well as our retaliatory weapons. Here is how SALT actually got started, as described in *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* by John Newhouse:[7]

> In April [1967] Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin sent word to McNamara through an intermediary suggesting a talk. McNamara responded to this singular initiative by offering to meet in his office or at home. Dobrynin came along to McNamara's home and they talked for three hours. Dobrynin then flew to Moscow for consultation.

From the time Kissinger took power in the White House in January 1969, the substantive SALT negotiations were conducted by him with Dobrynin through the so-called "back channels." The formal negotiations by our SALT Delegation in Helsinki and

Vienna were merely a charade staged by Kissinger to make the SALT I agreements appear to have been the product of years of hard-headed give-and-take bargaining across the conference table.[8]

Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko both had to oversee and approve every step of the negotiations on SALT from the 1967-68 conversations of McNamara and Dobrynin, through those by Kissinger and Dobrynin over the five years from 1969 through 1974.

So each of the three top-level Soviet negotiators at Vladivostok had had the benefit of nearly eight years of learning about the complexity of strategic nuclear weapons limitations, and a consistent experience in *winning* those arcane negotiations. In addition, these negotiators were backed up by the personal presence in the room (and later just outside the door) of two strategic military experts (whom Kissinger called the "generals"). Also, they were in consultation with Moscow experts, including the experienced Kosygin and Grechko, through the military communications system which links Vladivostok with the Command Center in Moscow.

On the American side of the Vladivostok negotiation, we had (1) Gerald Ford, with zero years' experience in SALT or any other strategic negotiations, and zero understanding of the subject-matter (what Kissinger had taught him was confused, and what Ford thought he knew was wrong); (2) Henry Kissinger, with six years' experience in *losing* SALT negotiations; and (3) a third member of the U.S. team on whose identity there is no unclassified information. The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communique of November 24, 1974 lists both Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, counselor of the State Department, as "tak-

ing part in the talks," but we know from Kissinger's "deep backgrounder" that only three Americans were present in the smoke-filled room. It makes little difference which one was there, anyway, because the Ambassador has had little substantive experience with SALT, and Sonnenfeldt is merely "Kissinger's Kissinger," an alter ego for Henry. It is clear that the only experience in SALT negotiations on the American side was Kissinger's.

How, then, did the situation look to Gerald Ford? Would a reasonably prudent man, with his responsibilities, have taken warning from the obvious imbalances in negotiating know-how, experience, and capability? Even Ford must have recognized as more than a mere happenstance his being taken by total surprise in the switch of the agenda from "getting to know you" to "let's conclude in 9½ hours a SALT II agreement that has been stalled for 2½ years."

There were other elements of a classic ambush that should have alerted him. Surprise is, of course, the *sine qua non*, but it is also very professional to isolate the target, to stage the attack as far from the target's home base as possible, and to block any communication between the target and his support. Even Gerald Ford must have recognized that, next to taking him for a ride in a space ship, he could not be farther from his home base. If the conference had been held in Moscow, Ford would have had the use (at least theoretically) of secure lines of communication to Washington through U.S. Embassy facilities (although he might have been exposed to the routine radiation of Soviet surveillance). But in the Vladivostok smoke-filled room, he was as isolated from Air Force One's elaborate communications equipment as if it, too, were half a world away.

No one in that room could have failed to be impressed by the concern of the two Soviet generals

sitting behind Brezhnev and the way they passed him little slips of paper whenever the negotiations became "concrete," and interrupted and butted into the disscusions. Should that not have made Gerald Ford feel the need for the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense, who are by law his military advisers? And when, on at least two occasions (probably more), Brezhnev sought advice from his Moscow team, did Mr. Ford never think of his own resources in Washington? He might have thought, for example, of his close friend Melvin Laird, the former Secretary of Defense who warned publicly in early 1969 that "the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability; there is no question about that." Should not Gerald Ford have recalled this warning as he attempted to negotiate an arms control agreement?

Anyone past the age of 35 should have known the character of the Politburo leaders against whom Gerald Ford was pitted so unexpectedly. Gerald Ford at that time was past 60 and had been a member of Congress for quarter of a century. Where was he during President Kennedy's TV address, in which Kennedy denounced Gromyko and Dobrynin for lying directly to him on a matter involving the lives of millions of Americans? Did Gerald Ford ever read the texts of Kennedy's Missile Crisis Address in the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Star*, or the *Congressional Record*?

Or, in that smoke-filled room, did Gerald Ford remember those things about those Communist leaders, but console himself with the thought that they are now different in the era of Kissinger's detente? If so, he should have remembered one additional warning courageously enunciated by his friend Melvin Laird back in 1962, in his book *A House Divided:*[9]

> Communism cannot change; and to believe in the possibility of change is a madness almost as far from the true order of reason as the ideology itself.

Did Gerald Ford remember that Leonid Brezhnev had a very special reason for exploiting any opportunity to humiliate an American President? The Cuban stratagem had been an even more personal humiliation for Brezhnev than for Gromyko and Dobrynin, who had merely lied to the U.S. President in order to assist the plan. Brezhnev had staked his prestige and risked his personal power. He and Kosygin had been the only two Presidium-level co-conspirators with Nikita Khrushchev in the planning and execution of the plot to introduce Soviet nuclear missiles within the U.S. defense perimeter. So now, after 12 long years and the reversal of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic military balance, and after a careful staging of a perfect psychological ambush, he was in a position to wreak his revenge on an almost pitifully naive and trusting U.S. President.

Gerald Ford's long experience in dealing with American politicians rendered him more rather than less vulnerable. In addition he was influenced by the wrong Harvard historian. Rather than Henry Kissinger, Ford would have been far better prepared for that summit conference room if he had listened to Richard Pipes, a truly learned and distinguished Harvard historian:

> The present leadership of the U.S.S.R., political as well as military, consists of Stalin's men. These people have gone through the most brutalizing political experience ever known and they are the product of a system of natural selection totally unfamiliar to the politicians in any other part of the world. ... To attribute to people with this kind of experience the habits of Americans, as is consciously done or not done by the philosophers of detente, is not unlike judging the behavior of ani-

mals raised in their natural wild habitat with that of tame domestic breeds. . . . It is not an advisable method for anyone who must cope with creatures raised in a world of fierce competition where, in Lenin's words, the guiding principle is *kto kogo:* "who eats whom."

With all these warnings of the danger to the survival of the United States if he negotiated a SALT II agreement under the carefully-crafted conditions of the Vladivostok ambush, did Gerald Ford behave as a reasonably prudent President — or even as a reasonably prudent man?

We have examined what the Soviets had going for their side. To evaluate Mr. Ford's judgment in continuing with the negotiations, it is necessary also to analyze what he believed he had going for our side to offset the tremendous Soviet advantages. There is only one advantage Ford could have reasonably believed he had at the bargaining table, and that was Henry Kissinger.

Was the presence of Henry Kissinger at Gerald Ford's side during the 9½ hours of intensive negotiations at Vladivostok an asset to the U.S. side? The answer to that depends on resolving what became known during the 1976 presidential election campaign as "the Kissinger issue."

chapter IV

THE KISSINGER ISSUE

The day of the United States is past and today is the day of the Soviet Union. My job as Secretary of State is to negotiate the most acceptable second-best position available.

Did Henry Kisssinger make that statement, in substance, to reputable witnesses? This is the way the media has phrased what they describe as "the Kissinger issue." All three national news magazines in April 1976 identified it as critical in the presidential election campaign. *Time* characterized it as "the only red-hot issue in the race for the Republican nomination." *U.S. News* was more specific: "How Mr. Kissinger's views as a historian influence his actions as Secretary of State will remain a hot issue in the presidential campaign." *Newsweek* reported that the Kissinger issue had split Gerald Ford's staff wide open; several of his advisers had gone public with predictions of Kissinger's imminent departure, but when Ford learned about this, he made them apologize to Kissinger and went out of his way to praise him as "one of the greatest Secretaries of State in the history of the United States."

Mr. Ford's reference to our history is relevant because Kissinger is the first Secretary of State who has ever been charged with putting the United States in such a weak, second-best position that we could be forced to surrender. Kissinger is charged with deliberately negotiating America into military inferiority to a ruthless enemy whose leader Nikita Khrushchev warned us back in 1956, "We will bury you."

True or false, outrage should have been deeply felt and powerfully expressed. The press characterization of the Kissinger affair as merely a "hot issue" was the understatement of two centuries. Because of its importance to our national survival, it deserved bigger headlines and more lines of space than Watergate. Congress should have initiated an investigation of unchallengeable objectivity. Although Watergate threatened our once sacred honor, it did not threaten our lives, our fortunes, and the independence of the United States.

If the charge is true — that Henry Kissinger has been and is continuing to negotiate, deliberately and covertly, an inferior military position that would require America to surrender in the face of a Soviet ultimatum — the sellout would reach beyond our freedom, lives, and fortunes. Western civilization would be brought down, as well as freedom and religion everywhere in the world. Could a surrendered and powerless American people expect better treatment from the Soviet Communist Party bosses than they have administered to their own people? According to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's impressively documented estimate, selective genocide imposed on the peoples of the Soviet Union reached some 66 million people. The respected British historian, Robert Conquest, documented 20 to 30 million people liquidated in the Great Terror alone.

On the other hand, if the charge against Henry Kissinger is proved false, it was an infamous charge to have been made against the senior U.S. Cabinet official, a man who has exercised not only the customary powers of Secretary of State, but unprecedented additional powers for nearly eight years as a *de facto* President for Foreign Affairs and Military Policy. If false, it is especially outrageous because it avoids being a charge of treason only because no

formal state of war exists and the Soviet Union has not officially been declared to be an "enemy."

The American people have a life-or-death need to know if the charge against Henry Kissinger is true or false. If it proves false, he has the right to be exonerated publicly of the charge that he *deliberately* brought the United States down from a position of overwhelming power to the brink of strategic surrender. The loss of U.S. strategic power in relation to the Soviet Union during the last eight years is an established fact. The "Kissinger issue" is whether or not he did this deliberately.

We could start the investigation of the charge with an analysis of the part Kissinger played in the smoke-filled room at Vladivostok. Did he try to warn the President of the dangers of the ambush? Did he warn a naive Gerald Ford that Brezhnev's bear-hugging and vodka-plying might possibly have an ulterior motive? Did Kissinger warn Ford of the danger to our national survival if the agreement did not limit the Soviets' burgeoning capability of launching a disarming first-strike at our land-based missile forces? In short, was Kissinger trying to help Ford *out* of the ambush — or was he helping to lure him into it?

Before we answer those questions, we should ask how much does Gerald Ford really know about Henry Kissinger? Ford's claim to be a competent President is very much involved in determining whether a reasonably prudent President would have entrusted Kissinger with such unprecedented power.

Gerald Ford inherited Kissinger from Richard Nixon, but Ford claimed his inheritance enthusiastically. Does Ford know more about Kissinger than Nixon did? Here is Kissinger's own explanation of his attitude when he accepted Nixon's offer of a job:

The President-elect had a hell of a lot more to lose than I did by offering me the job. ... He was taking the chance. ... If I was either disloyal or incompetent, it could affect his Presidency, and he knew not a goddamn thing about me.

That statement is from what might be called the official biography: *Kissinger* by Marvin and Bernard Kalb. Both are reporters who owe Kissinger for many worldwide trips on his luxury Air Force jet. The Kalb brothers proudly acknowledge that "our primary source was Henry Kissinger -- a series of private interviews, plus his backgrounders, his news conferences, his speeches." As one critic observed, the Kalb book is essentially "Kissinger on Kissinger." It is hardly objective but, as to Kissinger quotations, it is highly authoritative. (One of Kissinger's better quips relates to it: "I haven't read through it all, but I *love* the title.")

Kissinger made his revealing comment to the Kalbs for the purpose of publication, and they set it out in direct quotes. At the time he made them and at the time of the book's publication (1974), Kissinger was Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and chairman of seven of the eight operating committees of the National Security Council. Nixon was still President. If it were not that the media has consistently let Kissinger get away with conduct which would have been headlined as sensationally irresponsible by anyone else, we might have seen a headline like this: "Kissinger Charges Nixon Knew Not a Goddamn Thing About Loyalty or Competence of his National Security Adviser."

We now know -- from the disarray of our NATO alliance and from the SALT I monstrosities, plus the loss of our pre-Kissinger overwhelming strategic superiority -- that Richard Nixon's greatest mistake was giving Henry Kissinger a life-or-death power

over America, without knowing "a goddamn thing" about his loyalty or competence. Gerald Ford's first official act on becoming President, even before taking the oath of office, was to continue Kissinger in all his combined positions of unprecedented power and trust.

Another matter which should have prompted President Ford to order a security check on Kissinger was a confession Kissinger made in his famous news conference in Salzburg, Austria. What Kissinger said is what a lawyer might classify as an "admission against interest":

> Three of the four people on that original list were appointed to the National Security Council staff by me over the strong objection of all of my associates. Two of them were appointed to the National Security Council staff *by me over the strong objection of the security officers and I personally gave them a clearance.*

That was on June 11, 1974. It was one of the most widely-reported news conferences Kissinger ever held because it was the one in which he threatened to resign unless the Senate Foreign Relations Committee cleared him of responsibility for ordering wiretaps.

When Gerald Ford became President a couple of months later, should he not, if he had been a reasonable and prudent man, have inquired as to *why* Kissinger would pack the staff of the National Security Council with security risks? Ford raised no such questions.

The "Kissinger issue" might never have been raised at all in the national media were it not for the campaign of Governor Ronald Reagan. The blanket of silence in which Kissinger's most nefarious exploits are continually covered was pierced only by Reagan's buying a half-hour of television time on March

31, 1976, in which he quoted the Kissinger statement at the beginning of this chapter. This quotation, in turn, had been derived from advance copies of a new book by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, recently retired Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[10]

After that, even the blindly pro-Kissinger press could not pretend that the "issue" did not exist. Instead of ignoring it, the *New York Times* worked to blur the issue and lead the way for its vast following of lesser newspapers to obscure it down into oblivion. According to the *Times* of April 5, 1976, the real issue was "Henry Kissinger's world view. .. Is Mr. Kissinger too gloomy and pessimistic to chart U.S. foreign policy?" Using this line, sophisticated advocacy-journalism watered down the issue from *whether the Secretary of State has been betraying the United States by a long series of surrenders to the Soviet Union* into a debate on Kissinger's "philosophy." Then the *Times* showed the mass media how to bury the issue and remove it from public scrutiny:

> It is something of a bizarre debate, since neither Mr. Reagan nor Mr. Ford has examined in detail Mr. Kissinger's philosophy of history. And while the debate is potentially an intriguing one, it has unfortunately been *narrowed to the question of whether Mr. Kissinger in 1970 made a specific statement to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr.*, then Chief of Naval Operations, that suggested that the United States was on the decline and the Soviet Union was the wave of the future.

This paragraph, bylined by Bernard Gwertzman, exquisitely serves a dual purpose: (1) it eliminates from the debate the most sensational question — whether Kissinger had described his job as conducting a series of U.S. surrenders; and (2) it restricts proof of the remaining segment of the issue largely

to one man's word against another's. The crucial question is not whether, at a given time and place, Kissinger spoke a precise sentence to Zumwalt. The question is whether Kissinger has described his role as "it's my job to negotiate surrenders." Objective proof of negotiated surrenders is available. If the list of such surrenders is sufficiently impressive, there arises the inexorable inference that Kissinger has indeed been carrying out what he perceives his role to be.

What happened to the big three newsmagazines after characterizing the "Kissinger issue" as "red hot"? These magazines always have follow-up articles and round-ups on major national issues. But not this time. They dropped the "Kissinger issue" like a "red hot" iron and let the month pass without a single significant second mention of the most sensational charges ever leveled at so powerful a government official.

While the mass media overlooked specifics and followups on the "Kissinger issue," one veteran Congressman, Joe L. Evins (D.-Tenn.) began circulating among his colleagues Admiral Zumwalt's account of his private conversations with Henry Kissinger while serving in the Nixon administration. The account was based on notes made by Zumwalt at the time of the confidential conversations:

> Kissinger feels that the U.S. has passed the historic high point like so many earlier civilizations. He believes the U.S. is on the downhill and cannot be roused by political challenge. . . . Kissinger does not agree with the President [Nixon] that the people can be turned around. He states that his job is to persuade the Russians to give us the best deal we can get, recognizing that the historical forces favor them.
>
> Kissinger says that he realizes that in the light of history he will be recognized as one of those who negotiated terms favorable to the Soviets, but that

the American people have only themselves to blame because they lack the stamina to stay the course against the Russians, who are Sparta to our Athens.

Another conversation recorded in Admiral Zumwalt's notes took place during a White House meeting:

Kissinger: I believe the American people lack the will to do the things necessary to achieve parity and to maintain maritime superiority. I believe we must get the best deal we can in our negotiations before the Soviets and the U.S. both perceive these changes in the balance have occurred. When these perceptions are in agreement, and both sides know that the U.S. is inferior, we must have gotten the best deal we can. Americans at that time will not be happy that I have settled for second, but it will be too late.

Zumwalt: Why not take it to the people? They will not accept the decision to become second best while we are in possession of a GNP [Gross National Product] twice that of the U.S.S.R.?

Kissinger: There's a question of judgment. I judge that we will not get their support and if we seek it and tell the facts as we would have to do, we would lose our negotiating leverage with the Soviet Union.

Zumwalt: But isn't that the ultimate immorality in a democracy to make a decision for the people of such importance without consulting them?

Kissinger: Perhaps, but I doubt there are one million who could even understand the issue.

Zumwalt: But even if that presumption is correct, those one million can influence the options of the majority of the people. I believe it is my duty to take the other course.

Kissinger: You should take care lest your words result in a reduction in the Navy's budget. There are subtle retributions available.

Kissinger denied the accuracy of Zumwalt's notes, but admits that he did have a number of discussions with him while Zumwalt was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In defending his notes, Admiral Zum-

walt has challenged Kissinger to a joint appearance under oath before an appropriate Congressional committee to determine who is telling the truth. Thus far, Kissinger has refused to accept the challenge on the asserted ground that Zumwalt is seeking political office, which is, of course, irrelevant to the "Kissinger issue."

The objective evidence that Henry Kissinger has led the United States down a long line of surrenders, especially at the SALT I Summit of 1972, was comprehensively documented in the authors' earlier book *Kissinger on the Couch.* More than a year before the Zumwalt notes became public, this book produced impressive evidence that Kissinger's "surrender syndrome" dates back at least as far as 1961.

Here is Dr. Kissinger's own description, excerpted from a book he published in 1961, of what he then believed was the strategic environment of the world. Set off against it in a parallel column — again in his own words, but written in 1970 — is an accurate description of the world in the 1960s.

It is generally admitted that from 1961 until at least the end of 1964, the Soviet Union will possess more missiles than the United States. . . .

There is no dispute that the "missile gap" will materialize in the period 1960-64. . . .

The missile gap in the period of 1961-1965 is now unavoidable.[11]

In as late as 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union had around 40 ICBMs. We had over 1,000 bombers and over 200 missiles that could reach the Soviet Union.[12]

Dr. Kissinger's 1970 figures are, of course, the correct ones. In 1968 Richard Nixon put the ratio of our 1962 strategic superiority over the Soviets as 8-to-1. It is worth noting that the year 1962, which Dr. Kissinger used as the basis for his 1970 figures, is midterm in the period covered in the first column; and that, by the end of 1964, the United States had

1,398 missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union (934 ICBMs and 464 SLBMs), whereas the Soviets had only 331 missiles capable of reaching the United States (224 ICBMs and 107 SLBMs).

The difference in the strategic significance that Dr. Kissinger attributed, respectively, to the two estimates for the same timeframe is also interesting:

> **The only controversy concerns its [his predicted "missile gap" as described above] significance. It may mean that we could lose if the Soviet Union struck first. In that case, we would be fortunate if we escaped a surprise attack.[13]**
>
> **In short our strategic superiority was overwhelming [in 1962, as described in the right-hand column, above].[14]**

Thus, in Dr. Kissinger's artificial out-of-touch-with-reality world, he imagined the threat of a Soviet strategic force substantially more powerful than ours; he vested this nonexistent Soviet missile force with such a margin of superiority over us that it was possible, or even probable, that they had a first-strike capability against us; and he attributed to the Kremlin dictators the will to use this missile force so that we would be "fortunate" if they did not launch a surprise attack against us.

The fact is, as Dr. Kissinger officially conceded in 1970, that U.S. strategic superiority was "overwhelming" in the 1961-1964 timeframe. Therefore, his 1961 vision of the United States "losing" to the Soviets was not only defeatism, but sick defeatism. At the time of his early writings, there not only never was any basis for this fear, but instead there was every possible reason for absolute confidence that, in a strategic confrontation, the Soviets would lose. The strategic military balance at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis provided pragmatic proof that this was so.

Just suppose that Henry Kissinger had held in 1961 the power over U.S. strategy and military pol-

icy that he began to build in January 1969. Would he have negotiated some sort of clandestine delayed-action surrender on the theory that it was necessary to avert that massive nuclear "surprise attack" that he considered probable because of the margin of superiority he imagined the Soviets then had?

Perhaps not. He might not have done so *if* he had faith that the United States could build up strategic power in time to close the imagined "missile gap" before the Soviets could exploit their advantage. But Dr. Kissinger did not have that faith in America. He actually suffered another and more serious manifestation of defeatism, which appears in its tersest form in the sentence immediately following one of those quoted above from his 1961 book:

> The missile gap in the period 1961-1965 is now unavoidable. Lead times of modern equipment are so long that even should we change course immediately, *we could not close it.* (emphasis added)

It is difficult to escape a chilling sense of *déjà vu* when evaluating Dr. Kissinger's rationalizations of the imbalances he allowed the Soviet Union in the SALT I pacts. His defeatism is now in a much more advanced stage. Whereas the imaginary "missile gap" shook his faith in the United States, the present very real and massive gap — which he deliberately allowed to open and then to widen after he took office — has utterly destroyed his faith in America's strength and resources. He fell into a state of panic as to our chances against the Soviet Union: sophisticated panic, but hopeless panic nevertheless.

When dealing with the imaginary gap before his faith was totally destroyed, Dr. Kissinger conceded that, although we could not close the gap, we could at least narrow it. Now, when faced with the real gap, he contends that this great United States of America

cannot, within five years, produce a single additional missile launcher, either land-based or submarine-based, or a single additional strategic bomber. Thus, in the central document of the many briefings providing his rationalizations of the SALT I pacts, he presented these contentions:

> For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems. . . . By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too,–that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally five to ten years. . . .
>
> The U.S. completed deployment of Minuteman and the Polaris submarines in 1967. . . . We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze.
>
> In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960s, and *not reversible within the timeframe of the projected agreement*, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land-based and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. *Without an agreement*, the gap would steadily widen.[15]

Dr. Kissinger thus slickly lays the blame for our present alleged helplessness to reverse the gap on a strategic decision made "in the 1960s" to terminate U.S. building programs in major offensive systems; and he implies that by 1969, when he took over, it was too late to do anything to cure our helplessness. This was not so. If he and President Nixon had permitted Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to tell the American people the truth about Soviet capabilities *and intentions* in early 1969, and had instituted

strategic building programs early in 1969, we could have produced hundreds of additional missile launchers by 1972. We could then have produced not only hundreds but thousands of additional strategic weapons by 1974, three years within the five-year period within which Dr. Kissinger claimed we "could do nothing."

Dr. Kissinger even asserted that a *crash* program to build missile submarines of a type "similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980s and beyond," could "not produce results before 1976."

This is the Kissinger surrender syndrome in full display. He wants to default the greatest industrial power in all history to a less-than-half-size competitor — and he wants to do this in a *production* race in which the very survival of the United States is at stake. He wants to default America in a competition with a government so snarled up in Communist ideology that it cannot come within a thousand million dollars worth of grain a year of feeding its own people; a nation whose farmers are so fouled up in bureaucratic restrictions that, whereas each American farmer feeds himself and 58 other people on a high-protein diet, each Russian farmer is falling short of his government-prescribed quota to feed himself and seven other people on a starchy diet.

Dr. Kissinger wants to default America although our Gross National Product is more than twice that of the Soviet Union. In capability of inventing, developing, and deploying strategic systems, America deployed its full fleet of 41 Polaris submarines some 10 years ahead of the Soviets' frantic efforts to compete, even aided by the Polaris designs that the Gordon Lonsdale espionage ring stole from the Portland (England) Naval Base.

In the real world from which Dr. Kissinger compulsively seeks to escape, the United States has ample capability to produce within five years not merely a few additional strategic missile launchers, but quite literally thousands if we needed them. But we don't. An additional 496 SLBMs and 1,500 mobile Minuteman missiles, all with the improved guidance and greater explosive power that are within our technological capability, would be adequate. They would provide us with an invulnerable deterrent within the relevant timeframe.

We cannot, of course, rebuild the strategic deterrent that is essential to our national survival so long as we have a surrender-prone defeatist sitting astride the formulation of U.S. grand strategy. Nor can we hope to survive if he can continue to deceive the President and the people into believing that we do not *need* additional strategic power, and *could* not produce any in time even if we did.

During 1975 and 1976, more than a score of articles appeared which corroborate Kissinger's pessimism or his defeatism, and substantiate the probability that Admiral Zumwalt's version of his confidential conversations with Kissinger are authentic. One of the most authoritative was written by Kissinger's closest American friend in Washington, Joseph Alsop:

> The fact may be denied, but it is still remarkably interesting and instructive. The fact is that the Secretary of State of the United States gravely doubts the long-term power of survival of the American society that he now serves so well.
>
> "As a historian," he has said more than once in relaxed moments, "you would now have to predict that our kind of society would not last much longer. . . ."
>
> This profound inner pessimism, combined with an extraordinary drive to "do the best I can," are the real keys to Henry A. Kissinger. . . .

The truth is that the historical process, always dangerous to weak, unwary and self-indulgent nations, has grown much, much more dangerous in our grisly century. And this is one source of Kissinger's pessimism.

The most obvious cause of the increase of danger is the existence of the hideous new weapons. ...

Right here, however, one encounters the second source of Kissinger's pessimism. He is also, above all, worried about what has been happening to American society. The collapse of anything resembling an American "establishment," the increasing weakness of vital American institutions, the difficulty of governing America in its present mood and state — all these are his constantly repeated concerns. ...

Furthermore, it should be noted that Kissinger is by no means alone in this inner pessimism, which so strongly underlies his highly effective activism.

The first time that I heard a comparable view voiced by a highly placed and responsible man was in the golden years of President Kennedy. My own hopes were very high in those days, and I was downright shocked when Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, freely told a friendly gathering that he questioned whether any democratically organized society like ours could ultimately meet the challenges of our era.

At the time I wrote off McNamara's questioning as the aberration of a great technocrat and manager who had little political experience. Since then, I have learned better. *There was in truth a kind of a divide about a decade ago. From that time on, more and more of the thoughtful key men in the U.S. Government have come to share the inner pessimism* I have been describing. ... (emphasis added).

Sometimes, indeed, I half wonder whether Kissinger the activist — the virtuoso manager of our foreign relations — is not a mixed blessing for us. He has so often managed to make the great dangers seem undangerous that we take it all for granted.[16]

chapter V

WHY CONFESS SURRENDER?

To believe the Zumwalt version of his conversations with Kissinger requires a more difficult judgment than merely taking one man's word against another. Most of us intuitively crank into the equation a psychological factor which prejudices us against the Zumwalt version. We ask ourselves, "Even if Kissinger actually did *believe* the things he is alleged to have said, why would he *confess* to them?"

If Kissinger believes either of the two tenets Zumwalt said Kissinger admitted, this should disqualify him from holding his positions of national trust and power. How could Kissinger risk ruin and loss of his hoped-for high place in history by making such incriminating statements? Especially to a high military officer who might expose them?

Long experience with Dr. Kissinger's personal strategy and tactics teaches us that it is never safe to make a judgment on any segment of his conduct at the "what meets the eye" level of analysis. You must dig down deeper at least one additional level, and often even to a third or fourth level. Sophisticated deceit, layered with cynical self-preservation, enjoys emitting cloud after cloud of foggy murk.

Taking into account the full context of the conversations, and the special fund of strategic and military knowledge possessed by Zumwalt, the two *apparent* admissions against self-interest were actually self-serving exculpatory statements. Kissinger knew that

Zumwalt, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had full knowledge of Kissinger's policies and most of his actions. Kissinger knew *that Zumwalt knew* that these actions had resulted in an unbroken series of surrenders of U.S. positions of strength to the Soviet Union — both in negotiations and in actual policies controlling U.S. strategic posture. There was no point in Kissinger's attempting to convince Zumwalt that there had been no surrenders. Kissinger's approach to Zumwalt, therefore, sought two objectives.

(1) If you have positive information that a high government official is covertly surrendering the United States to a foreign power, your logical conclusion as to his motivation would be betrayal — at least in the sense of *de facto* treasonably *wanting* to help the foreign government. Therefore, when Kissinger came up with an "explanation" that he was only surrendering because of *necessity* — that he had no alternative (and all his other arguments based on his "profound inner pessimism") — he expected to rehabilitate himself in the opinion of a powerful JCS member and diminish the intensity of Zumwalt's opposition to the surrender policies.

(2) A military man (and any dedicated American) would consider a series of escalating surrenders to be inexcusable. But Kissinger hoped that his surrenders would become excusable if they were persuasively explained as representing the "best deal" he could get, considering that Soviet strength and U.S. strategic weakness had put him in not "the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people to find themselves in." This ploy is especially effective as a "cover" for deals in which Kissinger was *not* trying to get the best deal he could, but was actually volunteering concessions.

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger once described the Kissinger negotiating technique as tendering "preemptive concessions." An in-depth analysis of Kissinger's "bargaining" charades reveals that he (1) accepts all Soviet demands, (2) suggests a few additional concessions, (3) thinks up persuasive rationalizations of the Soviet demands, and then (4) sells the package to the U.S. President, the media, Congress, and the American public. If Kissinger can persuade influential experts (and potential critics) that he is cleverly getting the best deal he can from a position of weakness, he can make himself appear more of a savior than a *de facto* betrayer.

There are other persuasive reasons to explain why Kissinger would dare to risk making his confessions to Admiral Zumwalt. Kissinger is a master at creating situations in which his statements can be protected by what his elitist friends call "plausible deniability." The conversations with Zumwalt provide a classic example. Kissinger realized that, in the apparent case of one man's word against another, the average American would decide that the probabilities were against Kissinger's having taken such a risk, and that even Zumwalt would realize how little chance there was that his word would be taken against that of the man whom the polls identified as the "most admired" in America.

Furthermore, he knew that Zumwalt would realize that Kissinger has established a monopoly of access to the President on defense and military matters and could easily carry out his threat: "You should take care lest your words result in a reduction in the Navy's budget; there are subtle retributions available." Kissinger had already proved that he would actually resort to such gross threats. John Newhouse in *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* describes Kissinger's "carrot and stick" handling of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, and spells out how they were offered both the B-1 and the Trident submarine *if* they supported the SALT I agreements, but were threatened that they would get neither if they failed to support it. Kissinger himself attested the authenticity of this book in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1973.

For all these reasons, we must discard the theory that it is inherently improbable that Kissinger would have made such "confessions" to Admiral Zumwalt. There are, however, additional and affirmative reasons for believing the Zumwalt version. Kissinger, functioning as U.S. Secretary of State, has repeatedly made public statements which are the equivalent of those he made to Zumwalt in private conversation.

In Kissinger's sales pitch for the SALT I agreements, he made a cluster of assertions that, in the face of Soviet strategic strength and U.S. weakness, his job is to get the best second-place he can negotiate. His important 1972 news conferences were shrewdly designed to "sell" SALT I to two different audiences.

To the American people who are uninformed on statistics about the strategic balance, he gave assurances that SALT I was a great triumph for the United States, that we had obtained major concessions from the Soviets, that we had superiority, and that we would retain a 5-to-1 advantage over the Soviets in numbers of warheads throughout the entire term of the Interim Agreement. Upon this first group, he lavished his special capability, as phrased by Joseph Alsop, of managing "to make the great dangers seem undangerous."

To the reasonably well-informed members of the group of less than a million whom Kissinger conceded might possibly understand the issues, he made

his "I negotiated the best deal I could get considering Soviet strength and U.S. weakness" argument. This line is pervasive throughout his comprehensive briefing for the five Congressional committees delivered on June 15, 1972 at the White House.[17] The gist of it was presented in more manageable length in his news conference at the Intourist Hotel in Moscow on May 27, 1972.[18] Here are several pertinent sentences:

> On any day you would have picked over the last year, over the last two years, and on any day you are going to pick in the future, you will be able to demonstrate a Soviet numerical advantage. Moreover, it was a numerical advantage that was growing, because *in the ICBM field, we have, as you know, no ongoing program.*
>
> In the submarine field . . . we also have no programs for missiles which will be operational. . . . We have now no submarine under construction. The first submarine that we have that would become operational would do so early in 1979, or late in 1978.
>
> Therefore, at any time over the next five years we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, which we could do nothing to reverse in that five-year period.
>
> *Question:* . . . The idea that the United States got stuck with a submarine deal—
>
> *Dr. Kissinger:* That is an absurdity. It is a total absurdity. It was the United States which insisted that submarines be included.
>
> The United States was in a rather complex position to recommend a submarine deal since *we were not building any and the Soviets were building eight or nine a year, which isn't the most brilliant bargaining position I would recommend people to find themselves in.* (emphasis added)

Upon analysis, Dr. Kissinger is saying in his public statements the substance of the same things that he said more tersely and dramatically in his conversations with Admiral Zumwalt, namely, that the Soviet

Union is superior in military forces, the United States cannot compete successfully, and he has to negotiate the most favorable deal he can get from his "unbrilliant" bargaining position. It is, therefore, highly credible that, in private conversations, he would describe this as his "job."

Further analysis of Kissinger's purportedly reluctant concessions to the Soviets in SALT I demonstrates that both parts of his statements were false and actually served as covers for the actual situation and for the fact that he did *not* try to get the best deal he could, but made preemptive concessions (in James Schlesinger's language).

Henry Kissinger, in his capacities as National Security Adviser to the President, Director of the National Security Council, and Chairman of the NSC Committee on Defense Policy, had imposed a freeze on the development of U.S. strategic forces, holding us down while the Soviets rushed ahead with new programs of "staggering" momentum (as they were later described by Schlesinger). If, at a critical point in SALT negotiations, a relative U.S. weakness sufficient to justify concession to the Soviets had not yet developed, he would create an artificial weakness by lying about it in a sophisticated manner. Take Kissinger's specific statements that "in the ICBM field, we have, as you know, no ongoing program," "in the submarine field ... we also have no programs for missiles which will be operational ... we have now no submarine under construction," and "therefore, at any time over the next five years we were confronting a numerical margin that was growing, and a margin, moreover, which we could do nothing to reverse in that five year period." Each of these statements is false.

The true and specific facts are that we, at the time Kissinger was making those statements, did have

dynamic ongoing programs for the production of new Minuteman III ICBMs and for the production of the equally new Poseidon SLBMs. The new production of ICBMs, which was just reaching full capacity and actual deployment, was to total at least 550 missiles, plus 50 more for spares and tests. The new production of Poseidon missiles, then in full swing, was to total 496 for operational purposes, plus spares and test missiles. Thus, at the time Kissinger made his positive statements that we had no ongoing production programs, we had production lines for new type missiles in actual operation, capable of turning out at a deliberately slow pace, timed to the availability of incremental funds each fiscal year, a total of more than 1,100 ICBMs and SLBMs.

These were all advanced missiles of the fourth generation. Both types had substantially increased throw-weight — the Poseidons had six times the throw-weight of the earliest Polaris missiles. Americans are not permitted to know the increase of Minuteman III throw-weight over Minuteman I and II.

Because we had in actual operation production lines capable of turning out more than 1,000 new missiles a year at a deliberately slow pace, production could easily have been stepped up to between 2,000 and 3,000 by putting the production lines on three shifts. It is no big thing for a nation with our industrial, technological, managerial, and labor resources to add two more production lines.

Thus, in the five-year period Kissinger asserted we could produce *no* new ICBMs (and hypnotized Richard Nixon into telling Congress and the nation that we could not have "produced *any* new weapons during the period of the freeze), we *actually could*

have averted the opening of a missile gap against the United States. Even if the Soviets had continued racing to build additional weapons, we could have averted the gap by adopting two common-sense programs: (1) allocating sufficient additional funds to expand and accelerate the two ongoing U.S. ICBM and SLBM programs, and (2) cancel programs for the destruction of U.S. strategic weapons systems which were then in-being and were good for another 15 to 20 years.

Instead of doing either or both of these things, Kissinger persuaded the President to rely on Soviet "restraint." Their "restraint" consisted of adding more than 1,000 ICBMs and SLBMs while SALT I negotiations were pending. During the second phase of that "restraint," the years immediately after the signing of SALT I, the Soviets quickly introduced four new and vastly more powerful and accurate missiles, with throw-weights up to five times that of the models they replaced.

Kissinger was able to get away with his deviously-structured lies that we had "no ongoing programs" for the production of ICBMs, SLBMs or submarines by resorting to a highly technical prevarication that our production lines were not "producing" but merely "converting." And, as a matter of fact, Kissinger was scrapping one existing ICBM, SLBM, and submarine for each new one deployed.

There was a superficial verisimilitude in regard to the submarines. Each new Poseidon used about 30 percent of the parts of the Polaris that was being scrapped. But these alleged "conversions" took more than 3½ years in the shipyards. Whereas a Polaris had cost an average of $100 million with all new parts and construction, a Poseidon cost $170 million not including the value of the salvaged Polaris parts.

No argument can be made that the 31 Polaris submarines were obsolete enough to justify scrapping them. The "conversion" process began on the older ones before the last eight Polaris were even deployed! The Polaris boats were designed for a hull life of 25 to 30 years and would not need to be retired until the 1985-90 timeframe.

By 1970 Kissinger knew that the Soviet submarine construction momentum would soon open a missile submarine gap against us. If even then he had stopped the then-ongoing scrapping ("conversion") of Polaris boats and built new Poseidons as *additional* submarines, he could have given us a missile-launching submarine force composed of 35 Polaris, 6 Polaris-Poseidons, and 25 all-Poseidons. This would have given us a total of 66 near-invulnerable strategic weapons systems to preserve our strategic deterrent well through the 1980s.

Kissinger cannot blame his failure to do this on lack of Congressional appropriations. The only additional expense would have been for the parts salvaged from the 25 Polaris, and those parts were less sophisticated and less expensive than the rest of the submarine. Construction with new parts is usually less expensive and less time-consuming than salvaging and utilizing used parts. Such small amounts of money could easily have been funded from economies in other appropriations. The Poseidon *missiles* were not "conversions" at all, so their cost would have been the same.

The Kissinger claim that we had no ongoing production for ICBMs is far less plausible than for submarines. Like the Poseidon missiles, the Minuteman IIIs are totally new "birds" and of a type far more advanced and more powerful than the Minuteman Is and IIs.

It is no argument to say that the existing 500 Minuteman I and II had to be scrapped because there would be no launchers for them after they had been removed from their silos to make way for the 550 new Minuteman IIIs. The fact is that the Minuteman IIIs were ready for deployment in 1970 — two years before SALT I imposed a freeze on digging new silos. In order to add 550 missiles to our ICBM force, all we needed were 550 more holes. The digging of holes with modern earth-moving equipment is not very expensive. If we had dug new holes for Minuteman III, it wouldn't have cost us more than $1 million per Minuteman III complete with launch tube and hole, as compared with the $800,000 we paid to "modify" each existing launch tube and fit each Minuteman III into it.

We invested at least $2½ billion in the cost of the 550 Minuteman IIIs. But because we used the same holes, we did not get a single addition to our missile force. For a puny $110 million more, we could have increased our missile force by 50 percent.

Such an addition would be vastly more valuable than adding numbers of warheads to a constant number of missiles. Our purpose is to deter against attack — especially to deny the enemy the capability of knocking out our retaliatory force. If you replace a single-warhead missile with a 5-MIRV warhead, it still requires only one enemy warhead of sufficient yield and accuracy to destroy it. If, instead, you add a missile, you double the number of warheads the enemy must deliver in a disarming attack.

Therefore, at an inconsequential cost, we could have added 550 new Minuteman missiles instead of scrapping-and-replacing Minuteman missiles on a one-to-one basis. This just might make the difference between the Kremlin's giving a "go" order or a "no go" order.

What did Henry Kissinger gain by picturing to the President, the Congress, and the American people a massive and widening missile gap favoring the Russians, and by falsely asserting that we could do nothing to close the gap — even within five years? It accomplished his purpose of selling the nation a grotesquely imbalanced agreement shot through with 14 major loopholes made to order for the Soviets' planned buildup of strategic forces. Here is how Senator Henry M. Jackson explained what was put over on us in the SALT I pacts:

> The stark facts are these: The United States — a country with a 2-to-1 economic *superiority* over the U.S.S.R., a country with innovative and technological superiority over the U.S.S.R. — has accepted agreements which guarantee the United States a 3-to-2 *inferiority* in crucial categories of strategic offensive systems.
>
> All Americans ... desire the increased security that flows from a potential aggressor's knowledge that he simply can't execute a disarming strike against our deterrent forces.
>
> Unfortunately, I see nothing in the present agreements that lessens the threat to the security of these deterrent forces. On the contrary, far from placing us in a position of stable deterrence, the agreement permits the Soviet Union to continue its offensive buildup in a way and on a scale that could prove highly dangerous.
>
> Simply put, the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything: more light ICBMs, more heavy ICBMs, more submarine-launched missiles, more submarines, more payload, even more ABM radars.
>
> *In no area covered by the agreement is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union.*
>
> The "understandings" attached to the SALT Agreements ... raise as many questions as they answer. ... I am disturbed, first that the understandings fail to identify the permitted number of Soviet

missiles. Soviet refusal to state clearly the number they feel obligated to respect raises the most fundamental doubts about whether they have negotiated in good faith.

Let me state the numbers that the Moscow Agreement omits. The Soviets are granted numerical superiority in every area: land based missiles (1,618 to 1,054), modern submarines (up to 62 for them and 44 for us), missile-delivery capability (4 to 5 times as much for them).

Second, the Soviets have refused to agree to a definition of the all-important term "heavy missile."

The Administration has had to resort to a weak and unilateral assertion as to what we understand a "heavy missile" to be, while the Soviets have chosen even to withhold comment on our definition.

> The failure to resolve disagreement on this term raises doubt about the central claim that is being made for the agreement: that it will prevent the Soviets from deploying more SS-9 type missiles.[19]

Every single prediction Senator Jackson made about SALT I came true, doubled in nuclear spades.

The point so uncomfortably relevant here is that Henry Kissinger, of course, also knew about all the Jackson-specified disadvantages for the United States in the SALT I pacts, but nevertheless lied in order to persuade the nation to accept them. He repeatedly assured Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the American people that the SALT I "agreement" contains adequate "safeguards" against the Soviets' converting their "light" missiles into "heavy" missiles. The book *Kissinger on the Couch*, which came off the press in January 1975, was the first to expose and document the falsity of Kissinger's assurances on heavy missiles. In the original promotional literature on the book, the authors proposed offering a reward of $50,000 to anyone who could prove that the "safeguards" were in the SALT Agreement that Kissinger claimed were there. Unfortunately, it turned

out to be impractical to make such an offer. But the book documented Kissinger's lie so convincingly that, about six months later, the *New York Times* and liberal magazines "discovered" Kissinger's duplicity and began carrying articles on this very point. The *New Republic* of June 7, 1975, for example, published an article by Tad Szulc entitled "Have We Been Had? Soviet Violations of the SALT Deal." A careful reading of the article demonstrates that, although the United States has indeed been had, we were deceived principally by Henry Kissinger. Here are a few relevant paragraphs:

> Of the 1409 land-based ICBM launchers allowed the Russians, 313 were in the heavy SS-9 class (some of these were under construction and the United States tacitly recognized that a certain number would be upgraded to what now is the super-heavy SS-18 missile) and 1096 in the "light" class of the SS-11 missile.
>
> The American expectation was that none of these 1096 light missiles would be converted into heavy ones. In 1972 the light SS-11 missile had the volume of 69 cubic meters. The secret record of the negotiations shows that the Americans told the Russians that they would consider as "significantly greater" — and, therefore, as a "heavy" weapon — any missile exceeding 70 cubic meters. Briefing members of Congress at the White House on June 15, 1972, Kissinger put it this way: "The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are, however, a number of safeguards. First there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted. Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement or the interpretive statement which we made, which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent. We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate

safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue. . . . As far as the break between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, we believe that we have assurances through the two safeguards."

What Kissinger was saying, however, was misleading. In the first place the United States never received Soviet assurances that the American unilateral interpretation was acceptable. Kissinger simply omitted this vital fact in briefing the congressmen. He brushed aside the fact that Moscow had shied away from defining heavy missiles and claimed that the United States had "adequate safeguards" though none really existed.

Subsequent events proved him wrong. According to United States intelligence the Soviets have all along been converting the SS-11 missile into the SS-19, which has a volume of close to 100 cubic meters. The quantum jump from the 69 cubic meters of the SS-11 to the 100 cubic meters of the SS-19 is indeed "significantly greater." Kissinger was likewise wrong in assuming that the agreement in "agreed interpretations" on limiting the increase of silo configurations for launchers to 10 or 15 percent would prevent the installation of the new heavy missiles in the old holes.

In this area Kissinger was defeated by new Soviet technology. Thus the Russians have developed the so-called "cold-launch" technique in which compressed air is used to "pop up" (elevate) the missile in the silo before its engines are ignited. In this fashion a SS-19 can be fitted into a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo.

The United States has privately protested against the SS-19 conversion. At this juncture, however, the Russians are deploying hundreds of SS-19s and testing them with MIRV warheads. Quite aside from strategic implications of this development, this episode serves to demonstrate how useless was Kissinger's recourse to unilateral statements in SALT diplomacy.

Those excerpts from a liberal publication should make clear the depths of deception to which Kissinger would stoop to seduce his countrymen into a potentially suicidal arms agreement with the Kremlin.

Such conduct by Henry Kissinger in connection with SALT I bears on the question about Vladivostok: was he an ambusher or an ambushee? Was he on the side of Gerald Ford, or on the side of Brezhnev, Dobrynin, and Gromyko?

It cannot be contended seriously that such a renowned "expert" in negotiations as Dr. Kissinger would not recognize such an obvious ambush as that plotted against the President of the United States at Vladivostok on November 23, 1974. Kissinger has a specialty in intra-Administration infighting to build personal power and vent personal spleen. He has successfully ambushed and shot down the careers of (1) one Secretary of State (William Rogers; Kissinger wanted the job); (2) two Secretaries of Defense (Melvin Laird, who attempted to warn the President of the Soviet intention to build a first-strike capability against the United States; and James Schlesinger, who attempted to warn the nation that detente is a swindle); (3) two directors of the CIA (Richard Helms, who showed too much independence from Kissinger control; and William Colby: a CIA scapegoat was needed); (4) one Ambassador who was also Head of the U.S. SALT Delegation and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Gerard C. Smith, who dared to insist on the inclusion in the SALT I "Noteworthy Unilateral Statements" the official warning that U.S. "supreme interests" would be jeopardized if a SALT II agreement plugging the major loopholes of SALT I were not achieved within five years); (5) one director of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (Dixy Lee Ray, who showed too much independence from

Kissinger control); and (6) one U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who revealed the truth about Communist control over "liberated" African dictatorships and tried to refute their propaganda against the United States). That is quite a roll call of official scalps collected by Kissinger!

Kissinger's masterpiece of ambuscade was his personal capture of Richard Nixon. This involved probably the most elaborate and dramatic stage-setting ever accomplished in history. By a dictatorial control of the entire U.S. intelligence community, Kissinger created an entirely artificial environment for Nixon in strategic and military matters. Kissinger fashioned a "world" in which the United States could be saved and nuclear peace preserved *only* by Nixon's signing the SALT I pacts at the Moscow Summit of May 1972.[20]

By analysis of the character and capabilities and past history of the Soviet participants in the Vladivostok Summit, it is clear that they "would if they could, and could if they would" set up an ambush for an inexperienced President of the United States. Tragically for our nation, it appears that the same applies to Henry Kissinger. By his repeated assurances — and they have been proved to have been false assurances — that the SALT I pacts contained adequate safeguards to protect our national security, he persuaded the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Congress, the media, and the nation to support the SALT I agreements.

The best evidence that he similarly deceived Gerald Ford into accepting the SALT II guidelines at Vladivostok can be developed only by an analysis of what that agreement will do to the United States.

chapter **VI**

THE TIME-TRICK: ILLUSORY EQUALITY

Anything that can be bought, the United States can buy more of — by a factor of 2½ — than the Soviets. So how could they have attained strategic superiority over us? Why don't we just *buy* our way back to superiority? We have the technology, the industrial plant, the managerial techniques, and the highly-skilled labor force. We even have (if we can stop Kissinger from destroying Rhodesia and South Africa) access to the exotic raw materials required for the high-technology items of strategic power. For the time being at least, we still have energy available; the Soviets are still permitting us to import oil from the Middle East.

However we don't have the essential ingredient — time — and we can't buy it. Howard Hughes had billions of dollars and vast power; but he ran out of time and, with all his billions, could not buy another year. Likewise with oil billionaire J. Paul Getty. With even the greatest nations, the problem is the same.

Our survival would not be critical now except that for the last 15 years the Soviets have been playing a satanically brilliant game with us: the stakes have been "lead time" for the development of strategic weapons systems. To cheat our eyeballs out in this game, the Soviets needed the help of our defense policymakers. They have had it — ever since Robert

Strange McNamara took office in 1961 with Paul H. Nitze, Roswell Gilpatric, and Cyrus Vance to help him. McNamara passed eight years of lead time to the Soviets under the table. Then Henry Kissinger seized the torch and handed them an additional eight years.

Our prophets-of-self-fulfilling-doom policymakers needed a convincing cover for what they were doing to the United States, namely, bringing us down from an overwhelming (8-to-1) strategic superiority to a present inferiority by the same factor. In 1962 we could have *delivered* at least 40,000 megatons of explosive power on Soviet targets. Now the most we could *hope* to deliver is less than 2,000 megatons. In 1962 we had a credible first-strike disarming capability against the Soviets, with a dominant reserve. Now that picture is also reversed.

SALT was the name of the game they played. The continued pendency of SALT negotiations provided McNamara and Kissinger with the rationalization for delaying our strategic weapons programs. Even before they came to be known as SALT negotiations, McNamara used them to block deployment of an ABM defense for our people as well as our weapons against Soviet nuclear missiles. The SALT I negotiations were pending from 1969 through mid-1972. The SALT II negotiations have been pending ever since. SALT III negotiations are already scheduled to follow the final signing of SALT II.

During the SALT I pendency, the Soviets added more than 1,000 missile launchers to their force. We didn't add a single launcher; we were waiting for the outcome of the negotiations. So also as to SALT II pendency. The Soviets are deploying four new and more powerful missile systems; they are increasing their throw-weight superiority by a solid 100 percent.

At the time of SALT I, they had a 4-to-1 lead; now they will have an 8-to-1 advantage. Each year the annual report of the Secretary of Defense explains that all new programs for strategic weapons developments are being held in the pre-engineering development stage pending the outcome of the SALT negotiations. In 1976, exactly this same explanation is given about development of strategic cruise missiles.

The overall result is that the Soviets have attained a 10-year lead over us in the most vital strategic systems. This will soon give them a dominant first-strike disarming capability against us. When that happens, we will have run out of time and they will have won the game. Suppose this happens in 1978. At that time we may have under construction, but still several years away from completion and deployment, perhaps four Trident submarines and 20 B-1 strategic bombers. The Soviets can preempt. They can notify us, "Cease production on those terrible weapons; we will preserve the peace of the world by a nuclear strike to destroy them if you continue." The United States would have to bow to this threat because the Soviets would then have the capability of delivering a disarming strike against our land-based ICBMs. After destroying ours, they would have a reserve of some 1,200 ICBMs remaining. The Soviets *already* have operational their versions of the Trident submarine and the B-1.

The Soviet Delta-class missile-launching submarine has missiles with an even greater range than our Trident will have in the 1980s. The Deltas have stellar-assisted inertial guidance — an advanced feature we have not yet reached on any deployed U.S. submarine missile. The Soviets will have 28 Deltas operational by the end of 1978, plus 34 Yankee class which are the equivalent of our Polaris. So they will

have a total of 62 to our 42 missile submarines in that year.

In 1976 the Soviets have operational 41 nuclear-propelled cruise missile submarines, and another 20 cruise missile submarines with conventional propulsion — to our zero. The Soviets have 100 of their Backfire strategic bombers operational now, and have just increased their production facilities. They should have more than 200 deployed by 1978. Although their Backfire is ⅕ smaller than our B-1, the Backfire will fly about 400 miles an hour faster — and is flying now. Our B-1 will not reach full production until 1982, according to the JCS Chairman's estimate.

It's the same way across the spectrum of strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviets have 313 very heavy missile launchers which can take either the single-warheaded SS-18 of 50 megatons, or the MIRVed version with eight 3-megaton warheads. They are in deployment *now*. By the terms of the Vladivostok agreement, the United States will never (within 10 years of the agreement) be permitted to have *any* of these. The Soviets have in deployment the medium-heavy SS-19 ICBM with six MIRVed warheads of two to three megatons each — and they could have up to 1,200 of these. These have been in deployment for two years, so the Soviets have them *now*. On the other hand, other than the 16-year-old Titan IIs of which we have only 54, our heaviest missile is the Minuteman III with only three MIRV warheads of 170 kilotons each. We have no missiles with MIRVs in the megaton range and no ICBMs which carry more than three warheads. If we ever get any, they will not be fully operational until the mid-1980s.

If General Robert E. Lee had had a few World War II battle tanks for his Confederate Army, he

could have won the Civil War. That is, of course, if he had had them operational by 1864; if they could not have been delivered to his army until 1870, they would have made no difference whatsoever.

Time is the fourth dimension of strategy. It was Gerald Ford's ignorance of the critical function of time, plus Kissinger's failure to enlighten him, which led to Ford's being suckered in on Vladivostok's purported "equality." Apparently, Brezhnev, Dobrynin, Gromyko, and Kissinger all stressed "equality" to him as a guarantee that the agreement was fair to the United States. In his news conference on December 2, 1974, Ford kept repeating that "it is a good agreement" and "I think that the American people will buy it, because it *provides for equality*."

We have already seen that, on one aspect of the purported "equality" ("on MIRVing we are equal"), Ford simply did not understand what he had agreed to. The Vladivostok agreement did *not* grant equality in MIRVing. The only "equality" was in the number of missiles on which MIRV warheads could be mounted. This alleged "equality" is illusory because a missile's throw-weight controls its number of MIRV warheads, as well as their delivery capability in explosive power. Because of the missiles the Soviets have in being and operational *now*, they can, within the "equality" provisions of Vladivostok, out-MIRV us 10-to-1.

Here is Gerald Ford's convoluted misunderstanding of the throw-weight issue:

> It is recognized that the Soviet Union has a heavier throw-weight, but the agreement does not preclude the United States from increasing its throw-weight capability. ... Now if the military decides at the *present time* that they want *to increase the throw-weight, we have that right under the agreement — and I can tell you that we have the capability to do so.*

So *if there is an inequality in throw-weight, it can be remedied* if our military recommends it and the Congress appropriates the money.

This statement by President Ford, made in his official news conference persuading the American people to accept the Vladivostok documents, amounts to a grievous deception and an illusory promise. He assures us that "we have the capability" to remedy the "inequality in throw-weight" — "*if*" there is any.

But *when*, Mr. President, *when*? And just what do you mean, "if" there is any? Unless Dr. Kissinger has you totally hypnotized, you must have known that, at the time of the signing of the SALT I pacts in May 1972, the Soviets held an advantage over us in throw-weight of at least 4-to-1, and more probably 5-to-1. Kissinger himself admitted the 4-to-1 Soviet margin in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The only ongoing program the United States had then was for production of Minuteman III missiles with a throw-weight of 1,500-2,000 pounds each. The Soviet ICBM force then had a total throw-weight officially estimated at 8,000,000 pounds (probably it was more than 10,000,000 pounds). So we would have had to build an additional 4,000 Minuteman missiles, *plus* launchers, plus communications and control, to equal the Soviets. If we had attempted to "remedy the inequality" by building heavier missiles, the research, development, testing, production, and deployment would have required eight years. In 1974 when Ford made his illusory promise, we had no missile heavier than a Minuteman III even in the concept stage. The much-touted M-X missile, which (if we ever get it) will be our heaviest missile, is still only in research, and could not be fully deployed

until 1985. Even then the M-X will carry only a fraction of the Soviet SS-19's throw-weight, and a still smaller fraction of the throw-weight of the SS-18.

So Mr. Ford's promise was totally illusory, just as the Vladivostok Agreement's promise of "equality" is totally illusory. Mr. Ford added even one more touch of false hope to the American voters. It would take us eight years to overtake the Soviet 1974 throw-weight lead *if the Soviets stood still* and did not add to their present throw-weight. Would the Soviets stand still? Gerald Ford gave us his assurance in his December 2 news conference:

> The agreement gives us the flexibility to move up in throw-weight if we want to.
>
> It does not preclude the Soviets from increasing throw-weight, but for, I think good reason, *they have no justification for doing so.* (emphasis added)

Certainly a reasonable and clear inference is that our Commander-in-Chief was giving us his considered judgment that the Soviets would not increase their throw-weight even though the Vladivostok agreement permits it. He even said that he had "good reason" for his confident belief.

At the very moment Ford was giving that assurance, the Soviets were engaging in the most massive throw-weight increase program in history. The size and momentum of the actual deployment of new ICBMs were so great as to be almost incredible. Soon the Defense Secretary and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering would be reaching for adjectives to describe the Soviet program, and the consensus was that it was at least "staggering."

It is difficult to write off as just a bad guess Mr. Ford's confident assurance that, in the period after December 1974, the Soviets would not increase their throw-weight. In the first place, responsible and

competent Presidents do not guess concerning a threat to national survival. In the second place, he and the nation had been explicitly warned nine months earlier, in the official report of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, delivered to Congress on March 4, 1974, that the new Soviet SS-19, which was replacing the older SS-11, had "five times the throw-weight of the earlier model." Here is his statement:

> In summary, the new Soviet ICBM program represents a truly massive effort — four new missiles, new bus-type dispensing systems, new MIRVed payloads, new guidance, new-type silos, new launch techniques, and probably new warheads. If all three of the new and heavier missiles are deployed, throw-weight in the Soviet ICBM force will increase from the current 6-7 million pounds to an impressive 10-12 million pounds. This throw-weight, combined with increased accuracy and MIRVs, could give the Soviets on the order of 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads in their ICBM force alone.
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> This very impressive program appears to have three main objectives — (1) expanded target coverage (particularly countermilitary) with MIRVs, (2) improved pre-launch survivability with the new hard silo designs, and (3) the attainment of a significant hard target kill capability. Given the warhead yield and CEP currently estimated for the MIRVed version of the SS-X-18, and looking at the fixed land-based portion of our strategic TRIAD in isolation from other elements, a force of about 300 of these missiles (permitted under the Interim Agreement) could pose a serious threat to our ICBMs in their silos, even after those silos are upgraded.

Unfortunately, Mr. Schlesinger understated rather than overstated the results of the Soviet throw-weight program. Elsewhere in the official reports, in addition to the confirmation that the replacement of SS-11s with SS-19s would increase the throw-weight of each one by a factor of five, it is admitted that the

"average" increase would be by a factor of three. Thus instead of a new total ICBM force throw-weight of "10-12 million pounds," the realistic figure would be 24 million pounds. Where Schlesinger said that a force of 300 MIRVed SS-18s "could pose a serious threat to our ICBMs," what he really means is that the Soviets could destroy some 95 percent of our ICBMs.

One final inaccuracy should be noted in Ford's assurance that the Vladivostok Agreement permits us to "remedy" any "inequality" in throw-weight. In reality, it prevents us from having any "very heavy" missiles, such as the SS-18, of which the Soviets are permitted to have 313. That would give them a throw-weight on those alone of between 4,695,000 pounds to 5,634,000 pounds. The SALT I restrictions on increase in silo dimensions prevent us from approaching the throw-weight of the SS-18s.

Is throw-weight all that important? Its most practical meaning is that it is a measure of what a missile can do — that is, what its warheads can destroy. The Vladivostok Agreement purportedly limits the number of strategic "delivery vehicles." Throw-weight is what a delivery vehicle can deliver. In the case of a missile (ICBM or SLBM) with a single warhead, the weight of that single warhead is the missile's throw-weight. If the missile has multiple warheads (MIRVs or MRVs), the missile's throw-weight is the weight of the post-boost vehicle which dispenses the individual warheads toward their separate targets, plus the weight of the fuel required by the post-boost vehicle or "bus," plus the weight of the warheads themselves. Thus, most strategic analysts agree with Paul Nitze's statement that "throw-weight is the most useful verifiable measure of relative missile capability, either MIRVed or unMIRVed."

The most massive loophole of the Vladivostok Agreement is that it purports to limit the number of "delivery vehicles" to 2,400 for each side, but makes no pretense of limiting the carrying capacity of either individual vehicles or the total force. This reduces the "arms limitation" accomplishment of the Agreement to a grotesque, macabre joke. It's like "equality" between two transcontinental freight-moving firms by allowing each 2,400 "delivery vehicles," when it just happens that one has in-being and operational 2,400 50-ton tractor-trailers, and the other has nothing larger than a half-ton pickup truck and no capability of buying anything bigger for five to eight years.

Just as the throw-weight of an individual missile is the measure of what it can do, the total throw-weight of a missile force is the measure of what the entire force can accomplish. If your missiles have sufficient throw-weight, such as the Soviet SS-18 (officially estimated at 15,000 pounds, but probably at least 18,000 pounds), you have the option of having it deliver a single 50-megaton warhead (the equivalent of 50 million *tons* of conventional explosive power), *or* deliver to separate targets eight MIRV warheads of 3+ megatons each. The throw-weight of our Minuteman missiles is classified, but it is probably no more than 1,500 to 2,000 pounds. In any event, Minuteman III, our latest and most powerful model, carries three MIRV warheads of 170 kilotons each (a kiloton is 1/1,000 of a megaton).

What does all this mean in terms of the life or death of a nation? The most dramatic answer computed on the basis of throw-weight was presented by Paul Nitze in January, 1976, in *Foreign Affairs*, the prestigious quarterly of the Council on Foreign Relations. Nitze is a former Secretary of the Navy, a

former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and was a senior member of the U.S. SALT Delegation from 1969-74. The special importance of the Nitze article is that it was prepared with the assistance of Mr. T. K. Jones, a senior technical adviser on the U.S. SALT Delegation, and has been cited with approval by a number of strategic analysts of national reputation, both in and out of government. These experts include Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering. It has also become the most widely known assessment of what the Soviets can do to us with superiority in missile throw-weight because of reprinting of excerpts in periodicals so diverse as *National Review* and *Newsweek*. The Nitze conclusions are closely paralleled by official computerized studies presented by James Schlesinger and his staff to Congressional committees, before he became a casualty of Gerald Ford's "Weekend Wipeout" of November 3, 1975. Here is the Paul Nitze macabre mini-scenario:

> By 1977, after a Soviet-initiated counterforce strike against the United States to which the United States had responded with a counterforce strike, the Soviet Union would have remaining forces, sufficient to destroy Chinese and European NATO nuclear capability, *attack U.S. population* and conventional military targets, and still have a remaining force throw-weight in excess of that of the United States. And *after 1977 the Soviet advantage after the assumed attack mounts rapidly*. . . .
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> In sum, the trends in military strength are such that, unless we move promptly to reverse them, the United States is moving toward a posture of minimum deterrence in which *we would be conceding to the Soviet Union the potential for a military and political victory if deterrence failed.*[21] (emphasis added)

The Nitze mini-scenario is based on computations that, under the Vladivostok Agreement, the Soviets could reach a total ICBM throw-weight of 11.6 million pounds, within the permitted 1,320 MIRVed missile launchers. This is with the types of ICBMs they are currently deploying — and they are known to have 10 additional ICBM types under development. These could multiply the projected 11.6 million pounds of throw-weight without violating the Vladivostok Agreement. The present SS-19 type, for example, enabled the Soviets to multiply the throw-weight of their old SS-11 by a factor of four. In its present form, it is a hot-launched missile. A cold-launch (pop-up) version could greatly increase the original four-fold multiplication. The Nitze scenario assumes that the Soviets employ about four million pounds of throw-weight in their disarming strike at U.S. retaliatory missiles, leaving in reserve a force of missiles with a throw-weight of about eight million pounds.

There are other critically important "time" factors which render illusory the Vladivostok "equality" provisions. It permits us to have, if we decide we want them, an equal number of missile-carrying submarines. But Soviet shipyards have the capacity to produce 12 a year, whereas we have a zero capacity until 1979, since our Poseidon "conversion" program is terminated, and then it will be one a year for two years, and then three every two years.

So also as to strategic bombers. The Soviets have been in production of the Backfire since 1972. We will not be in full production of B-1s until 1982. So also as to strategic defensive forces. The Vladivostok Agreement imposes no limit on air defenses for either side; but the Soviets have operational 12,000 SAM launchers, with reloads. We have zero.

chapter VII

THE PEACETIME INVENTORY TRAP

It is the consensus of strategic military analysts that the Vladivostok Agreement is dangerous to the survival of the United States. To keep domestic politics out of it, here are several excerpts from a major article by Dr. Colin S. Gray, Associate Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He was also Ford Fellow, Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, and consultant to the RAND Corporation and the Hudson Institute. Entitled "SALT and the American Mood," Dr. Gray's article appeared in the Summer 1975 issue of *Strategic Review:*

> Any obvious failure of SALT would mean a very sharp setback for detente — and it is upon a forward movement in detente that Kissinger, and now Ford, have gambled their places in history. In negotiations of any variety, agreement is never difficult to effect; all that one side must do is to meet the desiderata of the other side. . . . The Vladivostok accords are explicable in terms of the determination of Ford and Kissinger to attain an agreement.

> The most revealing, as well as the most damaging explanation of the details of Vladivostok was to the effect that they comprised the "best figures" on which the United States could obtain Russian agreement. This explanation is as shocking as it is platitudinous (naturally one presumes that the United States negotiators have done their best). . . .

Crudely stated, the Soviet Union has too many ballistic missiles of too great a throw weight, and she will be able to upgrade the performance of those missiles so that her range of strategic options will be far more impressive than will be that of the United States — possibly, though not inevitably, for a limited period only. ...

Also, despite the rising curve of Soviet missile deployment from the mid-1960s until the present day, succeeding Administrations decided to stand by the decision of November 5, 1964 that the Minuteman force would be limited to a deployment of 1,000. Model changes there have been ... but the military effectiveness of American MIRVs is severely constrained by the low yields (170 kilotons for Minuteman III, 40 kilotons for Poseidon C-3) necessitated by the low throw-weight permitted by relatively small missiles, and by former Congressional insistence that hard-target counterforce capability be restrained by the self-denial of the option of fitting ballistic missiles with stellar navigation aids for mid-course correction. ...

SALT I ... legitimized the course of action of maximum strategic advantage to the Soviet Union. American critics claimed that SALT I guaranteed the medium term vulnerability of the entire Minuteman-Titan ICBM force — once the Soviet Union married reasonably accurate MIRVs to their large payload missiles, and that it would be next to impossible to induce the Soviets to forego in SALT II, the asymmetrical political and strategic promise that was inherent in this emerging posture. Such has proved to be the case.

In defending the Vladivostok accords, Henry Kissinger has attributed the effecting of a "breakthrough" to the fact that the United States shifted from a "complex" to a "simple" agreement. What was meant was that the United States ceased to demand compensation for the high payload of Soviet missiles. ... The Moscow-Vladivostok "breakthrough" cut through the complexities of missile payload and MIRV numbers by ignoring them. ...

Vladivostok would seem to guarantee the medium term vulnerability of the United States' ICBM force. ... Kissinger has succeeded in uniting his critics. Vladivostok both encourages the qualitative weapons race and is quite unresponsive to the vulnerability problems — and hence the potential coercion problems — of United States ICBM silos.

If you are familiar with the highly stylized understatement used by strategic analysts, especially British ones, you would know that the above statement is a devastating critique of the Vladivostok agreements and of whoever is responsible for them. Most U.S. experts have reached the same conclusions. In the fall of 1975, Henry S. Rowen, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and President of the RAND Corporation, testified before a subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations on the implications of the SALT process between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.:

> The first question is whether or not the agreement outlined at Vladivostok meets the national security interests of the United States. ... In the six months since the summit, the text of the agreement has not been made public. However, based upon public information, *I believe the agreement does not meet the national security interests of the United States.* ...
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> In my view, the U.S. approach to SALT suffers from a number of serious defects:
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> * It has been based upon a strategic concept which is wrong and which has been rejected by the Administration in other important policy contexts;
>
> * It is premised on the faulty notion that we have been engaged in an 'uncontrolled arms race';
>
> * It is internally inconsistent on matters of great importance;
>
> * It is based on premises which are clearly not shared by the Soviet Union;

* It argues unpersuasively that without SALT I things would have been even worse;

* It makes dubious claims that equality has been provided for;

* It assumes that the practice of summitry and 'back channel' diplomacy is the appropriate way to useful agreements.

Perhaps the most fundamental defect in the U.S. approach to SALT is the mutual assured destruction doctrine, the doctrine that holds that any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably result in civil destruction on a genocidal scale. This is a doctrine which holds that the appropriate criterion for developing and procuring a nuclear force is its use against civil populations. . . .

SALT virtually eliminated the principal means of providing protection to . . . fixed land based forces, the ABM. The growing vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles . . . was significantly worsened by SALT I. *In that case, saving the agreement was thought to be more important than saving the force.* . . .

Much has been made by our principal SALT negotiator . . . of the weakness of the U.S. bargaining position. Only in the field of ABM technology did we have a clear advantage, and it is no accident that the two sides arrived at the most far-reaching agreement in this area.

The only way significant increases in R&D for new strategic programs could have been obtained would have been for the President to have engaged in a major effort to explain the importance of such programs to the Congress and the public. . . . But the Administration was boxed in by its stopping-the-arms-race rhetoric and by the effort to promote detente.

Inconsistencies have abounded. SALT, when criticized, is defended in the terms of the blessings of detente; detente, when viewed skeptically, is supposedly saved by the accomplishments of SALT.

Mr. Rowen also has the best short answers to two of Kissinger's flip quips made in "backgrounders":

"throw-weight is a phony issue," and "you don't get hit with launchers — you get hit with warheads." Here are Mr. Rowen's replies:

> The argument is sometimes made that the throw-weight issue is "phony." This amounts to saying that all warheads are the same, big or little, and that the number of them doesn't matter either — at least in the range of the numbers implied by Vladivostok. For if warheads were different, then the side with more or better ones would have an advantage. The notion that all warheads are the same is difficult to square with the fact that there is nearly a factor of 1,000 between the yield of the smallest warhead in the U.S. strategic force and the largest one in the Soviet force. . . .
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> Warhead size also makes a difference in capacity to destroy hard silos. The probability of destroying a hard silo varies as the two-thirds power of the weapon yield; a factor of 1,000 difference in yield for a given accuracy means a factor of 100 difference in hard target destruction capacity. . . .
>
> American spokesmen have been known to remark that you don't get hit with launchers, you get hit with warheads. This American argument has also been picked up by Chairman Brezhnev.
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> But disparities in throw-weight imply disparities in warheads, an index of power of great importance according to both American and Soviet authorities. We can add this item to our list of SALT inconsistencies.[22]

Another sample of influential expert opinion on the potential SALT II Agreement under the Vladivostok accords is presented by Paul Nitze in his January 1976 article in *Foreign Affairs:*

> There is every prospect that under the terms of the SALT agreements the Soviet Union will continue to pursue a nuclear superiority that is not merely quantitive but designed to produce a theoretical war-winning capability. Further, there is a major risk that, if such a condition were achieved, the Soviet Union would adjust its policies and actions in ways that would undermine the present detente

situation, with results, that could only resurrect the danger of nuclear confrontation or, alternatively, increase the prospect of Soviet expansion through other means of pressure. . . .

The practical fact we now face is that a SALT II treaty based on the Vladivostok Accord would *not* provide a sound foundation for follow-on negotiations under present trends. If, and only if, the United States now takes action to redress the impending strategic imbalance, can the Soviet Union be persuaded to abandon its quest for superiority and to resume the path of meaningful limitations and reductions through negotiation.

Why are so many experts so critical of Vladivostok? The most massive and potentially fatal trap included in the Vladivostok guidelines is that they deal exclusively with what is known as "peacetime inventory" figures. Each side is allowed 2,400 "strategic delivery vehicles," and no more than 1,320 of these may be equipped with MIRV warheads. But peacetime inventories are subject to apocalyptic change in the first 45 minutes of a nuclear war. There simply cannot be an "equality" or "essential equivalence" between two strategic forces based on peacetime inventory when one force has a decisively greater first-strike disarming capability against hard targets.

Because of their vastly greater throw-weight, the Soviets need to MIRV only 313 of their SS-18 ICBMs, and that gives them 2,504 individually-targetable, highly-accurate warheads of at least three megatons each. With these, they can, with high confidence, destroy 1,000 of our 1,054 ICBMs, 330 of our claimed 500 strategic bombers (only 170 would be on alert, and two Soviet warheads dropped on each of 10 air bases would do it), and, say, 10 of our Polaris-Poseidon submarines in port or ship repair yards. Because each submarine has 16 launching tubes, that would dispose of 160 "delivery vehicles."

Our peacetime inventory of 2,210 delivery vehicles would have thus become a wartime inventory of 720. (Our peacetime inventory figure of 2,210 is not up to the Vladivostok limit of 2,400, which was set to accommodate the Soviets.) The Soviets have 2,358 delivery vehicles in their peacetime inventory, and, having expended 313 SS-18 ICBMs to kill 1,490 of our delivery vehicles, would have remaining in their wartime inventory 2,045 — to our surviving 720.

Our situation would actually be much worse than those figures indicate. Our 170 surviving bombers would have to penetrate through the deepest, most dense air defense in history: 12,000 SAM launchers and nearly 3,000 interceptor fighter aircraft, some capable of speeds of 1,600 miles per hour greater than our 24-year-old B-52s. And our remaining strategic delivery vehicles would be mostly Poseidon missiles, with either ten 40-kiloton MIRV warheads or fourteen 17-kiloton warheads. Operational tests have demonstrated that these over-MIRVed missiles are less than 50 percent reliable. With such small yields of explosive power, they are of no practical effect against hard targets (with the accuracies available in the next seven years), and they are no substantial threat to people in a nation which has an intensive civil defense program.

To illustrate how the Vladivostok terms fatally disadvantage the United States, consider this projected scenario for 1980 developed by two expert strategic analysts, William Schneider, Jr. and Francis P. Hoeber:

"What in the name of God is superiority? What do you do with it? How do you use it?" The Secretary of State asked these questions rhetorically. Soviet doctrine and the new Soviet capabilities suggest an answer.

Suppose that, as is probable by 1980 or so, the

Soviets have from three to four times as many warheads in their ICBM force as we do in ours — 6,000 to 9,000 as against our 2,154. Suppose also that they have SLBM forces substantially equal to ours. ... And finally, assume we still have 400 B-52s (the B-1 is not yet deployed), and the Soviets have 140 heavy bombers, plus in exigency 1,000 medium bombers.

Now suppose that the Soviets use 2,100 ICBM warheads against our 1,054 fixed ICBM targets. They could use all of their 300-plus SS-18s, with eight warheads apiece (allowing for reliability, or some aborts), and, if needed, some SS-19s with six MIRVs. On reasonable assumptions, not more than 105 of our ICBMs, with 155 to 160 warheads, would survive this Soviet preemptive strike. ... With a few extra warheads, the Soviets would also have killed perhaps 250 of our SLBMs on, say, 15 U.S. submarines caught in port, and they might use a few of their SLBMs, with or without MIRVs, to attack our air bases and eliminate our nonalert bombers.

The standard answer to this scenario is that the United States would still have over 100 ICBMs, 400 or so SLBMs, and from 100 to 300 bombers surviving — more than enough for assured destruction of Soviet urban population and industry, and thus supposedly more than enough to deter the Soviets. But the USSR would have its own submarine forces virtually intact, its bomber forces intact, and 1,000 to 1,300 ICBMs remaining (a minimum of 3,600 warheads, on the most conservative of assumptions). Might we not be deterred from using our deterrent?

Moreover, the Soviet deterrence posture would probably be bolstered by the claim that they had evacuated their cities and could limit fatalities to six to eight per cent of their urban population (a figure they have already published). This is ten to 15 million people, or perhaps half to two thirds of Soviet losses in World War II. The U.S. losses in "city exchange" would be several times this figure. The "balance of terror" would be tilted decisively in Moscow's favor. We would be unable to resist coercion by the wounds already inflicted (and civilians

would be suffering fall-out effects), and the further wounds the Soviets could threaten or inflict.[23]

If you want to believe that that 1980 scenario is too pessimistic, forget it. Actually, it understates the margin of Soviet superiority and understates our vulnerability. In the first place, the Soviets will have substantially that capability any time after 1977. The assumption that both sides will have "substantially equal" SLBM forces is unrealistic. Thanks to Kissinger's concessions in the SALT-I Interim Agreement, they will have 62 submarines to our 42. Only one of ours will be a Trident, whereas 28 of theirs will be Deltas or extended-Deltas. They will have 950 SLBMs to our 700, and almost half of theirs will have double the range of ours (except for our single Trident), as well as guidance superior to ours; their SSN-8s have onboard computers with stellar-assistance for inflight corrections on their inertial navigation system; ours do not (with the exception of our one modern boat). The scenario authors do not include in Soviet strategic forces their new Backfire bombers, but they have 100 now operational and by then will have 250-275 that fly at mach 2.2+ (compared to mach 0.8 for our old B-52s).

The scenario authors assume that from 100 to 300 of our bombers will survive. Actually, we have no airborne alert for bombers, and only ⅓ are on any alert status at all. We would be lucky if 100 did survive. The survivors would be up against a Soviet air defense of 12,000 SAM launchers (with reloads) and nearly 3,000 interceptor-fighters — compared to our zero SAMS and fewer than 300 interceptors.

The scenario authors estimate that, in a "city exchange," U.S. population losses would be "several times" Soviet losses. Actually, our losses would be far closer to ten times theirs. Some of their warheads

are 1,000 times more powerful than some of ours. Expressed in terms of tons of conventional explosive power equivalent, the differential between one of theirs and one of ours is 49,950,000 tons. A Soviet SS-18 50-megaton single warhead creates a fireball 36 miles in diameter. Three of them targeted on the "BOSWASH" megalopolis area of the U.S. East Coast could kill between 30 and 50 million Americans. That's why we need an effective deterrent to ensure that the Soviets will neither launch such weapons of terror against us, or blackmail us into surrender by threatening to do so.

It was the survivability of our strategic deterrent that was at stake in the Vladivostok Summit. Gerald Ford had been enticed into a negotiating game with the dictators of the U.S.S.R. — and the survival of the United States and of freedom in the world hung in the balance.

There are many additional loopholes in the Vladivostok guidelines. The most shocking of these are, of course, the repetition of, or preservation of, the loopholes in SALT I. Neither Dr. Kissinger nor Gerald Ford, however, ever refer to these methods of evasion as loopholes; they always call them "ambiguities." At his December 2, 1974 news conference, Ford asserted that "we know of no violations, either on the part of the Soviet Union or by ourselves. There have been some allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT I Agreement. We don't *think* they have. *There are, however, some ambiguities.*" (emphasis added) The evidence indicates that Ford believed what he was saying, or had been told to say. Kissinger was still czar of the entire U.S. intelligence community and passed on all reports of Soviet SALT violations only after they were dressed up as "ambiguities."

Because Gerald Ford has been warned of "ambiguities" and the advantages they gave to the Soviets, he should have been on the alert to protect U.S. interests against them at Vladivostok. So what did he do? He agreed to use the term "strategic delivery vehicles" in the basic provision of the agreement — but without any specific, concrete, or comprehensive definition of that term. This glaring defect compares with Kissinger's failure to secure an agreement in SALT I on the term "heavy missile." Kissinger recognized the critical nature of this defect and expressed formally, in "Noteworthy Unilateral Statement D", the "regrets" of the U.S. Delegation that the Soviets refused to agree to a definition.

The failure to agree on this definition put the lives of all 210 million Americans on the line. It enabled the Soviets — without violating the SALT I Agreement — to increase the throw-weight of their ICBMs by up to 500 percent. That is what gave them their hard-target kill capability, plus the enormous reserve, which would enable them to reduce the U.S. wartime inventory of retaliatory weapons by some two-thirds. It was critical because the SALT I ABM Treaty had stripped the U.S. population of all active defenses against Soviet or any other incoming missiles. With no defenses, all that stands between us and extermination at the plan or caprice of the men in the Kremlin is our retaliatory weapons. Without a definition of the key terms, SALT I permitted the Soviets to proceed with their program to build the power to destroy our deterrent.

Ford and Kissinger should have been repeating to themselves all during the Vladivostok Summit: "Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." Above all, they should have been on guard against the trap of a failure to define a key term in the agreement.

Suppose you had a son who had never learned the value of money, even when money had some value. For his birthday you gave him a signed check with the amount blank on your checking account which had a balance of $50,000. Would you dare to say, "Son, go buy yourself a motor vehicle"? You would know that that term could cover anything with wheels and a motor, from a mo-ped bicycle to a custom-built Rolls-Royce.

By failing to specify what was included in the definition of "strategic delivery vehicle," everything in that vague class was treated by the Vladivostok agreement as fungibles. A Soviet SS-18 with a 50-megaton single warhead is treated as equivalent to a one-megaton U.S. Minuteman I. The realistic difference is some 49,000,000 *tons* of explosive power each. A Minuteman III carrying three 170-kiloton MIRV warheads is treated as the equivalent of a Soviet SS-19 carrying six 2-megaton warheads. The difference is 11,490,000 tons of explosive power. The force difference between 1,000 of theirs and 1,000 of ours — permissible under Vladivostok — is 11,490,000,000 tons of explosive power.

The nearly two-year stall on the SALT II agreement has grown out of Vladivostok failure to define the term "strategic delivery vehicle." Is a Soviet supersonic intercontinental strategic bomber such as the Backfire included? Is a U.S. strategic long-range cruise missile included (if we ever get any)? Our projected cruise missiles are being held up in the pre-development stage pending the signing of the SALT II agreement.

Incidentally, not only is the term "strategic delivery vehicle" left totally vague, but even the "strategic" part of it cannot be defined on any objective basis. The Soviets have a mobile nuclear *battlefield*

weapon, which is therefore normally considered "tactical" rather than strategic — but it has an explosive power yield some 983,000 tons greater than the U.S. Poseidon 14-MIRV warheads. Poseidon MIRVs are certainly considered part of our strategic force. Nor can a demarcation be made by range or by intended purpose.

An additional and totally grotesque failure to insist on a definition relates to the Vladivostok provision that the "relevant parts" of the SALT I Agreement are to be embodied in and carried on for 10 years by the SALT II agreement. "Relevant" in whose understanding? The Soviets? Ours? Only if both agree? Key major provisions depend on the interpretation of "relevant": *e.g.*, does the limitation on missile-launching submarines apply? How about numbers of fixed land-based ICBM launchers? How about the application of the non-defined "heavy" missile limitation? This incredibly sloppy failure of specification leaves substantially every provision of the SALT I Interim Agreement open to controversy. The Soviets have demonstrated for more than four years the hard fact that they will exploit any and all "ambiguities" in their favor and against us.

SALT I left a major loophole in failing to constrain "reload" missiles or to count them against any limits. The same loophole is repeated in Vladivostok, and it's far worse now because the Soviets have massively increased their reload capability by development and actual deployment of their "cold-launch" or "pop-up" types of ICBMs. In the "hot-launch" type (the only type the United States has), the inferno of flame on blast-off inside the silo damages the launcher tube, thus requiring delays and repairs before a reload is possible. Not so with the "cold-launch" type.

The Soviets will be replacing some 1,000 older type SS-11s with SS-17s and mostly SS-19s. There appears to be no reason for expecting them to scrap these still potent missiles when new ones replace them in the silos. They can be reworked and become reloads. Sloppy U.S. negotiating at Vladivostok does not count them in any limit. Thus, as Dr. Henry S. Rowen commented in his testimony, "They [old missiles] could be kept for 'reloads' — extra ammunition, so to speak. . . . In any case, members of Congress should not be shocked if it is revealed some day in the future that the Soviets have a thousand or so extra ICBMs stashed away."[24]

The reload loophole is particularly valuable to the Soviets because, over the years, they have demonstrated a common-sense reluctance to destroy or scrap any instruments of their strategic power. Professor R. J. Rummel, in his recent book *Peace Endangered: The Reality of Detente*, put his battery of computers to work and came up with these sobering conclusions:

Strategically the Soviets were behind until about 1968, then there was a short-lived parity, and now they have forged ahead. While we emphasize war avoidance, they configure their forces for waging war.

Perhaps the number of weapons scrapped best exemplified the two doctrines. From 1946 to 1974 we have built and scrapped 1,210 ICBMs, 544 SLBMs, and around 1,400 bombers; at the same time the Soviets have scrapped 11 ICBMs, 15 bombers, and zero SLBMs.[25]

Land-mobile missiles were another loophole left by Kissinger for the Soviets in SALT I. The SALT I Agreement placed no restrictions whatsoever on them. The Soviets wanted mobiles left as a "free" system because they had an advanced type in development, just about ready for deployment. This is

now known as the SS-16, and it has an intermediate-range version, also mobile, designated the SS-20. In the Vladivostok negotiations, we politely requested that, if the Soviets deploy them, they place them where our satellites can easily photograph and count them. But, just as in SALT I, there is no restriction on land mobiles, although if we can find them, they will count in the overall vehicle limit of 2,400. Dr. Kissinger, in his "deep backgrounder," claimed that we could "catch" from ⅔ to ¾ of their land mobiles. But that, of course, is if they are out in the open. He did not explain how we could find any that might be garaged under roof or cover.

Exclusions provide another type of loophole for the Vladivostok guidelines. Excluded are some 800 Soviet medium bombers which have always been counted as "strategic" by all objective experts. McNamara simply dropped them from the count to improve his "numbers" game. All agree that these are capable of attacking the United States on 1¼-way missions, if refueled. The Soviets maintain a number of air bases in Cuba.

Also excluded are 900 to 1,000 intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles which are strategic in type. They cannot reach the United States, but they hold our NATO allies hostage, since we scrapped all of ours, and since we agreed in SALT I not to provide NATO with any anti-missile defenses.

The Soviets have operational 41 nuclear-propelled cruise missile-launching submarines, capable of underwater launch, plus more than 20 additional cruise missile submarines of conventional propulsion. They are reported to have from 2,000 to 4,000 cruise missiles, many carried on surface vessels. These are supposed to be for anti-ship employment primarily, but they could reach many important targets on the

East and West coasts of the United States. Their range can be upgraded because we have no SAM air defense, only 372 interceptors, and no strategic warning and control system for the old interceptors we do have.

Other imbalances favoring the Soviets in the Vladivostok guidelines result from their long-established universal civil defense system, plus an extensive (and expensive) program for dispersal of industry and putting many new plants underground. With no substantial civil defense, our casualties from the same level of attack would run ten times theirs. They have the world's most massive air defense system, with 12,000 SAM launchers, many with reloads, plus nearly 3,000 interceptor aircraft, many of them capable of supersonic flight at the near-incredible speed of mach 3.2.

The distortion against us shows up dramatically when you recognize that our 24-year-old B-52s, with a maximum speed of less than 800 mph, would first have to survive a surprise missile attack, and then have to penetrate the massive Soviet defense, before they could *deliver* their weapons loads. It would seem that a "strategic delivery vehicle" should have a realistic chance of *delivering* its load in order to be counted in the total. If Kissinger has his way, however, our B-52s would be counted as "strategic delivery vehicles," but the supersonic mach 2.2+ Soviet Backfire, capable of carrying a greater weapons load than a B-52, and facing only a zero U.S. SAM defense and 375 old, slow U.S. interceptors, would not count at all.

Yet even all this is not a complete list of the traps in the Vladivostok accords which prejudice our chances of national survival.

chapter **VIII**

THE KISSINGERIAN CANDIDATE

Of course, it's conceivable that the Soviets would deliberately agree to SALT II signing during the election campaign in order to help Ford win. They were unabashed about trying to help Nixon during the 1972 campaign. They boasted afterwards of having done it.[26]

The purpose in examining the specifics of the Ambush at Vladivostok has not been merely to ascertain if Gerald Ford had been "taken" by the wily Russians. Tragically, analysis of the Vladivostok Agreement and its results proves that, and the answer is written in history. There is an additional purpose — and it leads to more intriguing machinations. In dealing with plots by the planners of the Politburo, it is never safe to stop when you discover the first booby-trap. That one is probably a relatively simple one, designed not only to work, but also to cover an additional trap of more serious consequence. Underlying the second, there may even be a third trap.

The first and most obvious purpose of the Ambush at Vladivostok was to trap Gerald Ford into an agreement which would be *potentially* fatal to the United States, which would set up the new correlation of forces which in turn would prepare for the ultimate defeat or surrender or destruction of U.S. power. Once U.S. power has been canceled out,

there would be no remaining obstacle to control of the world by the Soviet Communists.

Certainly the simple-sounding but grotesquely-unbalanced guidelines that came out of the Brezhnev-Ford agreement do contain the *potential* for our destruction as a great power. But no piece of paper in itself can bring a strong nation down to oblivion, even though agreements with the Soviets are just pieces of paper. As Henry Kissinger once noted in a closely held "backgrounder," "as Marxists, they have almost no mechanism by which they would keep an agreement that is against their interests."[27]

But each agreement we negotiate with the Soviets also spawns certain foreign and defense policies. If a U.S. President has been co-opted by the Kremlin leadership as a "high pressure" salesman of the agreement, he may, in promoting the sale, box himself in as to what policies he can adopt and support in relation to strategic military power. He may even have disqualified himself from telling the truth to the American people.

Soon after Vladivostok, it became apparent that Gerald Ford had attained a new value to the Russians. By early 1976, the Politburo began affirmative action to brighten his political future. The announcements of additional large purchases of American grain were timed to coincide with 1976 primary elections. When the long-continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola became an embarrassment to the Ford Administration, a Castro announcement of the purported installment withdrawal of the 15,000 aggressors just happened to come in the nick of time.

Why did the Politburo suddenly become so helpful to Mr. Ford? All the possibilities foreshadow trouble for the United States. He could, for one example, have been brainwashed in the specially-con-

trolled environment the Soviets had custom-created for his participation in the Vladivostok Summit. There is the possibility, remote but still possible, that he had been "programmed" to execute some sort of post-brainwash suggestions. Never underestimate Soviet specialists on psychological warfare.

More plausibly, Gerald Ford could simply have been trapped into signing and then supporting an agreement so horrendously dangerous to America that he could no longer face the truth himself, let alone admit the actual state of the strategic military balance and how SALT is maximizing Soviet nuclear power. One thing is clear. Never since Vladivostok has Gerald Ford been able to tell the truth to the American people about the growing U.S. strategic inferiority to the Soviets. The entire nation has been confused by an unprecedented wave of distortions.

The domino effect of a President of the United States lying about the strategic military balance knocks over otherwise truthful officials and triggers sycophantic reactions by the media. The President is also the Commander-in-Chief. When he tells a lie about our military posture, the Secretary of Defense has to lie to support him; and so also the Secretaries of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force. So also as to civilian employees of the Executive Branch, as well as the President's political cronies.

During those 9½ hours in that smoke-filled room, how far were Ford's bear-hugging, vodka-drinking Russian "friends" able to bring him under their influence? How long would it endure? We certainly know that at his news conference on December 2, 1974, he still had not returned to the reality out of which he had been lured with sophisticated psychological bait in the Summit of Vladivostok. Just consider this language he resorted to — a week later, after com-

mon sense should have asserted itself — in describing the monstrosity of an agreement which he had been pushed into:

> At Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race which has eluded us since the nuclear age began.
>
> I believe this is something for which future generations will thank us. . . .
>
> What we have done is to set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war breeding tension, and economic waste. We have in addition created the solid basis from which future arms reduction can be ... and hopefully will be ... negotiated.

There is much more, but it all shows a total loss of touch with reality.

At Vladivostok Gerald Ford revealed another trait of character and a lack of essential experience and understanding of Soviet Communist doctrine which would make his continuance in the Presidency valuable to the Kremlin. After meeting the Brezhnev-Gromyko team only once, Ford went out on a limb to endorse their good intentions and to extol them to the American people. When asked for an explanation for the "breakthroughs" he claimed had been won from the Soviet leaders at Vladivostok, Ford replied:

> It is my best judgment that they are deeply concerned about the arms race.[28]

In another press interview, he indicated that Brezhnev personally was concerned with ending the arms race. Again, in explaining how the agreement was worked out, Ford said:

> Brezhnev and I agreed that we first had to cap the arms race, both in launchers and in MIRVs.[29]

It is interesting to note that the Vladivostok Agreement he signed provided no limit on launchers as

such (as SALT I had), and certainly not on MIRVs. The Soviets are known to be working on 10 new strategic missile systems. If it turns out that one of these new ones is capable of a MIRV warhead with 100 one-megaton warheads, it would be legal under Vladivostok for them to fill the slots of the 1,320 "strategic delivery vehicles" with 1,320 of the 100-MIRV missiles, for a total of 132,000 MIRVs. Of course, the Soviets would not be able to find targets for such an improbable number of warheads, but this illustrates that Mr. Ford—regardless of how he understood the Soviet interpreter—did NOT get any limit on numbers of MIRVs.

Gerald Ford boxed himself in when, acting as President of the United States, he gave his personal assurance—his "best judgment"—to the American people that Brezhnev and his associates were men of peace who wanted to cap the arms race. After extolling the Vladivostok guidelines as "setting equal limits for each side ... on delivery systems we are equal ... on the MIRVing we are equal," Ford again boxed himself in so that he could not admit to the nation that, under the agreement, the Soviets could soon attain decisive superiority over us. Ford was now so boxed in that he could never even say that the Soviets would *attempt* to achieve strategic supremacy over us, or would ever engage in nuclear blackmail against us.

This all added to Moscow's growing interest in promoting Ford's political future. Indeed, some Washington commentators were of the opinion that the Vladivostok Agreement itself was part of the Kremlin's campaign to influence the upcoming U.S. elections. For example, *Washington Post* columnist Victor Zorza wrote this within three days of the Vladivostok Summit:

> It looks as if the Vladivostok Agreement is based upon a tacit understanding between the White House and the Kremlin to keep Jackson at bay and to help reelect Ford. . . .
>
> The new agreement would also make Ford go into the 1976 election as the man who has put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, and to present Jackson or any other similar challenge as the man who wants to uncork it."[30]

After Senator Jackson faded from the primaries, Ford began to try to picture Ronald Reagan in exactly that light.

This brings us to the third covert purpose of the Ambush at Vladivostok in November 1974. Remember that the Soviets did not *need* a SALT II agreement, but the United States did. The Administration and some of the better-informed pro-Americans in Congress remembered the warning served by "Noteworthy Unilateral Statement A" that, if we did not obtain a SALT II agreement within five years to "constrain and reduce" the Soviets' hard-target disarming strike capability, "U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized." Adding urgency to that warning was the increasing information on the massive buildup of exactly that capability in the years following SALT I. Thus, all the Soviets actually needed in any SALT II agreement was to block, permanently if possible, U.S. efforts to constrain their hard-target counterforce kill capability. To accomplish this, all they needed was for the U.S. representatives to abandon seeking any limitation on throw-weight and any limitation on the number of MIRV warheads below, say, four or five times more than they would need for a disarming attack. The Soviets secured all this from Gerald Ford at Vladivostok.

Considering the time element and the state of the strategic balance at the time, the Vladivostok guidelines were *so* favorable to the Soviets that they could

afford to give away any marginal or peripheral issues in the SALT II agreement which was supposed to be completed and signed in 1975. What, then, was the real purpose for the Soviets' two years of stalling? Why were they so stubborn in refusing to reach a final agreement on the purported contest over the inclusion of Soviet Backfire bombers, and the counting of U.S. long-range cruise missiles, and the exclusion of shorter-range cruise missiles (the Soviets have these operational by the thousands)? This was all simply a diversion to provide a continuing pendency of SALT negotiations to delay the initiation of any U.S. strategic programs. This stall had successfully blocked U.S. rearmament efforts for some seven years and the new Soviet ploy would keep it going at least until the new U.S. Administration in January 1977.

One of the most respected younger strategic analysts in the United States explained the relative importance of the Backfire and cruise missile issues this way:

> These issues, however important individually, are still marginal when compared with the overall ceilings allowed, the lack of restrictions on Soviet throw-weight, and the continuing relative emphasis given to strategic force programs in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The major issue is whether the agreement is worth anything at all, or is simply more SALTing of the eagle's tail. In establishing such high numbers, rather than reducing forces; in not limiting the tremendous Soviet throw-weight advantage; in not restraining in any way the continued development of the Soviet threat, the issue is what good does it do?[31]

Thus a SALT II agreement which excluded the Soviet Backfire supersonic intercontinental mach 2.2+ strategic bomber, permitting them to build 500 or 1,000 if they chose, would be a tragic burlesque of an "equal" arms control agreement. But it is al-

most as tragic and equally a burlesque, even if Backfire *is* included. What this means in terms of Kremlin capability of influencing U.S. presidential election campaigns is shocking. The Soviets could come in with a timely and dramatic "concession" and accept inclusion of Backfires. This would make Gerald Ford appear to have won a tough two-year bargaining contest with the Soviets. It would provide him with a sure-fire answer to critics who had charged that he was "giving away" too much in SALT and detente. Above all, it would flesh-out, with the appearance of reality, his hollow and pallid slogan of "peace through strength" which he had hoped to substitute for his discredited detente.

If the Soviets did this, the media would incite a national orgy of congratulations to "Gerald Ford, courageous builder of peace through strength... the stalwart leader who proved that negotiation could be more fruitful than confrontation," and so on *ad nauseam*. The American people, unnerved after years of crisis in leadership, would want to believe what they heard.

The Soviets could sweeten the SALT II package even further by making this dramatic gesture toward peace-and equality: "You Americans keep your allowance of 1,320; we peace-loving Russians will MIRV only 600 strategic delivery vehicles!" Since the Soviets need only 300 for a first-strike disarming capability, such a grandstand play would cost them nothing in essential strategic power, but allow them to achieve other objectives.

The Soviets would know they couldn't get away with it, however, if enough Americans understood the traps in SALT II and the options available to the Soviets to deceive Americans and to influence our policies and our elections.

chapter IX

WHICH FORD DID YOU HEAR?

To attain a decisive first-strike disarming capability over the United States — that is, a capability which the Kremlin could use with high confidence as a basis for an ultimatum demanding our surrender — the Soviets need to hold down the rebuilding of U.S. strategic power. The massive buildup of their own nuclear forces, they can take care of themselves. But to hold down our retaliatory capability, they need the help of Americans. The one American best-qualified to accomplish exactly what the Kremlin needs is the President of the United States. He and he *alone holds the essential official policymaking* power, plus the trust and confidence of the American people in his stewardship of our national security.

As a result of their successful psychological manipulation of Gerald Ford in the ambush at Vladivostok, he has become valuable to the Kremlin bosses in several specific ways. But far and away the greatest value an American President could have to the Soviets would be if he gave the American people — in his official capacity — repeated assurances that the United States has superior military power, that is, that we are No. 1 militarily, and that our current defense budgets are ample to maintain military and strategic superiority in the future.

If such assurances are given them by their President, the American people will see no reason for any big effort to build up our strategic military power.

If such assurances are false, they will be decisive in holding America down while the Soviets attain that decisive first-strike disarming capability against us.

Answers to these questions, therefore, are vital to our national survival in freedom, and most probably to our lives as well: (1) Has Gerald Ford made official assurances of our superior military power? and (2) Are those assurances true or false?

In his State of the Union Message on January 18, 1976, Gerald Ford gave the American people three solemn assurances:

> Our military forces are capable and ready; our military power is without equal. . . . Our principal alliances with the industrial democracies of the Atlantic Community and Japan have never been more solid.

This particular statement was not an off-the-cuff impromptu political promise in an election year; it was an official pledge made in the one speech a year he is commanded by the U.S. Constitution to give.

Less than six weeks later, however, Gerald Ford contradicted his own solemn assurance that our military power is "without equal." On March 2, 1976, he held a meeting in the Oval Office with Senate Armed Services Committee leaders and told them:

> The United States does have a rough equivalency in arms power with the Soviet Union.

Although "equivalency" is a fancier word, the dictionary defines it as meaning "equal."

So here we have a President claiming to one audience (the American people, who cannot be expected to have full information on military affairs) that we are *without equal;* that is, that we have *superiority* in military power, that we are No. 1. To a better-informed audience (which knew too much to accept a false claim of superiority), Ford tailors down his claim to "*rough equivalency,*" that is, to parity.

In the nuclear age, is there any real difference? Just the difference between national life and death, that's all. But since both of his statements cannot be true, which one is false? Both are false. We are no longer No. 1 in military power, either strategic-nuclear or conventional. We no longer even have parity with the U.S.S.R. They passed parity with us in strategic nuclear forces in late 1968, and every month since then have been moving massively toward decisive superiority. Far earlier than that, they surpassed us in conventional forces.

All during the primary campaigns, Ford switched back and forth between claiming that the United States was No. 1 militarily, and his more modest but equally false claim that U.S. military might is "second to none."

This raises a potentially decisive political issue. A coalition of large metropolitan newspapers and news services polled individual voters after they had cast their primary ballots in order to determine what issues had influenced them the most. The most significant finding was about national defense: of every 10 voters who believed Ronald Reagan's charges that the Kissinger policies had let the United States drop to second place behind Russia in military power, eight of them voted for Reagan. This suggests that, if this issue had been opened up earlier, and the truth about the military balance had been revealed to the voters, the race would not even have been close.

It is still crucial to our national survival to get to the American people the answer to who is No. 1 militarily. The most important parts of this question have been considered earlier in this book, in examining the realistic meaning of the so-called "equality" supposedly conferred on us by the Vladivostok Agreement. As we saw, the massive Soviet advantage


in throw-weight in-being, and to come into being within the next several years, is really decisive. But here are some charts compiled from official data or from statistics prepared by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. These show at a glance where we have been in the last 10 years, vis-a-vis the Soviets, and where we are now. Tragically, they dramatically depict the clandestine, phased, unilateral disarmament of the United States. They reveal that the United State has *already* fallen well behind the U.S.S.R. in military power.

It would be encouraging if we could hope that these graphs overstate the danger of our position. Unfortunately, however, they understate it. Figures on comparative throw-weight would add to the chilling impact. The comparison of Reserve manpower is also impressive. The International Institute on Strategic Studies includes this note in its 1975-76 report on the military balance:

> Soviet conscripts have a reserve obligation to age 50. Total Reserves could be as high as 25,000,000, of which some 5,700,000 have had service in the last five years.

This is corroborated by the Joint Chiefs' Posture Statement for 1975, which credited the Soviets with "at least 20,000,000 Reserves in the land forces alone." The United States has slightly under 1,000,000 in Reserve forces. The Soviets also have some 430,000 in para-military forces, including 200,000 KGB border troops, and 230,000 MVD security troops, all equipped with first-line fighting equipment; and there are some 9,000,000 youths of 15 and over taking part-time military training. Altogether, it would appear that the Soviets have planned on enough military manpower to administer the world, after they neutralize U.S. strategic power.


STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS COMPARISON



MID-1975 BALANCE	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles	1,054	1,500
Sub Launched Ballistic Missiles	656	865
Strategic Heavy and Medium Bombers	421	825
Sub Launched Long Range Cruise Missiles	0	314
Mobile ICBM's	0	?
	2,131	3,504


Source: Annual DOD report, FY 1977 and The Military Balance, 1975-1976, I.I.S.S.

MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANT SHIPS and SUBMARINES




Source: Sec. Navy Middendorf before the House Armed Services Committee in 1975 and 1976, plus Navy update.

CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCE WEAPONS



Source: Figures from page 52 of "U.S. Military Posture Statement" for Fiscal Year 1977 by Gen Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE WEAPONS COMPARISON



MID-1975 BALANCE


	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
Interceptor Aircraft	315	2,600
Surface-to-Air Missiles	0	12,000
Anti-Ballistic Missiles	0*	64
	315	14,664

*100 U.S. ABM's became fully operational in October, 1975. In November, 1975, Congress voted to close down all ABM defenses.

Source: Annual DOD report, FY 1977 by SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld.


DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

(EXCLUDES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND CIVIL DEFENSE)




Source: C.I.A. Feb. 1976 Special Report—"A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1965—1975".

MILITARY MANPOWER



Source: C.I.A. Feb. 1976 Special Report—"A Dollar Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Defense Activities, 1965-1975"

The previous charts show the trends over the last 10 years, and where we stand now as against the Soviets in the military balance. An even more imminent warning is provided by the chart below, showing the relative production rates in the last three years. This chart was prepared by *Air Force Magazine* from official figures in March 1976:



The question of who's ahead is so overwhelmingly important to national survival that it justifies translating the above charts into the words of an internationally recognized expert. Robert Hotz, editor of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, devoted a full page on June 28, 1976 to an editorial entitled "Ominous Soviet Trends." Here are some key parts of his analysis:

> The major U.S.S.R. weapons trends include:
>
> * Expanding its ICBM force toward the goal of strategic superiority over the United States, *with a heavy megatonnage/throw-weight* advantage already achieved. There is also a basic change in the character of the new Soviet ICBM deployment from city-busting type missiles to hard target penetrators with the size and accuracy of warheads required to destroy hardened enemy ICBM silos. Continuation of this trend will give the Soviets *a credible first-strike capability by the early 1980s.*
>
> * Pressing transportable anti-ballistic missile defensive system research, including high-energy lasers on a broad scale, to produce a truly effective system worth deploying if the U.S.-USSR ABM Treaty is abrogated. *This would provide a useful degree of protection against any possible U.S. retaliatory strike.*
>
> * Organizing a civil defense program. . . . Soviets are hardening their key new military and industrial installations against nuclear attack, providing large scale population shelters, introducing a high degree of regional economic self-sufficiency and stockpiling food and tools as recovery bases after nuclear attack. The *whole pattern of heavy silo-busting ICBMs, effective missile defense systems and a hardened survivable base explain the oft-expressed Soviet concept that a nuclear war is survivable and winnable.*
>
> * Developing a wide variety of military space vehicles including communications, reconnaissance and interceptor satellites. The most ominous initiative in the Soviet space program is the persistant effort to *develop non-nuclear satellite destroyers that could quickly wipe out all U.S. systems of reconnaissance, early warning and some verification.*

... The new SS-20 mobile missile, at first thought to have intermediate range, now shows sufficient stretch to be an ICBM and reach the Western United States from its deployment in Kamchatka, Western Europe from bases deep in the U.S.S.R. and all of China. ...

* Building nuclear powered submarines in a massive program for both attack submarines and long range ballistic missile carriers. The Soviets already have about 300 attack submarines. ... Soviet nuclear powered subs with cruise missiles have been on patrol in U.S. coastal waters for several years and pose a serious threat to the Strategic Air Command bomber force because of the extremely short warning time from their missiles.

* Expanding vastly the Soviet surface navy ... fast long-range, heavily armed ships capable of sustained operational deployment supported by a new chain of foreign bases. Soviet sea forces are also augmented by the new Backfire supersonic bomber carrying air-to-surface missiles and by a fleet of long-range radar-loaded surveillance aircraft.

* Expanding the strategic airlift capability ... demonstrated in the massive airlift to Egypt and Syria in the 1973 war and the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the support of Cuban forces in Angola. ...

* While the Soviets have been pursuing these steady courses, U.S. military strength has been eroded by the massive misapplication in Southeast Asia and *the SALT negotiations have lulled Congress and the American people into a false concept of the Soviet Union's actions and goals.*

Any reasonable citizen who takes a look at these Soviet trends in contrast to U.S. policies during the past decade must feel like shouting: "Wake up America before it's too late!" (emphasis added)

If editor Robert Hotz, with more than 20 years' experience, week after week, in reporting defense and technological developments and evaluating trends; is convinced that *any* reasonable citizen should recognize the clear, growing, and deadly threat to our national existence, and sound the warn-

ing, how reasonable is a President who fails? Worse, how reasonable is a President who, instead of shouting "awake," says "sleep on, America, our military power is unequalled, we are second to none, we are No. 1"? Small wonder that the Soviets hope for his reelection. We recall the words of Japanese Admiral Matome Ugaki, Yamamoto's Chief of Staff, on December 6, 1941:

> Enjoy your dream of peace just one more day. ... Hawaii you will be caught like a rat in a trap.

By a strange coincidence, Gerald Ford was passing through Hawaii on December 7, 1975 — 34 years after the surprise attack. So he made an address at the Pearl Harbor Memorial. He was returning from an official visit to Peking from December 1 through 5 where high Chinese officials had pleaded with Mr. Ford to heed their warnings that the Soviet purpose in detente was to prepare for a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, Ford's official host because of the illness of Premier Chou En-lai, extended this earnest appeal on the first day of the visit:

Today it is the country which most vehemently preaches peace that is the most dangerous source of war. Rhetoric about detente cannot cover up the stark reality of the growing danger of war. The wind is blowing harder and harder, and nothing can prevent the storm.

chapter X

THE FACTOR OF 50 MILLION

Suppose a gifted nuclear-physicist-chemist invented an additive for gasoline which would increase its power by a factor of 50 million. Instead of our hoped-for 20 miles per gallon, efficient use of the newly pepped-up fuel would give us one billion miles per gallon. Very few automobiles would last long enough to run out of one gallon of nuc-pep-gas. Nor would drivers live long enough to get full mileage out of the fabulous new gallon.

But wait a minute. Suppose that, at the same time, a genius biochemist also made a similar breakthrough. He came up with a pill that would extend the human lifespan by a factor of 50 million. Instead of looking forward doubtfully to the traditional three score years and ten, we would face a lifespan of 3,500,000,000 years!

The gasoline additive and the longevity pill appear to be incredible flights of fancy — but the factor of 50 million is not. It is not even a science-fiction dream of what could happen in the 21st century. The factor of 50 million is here and now when applied to the increase in the power of strategic nuclear weapons over conventional weapons.

One of the most powerful conventional weapons was the bomber-carried 2,000-pound gravity-bomb warhead. It had the explosive power of one ton of TNT. Back in 1962, the Soviets tested hydrogen "devices" that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara

testified would "weaponize at 100 megatons." Ten years later, Senator Henry Jackson revealed that the new Soviet SS-18 ICBM, Mod. 1, with a single warhead, could carry 50 megatons of nuclear explosive power, or the equivalent of 50,000,000 tons of TNT explosive power.

One of Mao Tse-tung's sayings is that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Political power is now delivered, multiplied by that factor of 50 million, in the warhead of a strategic missile. The mere existence of such an expanding type of power creates the potential of a revolution in internal power-politics as well as in the entire field of foreign relations. When married to the massive rockets of the ICBM, which can throw a hydrogen warhead around half the world in half an hour, it became the first system in history with the capability of world conquest.

Most people hopefully believe that, because the 1-megaton to 50-megaton missiles have not yet *visibly* shaken apart the existing political organization, it cannot. Henry Kissinger purports to be one of these, and he wants all of us to believe this, too. Thus in his speech to the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on February 3, 1976, which he identified as a permanent pontification of U.S. grand strategy and which he entitled "U.S. Policy toward the Soviet Union," he asserted:

> At current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. *In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome.* Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent."[32] (emphasis added)

Dr. Kissinger apparently considers that ordinary Americans are too stupid to figure out that nuclear

weapons do not have to be actually launched and exploded to determine the "outcome" of a crisis. From a potential world conqueror's point of view, one great value of strategic nuclear weapons is that *if* you have a decisive margin of superiority, you may *never* have to launch them; you may not even have to *threaten* to launch them. Just as the actual physical power of strategic nuclear weapons is the greatest *physical* power ever controlled by man, the *fear* of nuclear weapons is the greatest *psychological* power ever exploited by man.

The corollary to Kissinger's contention that nuclear weapons have not determined the outcome of crises since 1962 is his assertion that most of our defense funds should be spent on "general purpose" forces, that is, on conventional armed forces. Under this Kissinger policy (in which he was joined by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger), an average of 40 percent of our annual defense budget goes to conventional forces, and only 10 percent on strategic nuclear forces and the Research and Development needed to keep them modern. That is one reason why we are approaching the brink of a strategic surrender.

One of the facts of developing life is that a revolutionary new power source is not necessarily usable immediately. Take that additive that we supposed would give the potential of a billion miles to a gallon of gas. An attempt to use such power in a conventional engine would no doubt result in an explosion that would destroy the driver who attempted a premature exploitation of the extra mileage. But the power base would be there, awaiting development of an engine that could make use of the available power.

That has been the situation as to the use of strategic nuclear power to bring the entire world under Moscow's political control. The men in the Kremlin

have invested a quarter of a century and 40 percent of the Soviet Gross National Product in order to convert that revolutionary power into actual weapons systems.

For the first 30 years of the nuclear age, the Soviets were more or less in the position of the owner of that billion-miles-per-gallon gasoline. If the Soviets had actually used that power, they would have been destroyed in the attempt. They made one attempt in Cuba in 1962 and they almost got clobbered.

To use nuclear power safely, you have to have decisively *more* of it usable than any rival. The "engine" for harnessing the horrendous power in thermonuclear explosives for military purposes is known as a "first-strike disarming capability." They have not quite attained it. It appears highly probable that they will attain it by 1977 and, as Paul Nitze says, their usable power will increase every year after that. When the Soviets reach that position, the United States will *not* be able to deter them from striking us *by threatening* to strike back and destroy them, because they will have the capability to destroy the weapons that we might have planned to strike back with.

This single scenario illustrates the unbridgeable chasm between nuclear and nonnuclear power:

The highly placed but anonymous assigner of Impossible Missions tapes this instruction (which will self-destruct five seconds after play-back):

"One of our B-52 bombers is capable of delivering in a single flight, on a single day, two 24-megaton hydrogen bombs — a total of 48 megatons — on Nation X.

"The same bomber aircraft is normally capable of delivering in a single flight, on a single day, 27½ tons of conventional bombs; but we will bring this bomb-delivery capability up to 48 tons for this mission.

"Your mission is to pilot a B-52 on one bombing trip per day, including Sundays, against Nation X. You will carry a full load of conventional bombs — and keep flying until you have dropped explosive power equivalent to what you could deliver in just one mission *if* you carried hydrogen bombs with 48 megatons of explosive power."

How long would it take for completion of this truly Impossible Mission? How long would you guess? The average answer given by nonexperts varies from one to five years. The actual answer is 2,739 years. If the MI pilot had started flying his daily bombing run at the time of Christ, he would still have more than 700 years to go.

Of course, this scenario is based on an oversimplification. Megatonnage is a measure of nuclear explosive power based on the equivalent explosive force of millions of tons of tri-nitro-toluene (TNT). Explosive power is not the equivalent of destructive power, which involves computation with a complex of variables such as type of target, accuracy of delivery (CEP), and even weather conditions. But megatonnage is the most convenient and meaningful measure of firepower in the nuclear-space age. *Tactical* nuclear power, measured in kilotons, is *thousands* of times greater than conventional weapons power; *strategic* nuclear power is *millions* of times greater.

In the real world (as distinguished from the fairy tales that Kissinger spins for audiences he does not believe can comprehend strategic matters), strategic nuclear power, if held in sufficient superiority, is not only *usable*, but it makes an opponent's conventional power *unusable*. As Dr. Edward Teller, the world's supreme nuclear physicist and inventor of hydrogen explosive power; stated:

Nuclear power does not mean the end of the world, but it does mean the end of nonnuclear power.

What he meant was that nonnuclear military power could not be used against, or even against the wishes of, a superior nuclear power. It could not be used even against the wishes of an inferior nuclear power which had a credible will to use it.

The wily Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, "The fear of nuclear war in a country's leader can paralyze that country's defenses." Lyndon Johnson was the outstanding example of such fear. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Vice President Johnson had shrunk back in fright at the mere idea of a blockade that might stop Soviet missile-delivering ships. It would be an "act of war," he intoned.

When Johnson was President, his paralysis of fear restrained him from permitting U.S. forces to win the war in Vietnam. Although President Johnson, for political reasons, would have preferred to win that war, he was afraid to use even our *conventional* military power to defeat a client state of the Soviet Union — even though, at that time, the Soviets had not attained nuclear superiority over us.

Two short scenarios will give practical meaning to the tremendous throw-weight advantage granted to the Soviets through SALT I and enshrined in the Vladivostok Agreement. These same two scenarios exemplify also how much the Soviets can do with their throw-weight advantage, even without launching a single missile, and how pitifully little we can do to protect ourselves or our allies with our present military forces.

chapter XI

OIL EMBARGO II and CUBA II

If the Western world, the peace-loving democracies, had learned the great lesson of World War I — that military weakness and disarmament treaties invite war — we would not have been subjected to the tragedy of World War II.

If the United States had learned from Oil Embargo I, we would not now be so terribly vulnerable to a far more drastic Oil Embargo II. Even Oil Embargo I in 1973 was quite an upheaval. Remember how it boosted double-digit inflation? Remember waiting in those long gas lines?

But all those costly immediate effects are overshadowed by the long-term results. Oil Embargo I opened a new age in military power — and consequently a new era of political, economic and financial dominance by the holder of the decisive new military power. It was like having an engine that could safely use the factor-of-50-million-additive gasoline for its trial run. It marked the first unfolding of the new Soviet strategic umbrella.

The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow in May 1972 had enshrined and publicized to all the world the strategic inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union. This new "correlation of forces" soon revolutionized the existing world. The usually

imperturbable and prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies in London evaluated the Arabs' use of the "oil weapon" as "bestowing the greatest shock, the most potent sense of a new era, of any event in recent years."

It was Henry Kissinger's SALTed detente which had generated that new era by destroying the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella which had been so effective in protecting the industrial nations of the free world, great and small, for more than a quarter of a century. SALT I, and Kissinger's policies of scrapping and holding down U.S. strategic power, had worked at the same time to establish the credibility of the *Soviet* strategic umbrella to protect the militarily weak Arabs from retaliation by the nations they were economically "strangulating." The Arabs could raise their prices with impunity. No longer need they fear that the United States might act to protect American property and enforce existing contracts by sending in the Marines, as President Eisenhower did in Lebanon in 1958 to forestall a threatened coup there.

The quintupling of oil prices caused economic repercussions which spawned government upheavals in all major NATO nations. The year 1974 became known as "the year Europe lost its head" because the heads of all European nations were thrown out. Prior to Kissinger and his detente, the nations of the Free World had a Cold War but hard currencies. They had some inflation, but only in that normal and controllable degree that accompanies an increase in Gross National Product. After Kissinger's SALT, every great Western industrial nation slid into double-digit inflation. As financial stability was swept away by the oil-generated spiral of costs, governmental stability disappeared with it, and the people lost confidence in their national security and destiny.

The only beneficiaries, other than the bloated oil-rich Arabs, were the Soviets. Their currency was not devalued, they suffered no inflation, and their dictatorial government reached a new high in stability. They reaped huge windfall profits from the increase in value of their gold hoard and from the real wealth they received in ever-increasing amounts from detente-spawned "trade" at favorable exchange rates and on preferred credit terms. Everything Kissinger touched turned out very much like the Great Grain Robbery of 1972.

This real-life demonstration of the worldwide revolution wrought by destruction of the effectiveness of the U.S. strategic umbrella reduces to contemptible absurdity the Kissinger assertion that "in no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome." The new Soviet nuclear umbrella unfolded over the Arabs, encouraged them to use their "oil weapon" for the first time against the West, and effectively sheltered them from any Western retaliation. The "strategic weapons of the two sides" did determine the outcome.

So impressive had the credibility of the Soviet strategic umbrella become that *not a single nation in the Free World dared to utter even an unkind word* in criticism of the Soviet-instigated-and-protected use of the "oil weapon" in an economic war launched by the Soviets' Arab proxies.

A nuclear umbrella cannot be effective unless the superpower extending protection over its client states can make — implicitly or explicitly — a credible threat of actually *using* its nuclear power. The U.S. umbrella was credible from World War II to SALT I because of the vast superiorities we held over the Soviets in numbers and deliverable throw-weight of our strategic weapons systems. Although these su-

periorities began to melt away by 1968, our umbrella retained a residual credibility because of the lag in international perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets.

Publication of the SALT I statistics in May 1972 destroyed the credibility of the U.S. strategic umbrella. The new Soviet superiority, which increased with each month after SALT I, became the *sine qua non* of the Arabs' effective use of their "oil weapon" against the great oil-consuming Western nations. And it was no help to the Western nations at all that their conventional military power overshadowed that of the Arabs by a factor on the order of 1,000-to-1.

Thus, the so-called "good for nothing" strategic weapons, when possessed by a superpower with the obvious will to use them if challenged, can provide the power to restructure the political and economic organization of the entire world. Mere possession, in sufficiently superior numbers and power, renders impotent all other forms of power that could otherwise be used for political purposes, including overwhelming conventional military power, massive industrial power, financial power, technological power, population power, and even food power. All those types are cancelled out by the mere possession of decisive strategic nuclear superiority by one superpower.—

Let us consider this possible scenario:

Oil Embargo II

Scene: The Kremlin, Moscow.
Time: October 1978.

Members of the Politburo are hosting a meeting of Heads of State of the Arab oil-producing nations. After much ceremonial talk and many ideological speeches, the First Among Equals in the 16-man Politburo, Leonid Brezhnev (or his successor in office) gets down to business.

Brezhnev: Comrades of the Arab World, we all have a common interest in world peace and prosperity, and we have been enjoying an extended period of apparent peace. But, as our great leader Lenin warned us, so long as Capitalist Imperialism exists, the danger of war will exist. As always, history has proved the accuracy of his predictions. Our courageous intelligence agents have uncovered a massive plot by the now-desperate Capitalist Imperialist Warmongers to launch a new world war. They have finally recognized that Socialism is the wave of the future, that the forces of history are inexorable in bringing to birth a New World Order in which the benefits of Socialism will be enjoyed by all the peoples over all the earth. They realize that the correlation of forces has moved so far in favor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that they will eventually be thrown into the dust-bin of history.

In an insane frenzy of revenge, they hope to change the ordained course of history by use of their nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, and quite possibly against most of the nations of Europe. If they actually dared to launch such a nuclear war, we would destroy them utterly with our vastly superior rocket forces — but meanwhile there would be much death and destruction such as the world has never seen before.

This would be bad for business — your business, I mean. The industrial plants of the European nations would be damaged or shut down. Oil consumption would drop. Not only Europe and Japan, but the United States — one of your biggest customers — would be destroyed by our necessary retaliation. All your economies are based on continuing revenues from your great resources of oil. So you all have vital national economic interests in preventing this senseless Armageddon.

There is a way — a peaceful way — to avert this nuclear destruction and the depletion of your treasuries. This is why I have invited your Excellencies to the Kremlin. I want you all to agree to impose, immediately, a total embargo on sales of oil to the warmongering United States and all her NATO al-

lies. These nations have no substantial reserves of oil. They are nearly totally dependent on your oil for energy. Soon not a wheel will be turning in their factories. They will have no electricity. They will even be unable to pump water. Soon they will be on their knees to you, pleading for oil to save them from starvation and freezing. They will beg for any terms. They will tender an unconditional surrender to your "oil weapon."

Then you and the great Soviet Union will impose upon them joint terms: they will pay any price you set for your oil. Although you will have lost sales and revenue for the short term of the embargo, you will regain this loss tenfold when you resume shipments.

As for our part in the settlement, the Soviet Union is the Defender of Peace for all the peoples of the world. We will demand the disarmament of the Capitalist Imperialist Warmongers. We will require them to surrender to the United Nations all their nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, and all their conventional weapons as well: aircraft, tanks, artillery. Of course, most of the members of the United Nations are too small and unsophisticated to handle the takeover of all these terrible weapons from the United States and NATO nations, so again the U.S.S.R. will serve the cause of world peace. We will take care of enforcing the surrender for the UN; and will keep secure custody of all the weapons.

To promote the prompt resumption of industrial operations in all of Europe and in the United States, we have programs ready to go into immediate effect. In Europe, ever since the spring of 1976, we have helped our fraternal Communist parties within the then-non-Communist governments to take over an active share in government. To set the stage for acceptance of Communist ministers in key positions, we even held a meeting of Communist parties in East Berlin in June 1976, and coached our friends to declare their "independence" of any control by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. After that, our fraternal Communist Party leaders were accepted into many Western European governments, including Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal. This

is how we prepared our fraternal "democratic" forces to take over the actual governing of those nations. We can accomplish this without any extended disruption of the industry and commerce which are so essential to providing you with customers for your oil.

So we are sure that you will cooperate with us in our great plan for world peace and Arab prosperity. We hope for your total and unanimous cooperation. We will be helpful to you if any of the oil-producing states attempts to take advantage of the cooperative embargo to make short-term profits. We have more than 60 submarines and 40 surface vessels equipped to launch cruise missiles. One of these missiles is sufficient to destroy the largest supertanker afloat. During the period of the Oil Embargo of 1978, therefore, not a single oil tanker will ply the seas without the permission of the Soviet Union. Although, of course, we would never do it or even threaten it, a single missile from one of our thousands of launchers, or a single bomb from one of our new supersonic Backfire strategic bombers, could destroy any oil-producing field with its equipment and pipelines.

You will want to know what the United States will do to pressure you into terminating your embargo.

The answer is: *nothing*. Not a thing. How can you depend on that? Just remember back to your first courageous and innovative employment of your "oil weapon" five years ago, back in 1973. What did the United States do then? What did the Western European nations do? Nothing. They did not even talk tough to you. Then they joyously agreed to pay you a five-fold increase in the price of oil — even though that increase drove their economies to the brink of bankruptcy and disrupted the stability of their governments. It was your courageous action which brought about so much inflation, unemployment, and industrial failure that the so-called "democratic" parties in Italy could no longer preserve either industrial or political stability, and the "Italian" Communists made such gains in nationwide elections that Italy could no longer be gov-

erned without us. The increase in oil prices was the final blow to England's shaky economy.

Every one of the Western nations brought down by your "oil weapon" had more conventional military power than any of the Arab nations. Yet the Western nations dared not use their power. Likewise for the United States. With 16 Army divisions and four divisions of Marines, the Americans could have occupied your countries with a fraction of their total conventional forces. Yet they never even dared to talk about it!

Why did they not dare to challenge you in 1973? Because of one thing and one thing only: we of the Soviet Union brought you under the protection of our strategic nuclear umbrella.

We in the Soviet Union have in our patriotic Army some 166 divisions, including 49 tank divisions, 110 motor rifle divisions, and seven airborne divisions. The United States has only 20 divisions, and only two of theirs are airborne or airmobile. Yet even if our conventional forces were reversed, and the Americans had such tremendous conventional-weapons dominance, they would still not dare to challenge the oil embargo you are about to impose on those Capitalist Imperialist Warmongers and their running dogs.

Why? Because our strategic nuclear umbrella — which was more than adequate in 1973 (as the official SALT I statistics demonstrated and history attested) — is now three times more powerful than it was in 1973. During those five years, we have completed the most massive strategic weapons program in all history. As the American Director of Defense Research and Engineering described our program with awe and envy: "The Soviet weapons development efforts are innovative, massive, sweeping, and relentless." The U.S. Secretary of Defense was at a loss to describe it; he called it "staggering."

To sum it up, in those five years, we have increased the throw-weight of our strategic forces from 8 million pounds to more than 24 million pounds. How much more must be held secret, even from our

good Arab friends and allies. But I can say that we have replaced more than 1,000 ICBMs with advanced models five times more powerful, and vastly more accurate — far more accurate, indeed, than the U.S. missiles. And we have deployed in that same time 28 of our huge Delta-class nuclear-propelled missile-launching submarines, equipped with SLBMs of intercontinental range. They have a range of 2,000 miles more than the U.S. boats. The Americans will not have any such submarines until the 1980s, and then only 7 to 10 of them. We can build up to 12 a year, if we wish.

In those same five years, the United States has not added one single missile launcher to her strategic forces. Not a single ICBM, nor an SLBM, nor a single strategic bomber. In fact, the Americans have added nothing to their forces since 1967. The only changes they have made was to mount MIRVed warheads on some SLBMs and some ICBMs — but in so doing, they cut down ⅔ of their megatonnage delivery capability and also on their reliability.

So it is that we have what is known as a dominant first-strike disarming capability against the Americans. If they try to coerce any of the Arab oil-producing states into abandoning the embargo, we will threaten to disarm them — and they know we can do it, and still retain 5% of our missile throw-weight in reserve. If they do resist and we have to disarm them, we will threaten destruction of their industries and their cities in "slow-motion," one center at a time.

The Americans, therefore, will give you no trouble, nor will they give us any trouble. The facts of nuclear space-age life are they simply do not have the capability. Our technique of keeping SALT negotiations continuously pending for 10 years held their forces down, while we built up, continuously and massively. Their Presidents and Secretaries of State and Defense deceived them into believing that they still were No. 1 militarily — so the people did not realize the need to rebuild their strength until it was too late.

We will entertain you Heads of State tonight at a formal banquet. And tomorrow, you will return to your respective countries — to put into effect the Great Embargo for World Peace.

What will Oil Embargo II do to the United States? Will it really disrupt our industry, transportation, and agriculture? We have had five years to prepare for such a contingency. Actually instead of improving our situation, we terribly worsened it. Whereas in 1973 we imported less than 40 percent of our oil, by 1976 our imports rose to 50 percent, and by 1978 we will import about 60 percent. What did the Ford Administration do to build toward self-sufficiency in oil? Practically nothing. The International Energy Agency, in a November 28, 1975 report, gave America the poorest rating among 17 of the West's leading industrialized states. The report explained, the United States "has no standards, no incentives, almost no taxes" to cut back energy consumption.

Is the scenario correct in having Brezhnev say that, under an Embargo II threat of strangulation, the United States *could do nothing*? Yes, if we rely on the Kissinger strategy, or on any other strategy the United States has professed since Robert McNamara took over in 1961. There is, as we will see later in this book, one great hope – but it depends on securing a President who will tell the American people what we need to know, instead of what we want to hear.

Meanwhile, consider the scenario for

Cuba II

Scene: JCS "TANK," Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
Time: October 1978.

The President of the United States has been hurriedly ushered through the security guards and devices to the lowest level of the Pentagon. The briefing is conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, referred to herein by his official abbreviation, CJCS.

CJCS: Mr. President, we asked you to come here rather than our taking this news to the White House because we have more equipment here than in any other War Room.

The shocking news is that the Soviets are moving some 225 SS-20s into Cuba. They also are right now landing on their air bases in Cuba the vanguard of a group of Backfire supersonic bombers. We estimate the total at about 100. Our oceanic reconnaissance facilities indicate a concentration of Soviet Delta II submarines and cruise missile submarines developing in the general area north of Cuba and south of New York.

President: Explain an SS-20.

CJCS: An SS-20 is a new-type Soviet ICBM first deployed in 1976 in Kamchatka. Apparently the Soviets were just deploying it there for an exercise and a diversion. It is a compact, land-mobile launcher for missiles, having five MIRV warheads, each in the megaton range. We at first mistook the SS-20 for an intermediate-range missile and did not worry when intelligence reported that they were apparently building them at the rate of more than 100 a year. We thought that they were designed and produced to replace the 900 intermediate and medium-range land-based missiles deployed in the U.S.S.R. to cover targets in Western Europe. If we had given the problem sufficient thought, we might have realized that the Soviets did not need to modernize their IRBMs and MRBMs covering Europe, and that they did not need to MIRV their warheads, because NATO nations have no defense against ballistic missiles, and the older missiles are just as effective for holding European cities and soft military targets hostage as new, more accurate, ones would be.

President: Mr. Chairman, why do we care that the Soviets are moving these SS-20s and Backfires into Cuba? They have thousands of missiles in Russia with which they could hit us. What can they do

to us with a missile launched from Cuba that they couldn't do with one launched from the U.S.S.R.?

CJCS: The difference may be national life or death. Ever since the Soviets completed their buildup of strategic weapons last year and reached a dominant disarming capability, our one chance of resisting an ultimatum for our surrender has been to shift away from the McNamara-Kissinger strategy of ride out the attack, then negotiate, and then *threaten* to strike back. For years, no one believed that we would actually strike back under those circumstances. The purpose of our strategic weapons has been to establish deterrence — but if the Soviets actually launch, then deterrence has failed. With our few remaining weapons and a badly damaged communications, command and control system, we could not hope to do much damage to the Soviets. They have an extensive civil defense system, and probably have a secret system of mobile ABM radars to upgrade their 12,000 SAMs to ABMs for a heavy defense against our remaining missiles plus what we could launch from our submarines.

We have advocated shifting to a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy. Our early warning satellites give instantaneous warning of a Soviet launch, from land or sea, and we would launch immediately upon confirmation by our OTH (Over The Horizon) radars that their strike was indeed on its way against us. We would get a third warning from our older BMEWS system, but launch could not wait for that. This changeover in strategy is essential now, since our ICBMs can no longer hope to "ride out the attack" — the Soviet missiles have sufficient explosive power and guidance accuracy to take out 95 percent of our retaliatory land-based missiles. This strategy is known as a "committal" strategy: you would not have to debate with your advisers for a week as to whether to retaliate. The enemy would know in advance that, if they launched against us, they would inexorably be hit by the full force of our undamaged strategic force.

That new strategy — the last best hope of the free world — will work against missiles launched from

Russia or from a reasonable distance at sea. Their missile travel time is about 30 minutes from launch to targets in the United States. That gives us plenty of time to get our ICBMs on their way to Soviet targets before they can be destroyed in their silos.

For SS-20s launched from Cuba, however, the travel time will be only 8 or 9 minutes to most of our Minuteman bases. The apparently intended total of 225 SS-20s will give them a total of 1,125 warheads, or slightly more than one warhead for each of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles and our 54 Titan II missiles. With the present accuracy of the SS-20s and a yield of between one and two megatons, they will have reasonably high confidence of destroying more than 90 percent of our total force. If their degradation figures are not too high, they may do it.

Even if they don't succeed in their total mission, we are still in bad shape. Even with instantaneous warning of the launch from Cuba, it would probably require 10 to 12 minutes to launch our ICBMs. The SS-20s from Cuba might create a "pin-down" effect or radiation plus electromagnetic pulse, which might prevent our launching, thereby giving time for a second salvo of SS-18s or SS-19s to arrive direct from Russia and destroy our missiles with certainty.

To sum up, Mr. President, once these missiles are landed in Cuba, they will cut more than ⅔ off our expected warning time, and would in effect "flank" execution of a launch-on-warning strategy. And a launch-on-verification-of-warning is the only way to save our entire ICBM force from destruction by the massive counterforce-hard-target-kill capability the Soviets have built up since the signing of SALT I in 1972.

President: What are the Secretary of State's recommendations?

Secretary of State: Get on the Hot Line and tender a preemptive surrender, requesting that the Soviets give us a chance to develop a plausible "cover" for it, so the American people will not realize what is happening.

President: What is the recommendation of the National Security Adviser?

National Security Adviser: Same as the Secretary of State's.

President: You, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: is there any rational alternative to surrender? What is your recommendation?

CJCS: Yes, Mr. President, there is one alternative and we consider it is rational. It does involve a major risk, but we feel that it is to be preferred to the certainty of the destruction of American freedom and of our Constitution and way of life which would surely attend surrender to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Mr. President, we of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave doubts concerning the legality of your order if you decide to adopt the recommendation of the Secretary of State. You and he both took an oath of office to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. So do we in the military. Our oath binds us to support the Constitution against all enemies, foreign or domestic. If you order us to surrender, would you not be violating your oath of office? Would it not become an illegal order? Would you not become a "domestic" enemy if you order the surrender of the sovereignty of the United States? Would we not be obligated by our own sworn duty to depose you from the Office of President, since you would be ordering the destruction of the Constitution and turning these United States and the American people over to the men in the Kremlin? Would we not have to next ask the Vice President, to see if he would uphold his oath of office? And if he, too, would surrender the United States, should we not then go through the legal order of succession to the Presidency?

There is one alternative open to you. It will not irrationally bring down upon our people a nuclear holocaust, but it will require a noble President to face the *risk* of Soviet response. We will tell you what it is.

chapter XII

KISSINGERISM WITHOUT KISSINGER

Among the Americans deeply concerned with what Kissinger is doing to our country, many believe that his ouster will end the danger. This is not so.

The calculated covert campaign to disarm the United States unilaterally and bring us to the brink of surrender did not begin with Henry Kissinger. Nor will it end with him — unless Gerald Ford is nominated and elected, and makes good on his repeated threat to keep Kissinger in office in his new Administration. In that case, Kissinger will be able, within two additional years, to complete his "job" of negotiating our surrender — just as he described it to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.

Not since the end of the Eisenhower Administration has any *President* exercised definitive and decisive power over U.S. grand strategy, national defense posture, the National Security Council, and the U.S. intelligence community. Robert Strange McNamara was *de facto* President for National Defense for seven years under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The NcNamara policies then continued unabated through a short "holding" term by Defense Secretary Clark Clifford.

When Henry Kissinger moved in as National Security Adviser to President Nixon in January 1969, he immediately took over seven of the eight key

chairmanships in the National Security Council; the eighth went to his deputy. Although Melvin Laird was named Secretary of Defense, Kissinger seized actual control of defense policies through his control of Nixon and the National Security Council. Kissinger reorganized the entire intelligence community so that all significant items were required to go through him before they could reach the President.

If Henry Kissinger is replaced by Ford or by a new President, the power-bases created by Kissinger will be easy for an astute and ambitious successor to gather unto himself. Therefore, the question of who will succeed Kissinger is almost as important as the question of who will take office as U.S. President in 1977.

All during 1975 and 1976, it was obvious that Kissinger was becoming increasingly vulnerable. Like a flock of vultures circling carrion, a group of self-styled "defense intellectuals" and foreign policy "experts" began maneuvering to get into position to become Henry Kissinger's replacement. Of that ambitious group, all nine of those most likely to succeed Kissinger would have *action* policies similar to those of McNamara and Kissinger. They might enunciate different *declaratory* policies — that is, their rhetoric would *sound* as if they were going to act differently, but they would *do* the same things to the nation.

They would all press for more SALT agreements with the Soviets. They would promote appeasement under the name of detente or some other pseudonym. They would talk about a strong defense while covertly preventing us from rebuilding our military power. Above all, they would continue to hold down U.S. strategic forces while the Soviets continue the staggering momentum of their buildup.

These policies are predictable because eight of the nine are — like McNamara and Kissinger (and Kissinger's most influential assistant, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and Kissinger's long-time deputy who took over the National Security Council for Kissinger) — all members of the most influential non-governmental group in the world, the Council on Foreign Relations.[33] The ninth man has a record of acting like CFR members. Even more persuasive is the fact that most of them either were stalwart members of the McNamara cabal at the Pentagon when he was Secretary of Defense, or were closely allied with that group.

Thus, Paul H. Nitze, Cyrus Vance and Paul C. Warnke were all part-and-parcel of Defense Secretary McNamara's policy to keep the no-win Vietnam War going, year after year, at an annual cost of up to $40 billion diverted out of our strategic weapons programs. This was how our commanding 8-to-1 superiority over the Soviets was reduced to parity by the time McNamara left office. Indeed, Paul H. Nitze was the brains and chief theoretician of the McNamara plan for the clandestine unilateral disarmament of the United States.[34]

Of the five CFR members who did not work directly with McNamara, George W. Ball is a long-time State Department Soviet-appeaser-type who has dedicated most of his career to urging increased (U.S.-subsidized) trade with the Soviets, even when the Cold War was at its hottest. Donald Rumsfeld is Gerald Ford's "my guy" Secretary of Defense who has followed and implemented the Kissinger policies (after noting that deviation therefrom caused the firing of his predecessor, James Schlesinger). Robert Ellsworth is one of the two present Deputy Secretaries of Defense and was formerly a State

Department official under Kissinger. Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, a liberal professor at Columbia University, is a highly articulate member of the CFR ideologue group promoting global government and "interdependence."

James Schlesinger, another eager candidate for Kissinger's post, supported and implemented all Kissinger's strategic and disarmament policies while he was Secretary of Defense, and still supports them in all vital parts. No policies advocated by Schlesinger would give our country any additional in-being weapons prior to the achievement by the Soviets of a first-strike disarming capability. Schlesinger was ousted by Kissinger from Ford's Cabinet because Schlesinger began to emerge as a too-ambitious rival for Kissinger's superstar role as director of all U.S. defense policies, but there never was, and still is not, any significant policy difference. Schlesinger's policy always was, and would remain, more SALT, more concessions, more stalling on weapons, more negotiations, while the Soviets race ahead.[85]

Jimmy Carter, in late March 1976, named Paul Warnke (Director, CFR) and Paul Nitze (long-time power in CFR) as his national security advisers, Brzezinski (CFR) as chief of his foreign policy task force, and Professor Richard Gardner (CFR) as a member of that task force. Cyrus Vance (Director, CFR) has long been considered in inside-Washington circles to be an "odds-on" favorite to replace Kissinger if *any* Democrat is elected President.

The near-total influence of this group over Carter in matters of defense and foreign policy was revealed in Carter's first major foreign policy address, delivered in New York City at the end of June 1976. The speech was put together by Zbigniew Brzezinski, but it sounded exactly like the Old McNa-

mara Hands. It was the foreign policy of McNamara speaking through John F. Kennedy; of McNamara speaking through Lyndon B. Johnson; of Kissinger speaking through Richard Nixon; and of Kissinger speaking through Gerald Ford. It was the foreign policy that cost 56,000 American boys sacrificed cynically and uselessly to "win" the Kissinger-type peace. It was the foreign policy of detente, of "accommodation," of "cooperation" with the Soviet Union. It was the foreign policy of clandestine unilateral disarmament of the United States in the face of the tremendous Soviet weapons buildup.

Of course, the *New York Times* approved. The Carter policy stressed "interdependence" (CFR's great rationalization for Global Government). It emphasized international problems of poverty and population control. It applauded "democratic" trends in Africa, and deplored the "racism" of South Africa. It deplored the sums of money spent worldwide on arms. It called for patience and understanding in dealing with the Soviet Union.

Jimmy Carter's "new" policy, despite some minor criticisms of Kissinger, followed the Kissinger policies closely. As one columnist noted, there was nothing in Carter's speech "that might signal to either America's allies or adversaries overseas that Carter will embark on new foreign policy departures if he is elected." Carter would continue the same foreign and defense policies which reduced us down from the greatest power in the world in 1962 to the brink of strategic surrender in 1976.

The most tragic of Carter's statements on foreign policy, however, was made in May 1976 in *Newsweek's* international edition (not generally available inside the United States). In it Carter expressed his firm belief that the United States must seek the "full

cooperation" of the Soviet Union in reaching a Middle East settlement, in reducing tensions in the Korean peninsula, and in achieving arms control measures (i.e., through SALT).[36]

America cannot afford one more President who professes belief that the "full cooperation" of the Soviet Union can be obtained for *any* objective other than to make the world soft and safe for Soviet Communist conquest. Franklin D. Roosevelt tried it at Teheran and at Yalta and failed; Harry S. Truman tried it at Potsdam and failed; Dwight Eisenhower tried it at Camp David and at Paris, and failed; John F. Kennedy tried it at Vienna and produced the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; Richard M. Nixon tried it at Moscow and at Washington, and reaped a disastrous detente and a sell-out in SALT; and Gerald Ford tried it at the Vladivostok Summit and was rewarded with a hypocritical bear-hug covering a contemptuous and cynical entrapment.

Gerald Ford, in his January 1976 State of the Union Address, boasted that our nation has not engaged in recrimination concerning our surrender in Vietnam. That doesn't sound like the sort of comment that would spring spontaneously into Mr. Ford's mind, so perhaps it was prepared for his speech by the senior Cabinet official most likely to be hurt by such recrimination, namely, Nobel Peace laureate Henry Kissinger. A thorough-going exposé and recrimination about our surrender in Vietnam is one good way we can prevent the surrender of the United States to the Politburo of the Soviet Union.

The same cabal of self-styled "defense intellectuals" and foreign policy "experts" who trapped the then-greatest military power in the world into an installment surrender to the fourth-rate Soviet-pup-

pet Communist government of North Vietnam, are now well on their way to accomplishing our nation's surrender to the Soviet Union. There has been no substantive change in U.S. defense strategy since Robert McNamara and his CFR associates went into power under President Kennedy in 1961.[37]

If there is no recrimination, we will not be able to learn from history and, in accordance with the aphorism attributed to George Santayana, will be doomed to repeat its mistakes. More specifically, we will forget that Vietnam was known as "McNamara's war" and that he proudly consented to have it so designated. We will forget that he was the architect of the "no-win" objective, and of the "creeping escalation" policy that implemented that objective. We will forget that he refused to let our war effort become what he contemptuously referred to as a "crusade against Communism," and that, whenever there was a move in Congress to enact a formal declaration of war in Vietnam, McNamara would personally rush over to the Hill to dissuade Congress from taking such affirmative action. It would, of course, have changed his status from that of only a *de facto* betrayer to a *de jure* betrayer, considering the aid and comfort he was giving to the enemy engaged in killing 56,000 American troops.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird later demonstrated with charts and statistics that, whereas the United States was spending nearly $40 billion per year on Vietnam, the Soviets were spending only $1 billion per year. This gave the Soviets a $39 billion-per-year advantage in capability of spending on strategic weapons. Of all the tragedies involved in the Vietnam war, the greatest is that, whereas we spent at least $150 billion on weapons that are now destroyed or captured by the enemy, the Soviets spent a comparable sum over the same period of

time to build an offensive weapons force capable of threatening or destroying the United States.

Recrimination about Vietnam is an urgent necessity because the very men who helped McNamara plot, execute, and prolong the Vietnam diversion are now ready — as "agents in place" — to move back into power again.[38]

The next President of the United States — if he is to finish his term as Chief of State of a free and independent nation — must *not* return to power any of these pro-surrender prophets of doom. And, of course, he must root out all of the residuals of the 16 years of the McNamara-Kissinger policies.

chapter XIII

THE TESTING OF GERALD FORD

During the critical weeks of the 1976 primary elections, Gerald Ford developed a counterattack against criticisms that he and his appointee, Henry Kissinger, were irresponsibly weakening our national defense. He repeatedly made an emotional pitch to the American voters' customary sense of fair play. Putting on his best TV expression of righteous indignation, Ford would raise his voice and say:

> My military budget which I introduced in January of 1975, and my military budget which I introduced in January of 1976, are the two highest military budgets in history.

What Ford *said* is true. It is the *implication* which deceives, namely, that because the last two military budgets are the "highest" in history, they therefore "must be" sufficient.

The truth is that those budgets are "high" only in inflated paper dollars. The most realistic and expert analysis of the Ford defense budgets was made by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. This group told many painful truths about the 1975 Ford military budget that apply equally to his proposed 1976 budget:

In the face of the Soviet military build-up, and Soviet foreign policy, *our defense budget is an invitation to disaster.*

The defense budget recently proposed by the Ford Administration would at best keep our defense

> posture constant. We believe this static policy is not enough, in view of the nature of Soviet policy and the massive regular increases in Soviet military programs, which show no signs of abating. We therefore recommend an increase in our defense capability, especially for the Navy, for research and development, and for ready conventional forces. ...
>
> Unless we set a new and responsible course, the next two years may see the military balance shift decisively toward the Soviet Union and its allies; an irreversible deterioration of our alliance network; and the conquest or destruction of many small nations whose existence we and others have guaranteed — among them the embattled state of Israel. ...
>
> The full gravity of our defense problems, and the magnitude of our defense needs, have not been adequately presented to the American people.
>
> The nation is in great danger. Our danger is increasing every day. The Soviet Union continues to pursue a policy of expansion that threatens our vital interests in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. ...
>
> The Soviet Union's expansionist foreign policy is backed by a military building program which has no peacetime parallel in world affairs.
>
> Thus far, however, — in public at least — our government continues to talk about 'detente.' ... In terms of real defense capability, the United States is in many respects pursuing a course of unilateral disarmament, especially with regard to the Navy and other conventional forces. We are now spending a smaller fraction of our GNP on defense than has been the case for more than twenty years. Defense spending now takes only 26 cents of every federal tax dollar, compared to 45 cents in 1964 and 57 cents in 1956.

The members of this Foreign Policy Task Force include many with impeccable liberal credentials.

The chairman is Eugene V. Rostow (formerly Under Secretary of State and presently a Professor at Yale Law School). Other members include John P. Roche (a former Special Assistant to President Lyndon Johnson and now Professor at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), and many professors and administrators from universities such as Berkeley, Stanford, Georgetown, and Washington.

The slick deception involved in Gerald Ford's 1976 defense budget can also be exposed by analysis of the official Department of Defense Report of March 1976, presented by Ford's own Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Evaluating our action capabilities as of March 1976, he concludes that in strategic nuclear forces:

> Taking Soviet improvements and U.S. developments into consideration, we can expect a *continued Soviet advantage* in throw-weight and megatons, although we should retain the lead in number of warheads.
>
> These trends mean that in most of the standard indices the Soviet lead will *increase* over the next decade, *even assuming Congressional support* for the proposed program. (emphasis added).

The "proposed program" that Rumsfeld is discussing is the Gerald Ford proposals for the next five fiscal years, 1977 through 1981. So Ford's vaunted "highest military budgets" in history will not even *start* us in an attempt to *catch up* with the Soviet leads in strategic power. Their advantage in the two most significant areas, throw-weight and megatonnage, will continue and will *increase*—*even if* Congress fully funds all the Ford programs in strategic forces.

Ford, Nixon, and Kissinger always try to blame Congress whenever defense weaknesses are exposed. Congress is, indeed, to blame for vital cuts in de-

fense appropriations — but in this case, on which our national survival depends, Ford's own Secretary of Defense makes it clear that the blame rests squarely on the Administration and *not* on Congress.

To most Americans, it seems impossible that more than $100 billion for fiscal 1977 will not buy us enough military hardware to help catch up with the Soviets. If you think that's bad, however, consider this. Since 1967, the unilateral-disarming Defense Department has gone through One Trillion Dollars — that's right, $1,000,000,000,000 — without adding a single ICBM, SLBM, or heavy strategic bomber to our strategic forces. We have exactly the same number of ICBMs deployed this year as we did in 1967; exactly the same number of missile-launching submarines; and about half as many strategic bombers. It wasn't easy to do this, but McNamara and his Whiz Kids, + Kissinger + Schlesinger + Rumsfeld have been highly resourceful in finding ways to spend money while holding down our strategic forces.

What were the Soviets doing meanwhile? Here is a partial answer from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's Report for Fiscal Year 1977:

> Between 1965 and 1975, Soviet strategic offensive forces have also increased:
>
> — Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from 224 to 1,600 (an increase of nearly 1,400);
>
> — Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) from 29 to 730 (an increase of about 700);
>
> — Strategic warheads and bombs from 450 to 2,500 (an increase of about 2,000).

Where do we go from here? What will Mr. Ford's proposed budgets for Fiscal '77, '78, '79, and '80 buy us in the way of strategic power? We have seen Rumsfeld's admission that they will not provide enough for us to cut down the Soviet lead or

even to hold our present position in the strategic balance. Speaking in terms of new missiles, here is the answer from two strategic experts:

> The United States, by contrast, will not have even one new missile until 1979 [fiscal 1980] when the Trident-I SLBM is expected to be deployed. The first new U.S. ICBM will not appear before the mid-1980s.[39]

While the United States under Gerald Ford's "highest-in-history" defense budgets is producing zero ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers in the fiscal years up to 1980, what will the Soviets be producing under the dictatorship of Bear-hugging Brezhnev, whom Mr. Ford assures us is so deeply concerned with capping the arms race?

The most accurate short unclassified estimate comes from England, so it is wholly uncolored by U.S. politics:

> The British Ministry of Defense has just completed a report on Soviet weapons. In a departure from custom, Roy Mason, Secretary of State for Defense, has sent copies to all members of Parliament. The conclusions confirm, in many cases go considerably beyond the estimates of rapid Soviet buildup in nearly all categories that have been made by James Schlesinger, Admiral Zumwalt, and others in the United States. The British report stresses continuing Soviet large-scale production of a variety of missile systems, and states that further SALT talks are unlikely to have any early effect on this. Production of the new SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 will accelerate to 300 a year; for the new long-range SSN-8, able to reach the U.S. from submarines in the Barents Sea, it will be more than 100 a year for the rest of the decade. The first true Soviet aircraft carrier (up to now there have been only helicopter carriers), of 40,000 tons, will go into service this summer; another is being built, and the keel for a third laid down. Fifty of the new missile-carrying Backfire bombers have been produced, with current

> production at two a month. More than 90 nuclear submarines have been produced in the past 10 years, including a bigger version of the already big Delta-class type that carries the SSN-8 missiles.[40]

In the midst of the April and May primaries in 1976, Ford's advisers realized they would have to devise a "cover" of some sort to fend off exposure of what Ford's budget would actually do and not do. Ronald Reagan's sincere concern on the defense issue was impressing more and more voters. So the Ford political staff dreamed up a ploy. Ford sent to Congress a request for a special defense appropriation which generated headlines like this on April 27:

> MORE MISSILES ASKED. President Ford, citing the slow pace of the arms-control talks with the Soviets, asked Congress yesterday for an additional $322.4 million to continue production of Minuteman III missiles. . . . Funds requested by the President would build 60 more missiles.

But there were a couple of jokers in the Ford request: (1) he did not commit himself to *build* the missiles; in the fine print it explained that he only wanted "the option" to build them. This means that, once the Reagan challenge is past, the Administration could merely forget the whole thing and then claim credit for saving $322.4 million.

The second joker was more sophisticated. It was made to sound as if we would add at least 60 missiles. But there would be no launchers for them. Since, unlike the Soviets, our silos and launcher tubes cannot be used for firing reloads, an additional 60 missiles without launchers will do us no good as additional strategic weapons.

Sophisticated deception and lies were alien to the original image of Gerald Ford. But that was before his inauguration and during the first few months when he unequivocally disavowed any intention or

desire to run for election as President in 1976. What happened to change him was a growing addiction to power accompanied by an over-exposure to Henry Kissinger.

By the time of Vladivostok, the Soviets had incontestable proof that Ford had already been taken by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger could have communicated that message to the Kremlin in one of his private conferences with his close friend, Anatoly Dobrynin. But Kissinger had also provided a public demonstration by a "planted message" in Gerald Ford's first address to Congress. The official voice was President Ford's, but the words bore the indicia of Henry Kissinger:

> To the Soviet Union I pledge a continuity in our commitment to the course of the past three years. To our peoples and to all mankind, we owe a continued effort to live and, where possible, to work together in peace — for in a thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations.

Those words committed the new President to adopt and continue the Kissinger policies "of the past three years" — the same policies that brought the United States down to strategic inferiority and which subjected the United States to detente on Soviet terms.

But there was much, much more. The same speech revealed that Ford was trapped in an artificial world so far divorced from reality that it expunged from his memory more than 25 years of history through which he himself had lived, and it involved Ford in a campaign to lead the American people into that same artificial world. Kissinger accomplished all this by having Gerald Ford affirm in that speech this monstrous lie masquerading as a truism:

> for in a thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations.

Of course there is an alternative to detente on Kremlin terms! The 27 years from World War II to SALT I attested to that! That passage represented a campaign of psychological warfare against President Ford, designed to bind his mind and spirit with a paralysis of fear. Those words set up the cunning Communist trap of the false alternatives: Red or dead. They lead to the pre-designed conclusion that the only alternative to thermonuclear war is "a positive and peaceful relationship" with the Soviets on *their* terms.

From the very hour he took office as President in August 1974, Ford's record is replete with sycophantic and fulsome praise of Henry Kissinger, and embarrassingly obeisant acceptance of his policies and orders. The incident of Kissinger's forbidding President Ford to meet with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in October 1975 will long stand as a low-mark in the humiliation of an American Chief of State. Ford has often repeated his assertions that Kissinger has been a great Secretary of State, and that, if Ford is elected in 1976, Kissinger will be asked to stay on in office. No wonder Congressman Ed Derwinski said: "The President is a captive of Henry K."

The chances are that most Americans, even though they do not admit it themselves, recognize that Gerald Ford has been brainwashed by Henry Kissinger. For better or worse, one thing the American people will not tolerate in a Presidential candidate *is an established vulnerability to brainwashing.* George Romney's speedy withdrawal as a front-running presidential candidate in 1968 proved that. In the Patty Hearst case, it appeared for a time that brainwashing might be accepted as a defense. But

it wasn't. As a nation, we know that any President will make mistakes. But we insist that at least the mistakes be his own.

It has become a time-hallowed tradition in the Soviet Union, raised over the years to the status of Communist doctrine, that the incumbent dictator of the U.S.S.R. will test each new American President in an ordeal of summitry. Stalin tested and bested Roosevelt at Yalta, and Truman at Potsdam; Khrushchev tested Eisenhower at a summit in Paris which was never actually held.

The ordeal administered to young Jack Kennedy by Khrushchev at the summit in Vienna in 1961 is the closest precedent for the Ambush at Vladivostok. At Vienna, the earthy and brutal Khrushchev raved, bullied, threatened, and shouted until he literally scared young Kennedy. Kennedy never officially reported on the Vienna conferences, but eventually enough leaked to give a reasonable picture of what happened. Khrushchev threatened to move against West Berlin with all the might of the huge conventional forces of the U.S.S.R. He threatened the use of nuclear weapons, and reminded Kennedy that the Soviets had developed the world's first ICBM even before they successfully orbited the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik I.

Khrushchev made his personal estimate of Kennedy's character and vulnerabilities, and then followed up with some additional tests. Khrushchev sent Kennedy, via the New England poet Robert Frost, a taunt that the U.S. Administration was "too liberal to fight—even in defense of U.S. vital interests." Kennedy made no response. So Khrushchev got together with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Castro to plot the clandestine deployment of offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba, thereby bringing scores of

millions of Americans within minutes of nuclear incineration.

Once the Kremlin dictators are convinced that the U.S. leadership, and especially the President, is vulnerable, they are convinced that the nation, too, is vulnerable. At the time Khrushchev engineered the deployment of his missiles to Cuba, the United States held a strategic superiority over the U.S.S.R. of at least 8-to-1. Furthermore, we then had a substantial disarming capability against the Soviets, and a capability of both "win-strike-first" and even "win-strike-second." Yet, Khrushchev's estimate of weakness in our national leadership was *decisive* in his accepting the horrendous possibility of retaliation from our 8-to-1 superiority. Consider the meaning to the survival of America if the Kremlin bosses should detect weakness in our leadership when the strategic odds are in their favor.

Looking back at the ambuscade at Vladivostok, we find that the Kremlin accomplished all its purposes: (1) a basic agreement that gave the Soviets everything they ever wanted or needed, (2) a boxing-in of the American President so that he would have to become a salesman of the terms of that agreement, (3) a boxing-in of the President so that he could never, from that time on, tell his own people the true state of the strategic balance, or even admit it to himself.

Brezhnev and Gromyko got out of the ambush one additional asset far more important to them — a lever against us with vastly greater potential for our destruction or defeat. They got a judgment of the intelligence and competence and courage of the new President of the United States — a realistic preview of just how he would react in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, and how he would respond

in decision-making when under psychological stress and strain. That knowledge is of supreme value to the Soviets — and supreme peril to us.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, the competence and courage of leadership have been recognized as essential ingredients in the credibility of strategic deterrence. Henry Kissinger, in his book *The Necessity for Choice*, explained the concept:

> Deterrence ultimately depends upon an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor. . . .
>
> Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor.
>
> Moreover, deterrence is the product of these factors, and not a sum. *If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails.* Strength, no matter how overwhelming, is useless without the willingness to resort to it. Power combined with willingness to use it will be ineffective if the aggressor does not believe in it. . . .

Unfortunately for the credibility of our deterrent, if the Soviets rate Ford as zero, then the product is zero and as Kissinger said, deterrence fails. The validity is of this concept is confirmed by the latest pronouncement of the 1976 Secretary of Defense in his DOD Annual Report, FY 1977:

> Before we can have deterrence, we must demonstrate a capability to act, the ability to act effectively, a credible plan to act, and the will to act according to plan with the available capability.

What the Politburo needs most to know about a President of the United States is his capability to make the decision to use what is called "the ultimate sanction." This power of the U.S. President to unleash or to hold-in-leash our strategic nuclear forces has never been more eloquently pictured than by John F. Kennedy in a 1962 radio and television address:

> For of all the awesome responsibilities entrusted to this office, none is more somber to contemplate than the special statutory authority to employ nuclear arms in defense of our people and our freedom.

Unfortunately for the credibility of our deterrent, in addition to what the Soviets discovered for themselves in their psycologically conditioned experiment at Vladivostok, they have Ford's record of decision-making as President to guide them. Professor John Roche, in his nationally-syndicated column, recited a series of Ford's changes of positions on policies and appointments, concluding:

> Why, in the era of Gerald Ford ... is there this nostalgia for the little man from Missouri? What was there about Truman that Ford lacks? His cruel critics suggest the answer is brains, but I don't buy that. ... The answer must be sought elsewhere, and I think it is self-confidence. If Truman went in for plain speaking, Ford indulges in plain dithering.
>
> To put it differently, is there one issue on which the President has not gone up and done like a yo-yo? Following his trail would break a snake's back. No help for sinful New York; well, maybe a little; well, $2.3 billion? OK.[41]

If the Politburo leadership had any doubts after Vladivostok about Gerald Ford's intelligence and understanding of military matters controlling the life or death of his nation, or his ability to judge and deal with Soviet leaders, they were dispelled when they watched the TV tape of Ford's press conference of December 2, 1974, describing the Vladivostok Agreement. It began, remember:

> At Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race which has heretofore eluded us since the nuclear age began. I believe this is something for which future generations will thank us.

Thus it was that Gerald Ford failed his test in the Ordeal by Ambush.

chapter XIV

THE SOLUTION

The crisis confronting America in our Bicentennial year is not a crisis of technology, or a crisis of resources, or a crisis of production, or even a crisis of funding. It is a crisis of leadership which was best described by one of the most eloquent writers of our age in these words:

> Through a combination of lapses, stupidities, overidealism, and misjudgments, each at the time seemingly sound and justified, each in its moment capable of a rationale that had brought a majority to approve it, the United States had gotten herself into a position vis-a-vis the Russians in which the issue was more and more rapidly narrowing down to a choice between fight and die now or compromise and die later.
>
> And out of that fearful peril only the most iron-willed and nobly dedicated and supremely unafraid men could lead the nation.[42]

Gerald Ford has been put to the test and found wanting. Now the American people are being subjected to *our* test. If we give a new four-year term to a man whom Soviet bosses have already bested in a confrontation of wits and fortitude, we deserve our fate.

It would give critical help to our deterrent if the American people choose as our new leader a man of intelligence and powerful character. His quality of being "supremely unafraid" must have been demonstrated, if we are to have confidence in it, and if the Soviets are to respect it. It is far too late for us to suffer a political candidate who wants to shelter himself and us from reality.

We are fortunate that we have at least one candidate who did not fear to raise the "Kissinger issue." None of us wants to hear that our nation is being betrayed by trusted leaders. Yet if we are to survive, that is the first unpleasant fact we must face. It is intolerable to be told that the United States is no longer No. 1 militarily and is rapidly, potentially fatally, falling into a weak second place. Yet, there is one candidate willing to accept the unpopularity which inevitably attends the bearer of bad news.

If the United States is to survive in freedom, the new President must clear out all the prophets of doom whose disarmament policies have brought us down to our point of fearful peril. We must not retain in office, or restore to power, those same men who brought us to our present state of weakness.

It is axiomatic that no realistic solution to a military threat can be formulated without first making an accurate estimate of the situation. You can't tell where you need to go until you find out where you are now. That has been a prime purpose of this book. Secondly, if enough people can be alerted to the danger of our present situation and brought to believe in its solution, the United States can be saved from the alternatives of strategic surrender or nuclear destruction.

What can we do now? What should the new President do?

The first priority is to rebuild the credibility of our strategic deterrent. Unless we do that, our entire population, deprived of all ABM defenses by the SALT I Anti-Defense Treaty, will be sitting ducks for mass murder or the threat thereof, at the will or caprice of the Kremlin.

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld properly included in his four essential elements of deterrence, "a credible

plan to act." That means a credible *strategy*. Henry Kissinger has deprived us of this. Quite literally, the United States now has *no* nuclear strategy. The SALT I pacts of 1972 were based on the strategy of "Mutual Assured Destruction," appropriately acronymed MAD. This theory has now been discredited. The Schlesinger bandaid treatment for this was to substitute a declaration of a flexible response to limited nuclear attacks—but this has no validity because the Soviet Union, having attained escalation dominance at all levels, will never launch less than a fullscale disarming attack against our land-based retaliatory forces. Why should they take the risk of massive damage by a U.S. retaliatory attack when they have the capability to ensure themselves against it?

Our ultimate objective should be to return to a posture that will support a war-winning strategy. Such a capability is the most reliable deterrent to nuclear attack.

In the interim before our deterrent is rebuilt, however, we need a change of strategy to prevent the Soviets from attaining the war-winning capability which they are fast approaching. The *only* way that we can do this from our present situation is to change over from our present strategy (of *not* launching our ICBMs until *after* a Soviet disarming strike has impacted) to a launch-on-verification-of-warning strategy. This is the *only* way we can preserve our ICBMs as a credible deterrent.

It is the satellite warning which revolutionizes the situation. There need no longer be any worry about starting a nuclear war by accident. It probably requires a 10-minute procedure to launch a Minuteman after the decision has been made. The countdown procedure would begin instantly upon the

first satellite warning, and would be aborted if a second warning or verification were not received.

In the 1959-to-say-1967 timeframe, our ICBM force *could* "ride out an attack" with some reasonable chance of survival. This is no longer possible. The advance in guidance technology in the Soviet ICBM programs has made survival of any substantial portion of our land-based deterrent a physical impossibilty. As we have noted, all the new Soviet series ICBMs have PBVs with on-board digital computers. That, combined with their now-more-than-adequate numbers of missiles and warheads and explosive power, has changed the former picture entirely and demands a revolutionary shift in our strategy.

We must change over immediately to a "launch-on-verification-of-warning" strategy. This will immediately render our 1,000 Minuteman force invulnerable and make it safe against a preemptive strike by the Soviets, or even a preventive strike. This will open up new, cheaper, and speedier methods of rebuilding our strategic force to the point of restoring a true balance. Instead of spending billions of dollars digging and constructing hardened silos for additional missiles, they will be just as invulnerable on inexpensive, easily constructed launching pads. Since the Minuteman III production lines are still open, we have ongoing production lines for the missiles.

Contrary to the alarmist cries of the disarmament elites, this change will not detract from but add to what they call "crisis stability." The actual effect of the new strategy will be to avert the causes of nuclear crises. An additional benefit of incalculable value, when dealing with the Soviets who have adhered to a preemptive strategy, is that it removes

all temptation to preempt, because it will make preemption impossible.

A second recommendation is increasingly being discussed among our country's expert strategic analysts, including those at the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Miami. We should withdraw from the SALT I Anti-Defense Treaty in accord with Article 15 which permits either country to do this when "extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Certainly the "staggering" momentum of Soviet buildup and their substitution of "heavy" missiles for "light" missiles do jeopardize our supreme interests.

Finally, one of the most perceptive U.S. critics of the Vladivostok Agreement made a cheerful comment:

> Well, there *is* one good thing about it; it hasn't yet been approved by Congress.

The American people and their representatives still have the option to reject SALT II.

A country so divinely blest as America, with boundless resources, a Gross National Product more than twice that of our enemies, a technology that is the envy of the world, the "can-do" resourcefulness that put a man on the moon, *certainly* has all the qualities it takes to defend ourselves against the Soviets and their armed might.

There is one essential ingredient, however, and it is urgently needed not only in the offices of President and Vice President, but also in Congress and other major offices. We need leaders who are supremely unafraid to face the unpleasant truth, nobly-dedicated to the continued independence of our "one Nation under God," and iron-willed in dealing with the Kremlin.

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