l!S© to the NEWS

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'WHEN A STRATEGY IS NEEDED

The new movie called MIDWAY is interesting because of its spectacular pictures of the greatest naval battle *ot* this century and the lessons that can be learned from it. Midway was one of the few occasions in history when the side with superior military strength lost. We were able to defeat the superior Japanese navy because we had broken the Japanese code, we knew where their carriers were headed, and Admiral Nimitz could concentrate our forces and surprise them.

Political campaigns have many elements similar to milbry cam paigns. A candidate with inferior assets can bridge the gap ody with a winning strategy. This was the key to Jimmy Carter's success. As a former one-term Governor of a southern state, he had little to start with. But he had a winning strategy: first, to get the liberals to support him as their candidate to knock George Wallace out of the race, then to use that momentum to go into all the primaries and get there firstest with the mostest.

Ronald Reagan faced an opponent who held the immensely superior assets of White House incumbency. The contrast between Ford's and Reagan's political weapons can be compared to two men hiring workers where one can pay everyone with certified checks, but the other can pay only with 1.0.u.s redeemable after January 20, 1977, if at all.

For Reagan to win in the face of such odds, he needed a winning strategy to outmane11Ver the occupant of the White House. Unfortunately, although Reagan is the most attracilve and articulate candidate to appear in many years, he did not have a campaign manager equal to the task.

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tJohn Sears' original :pleu 'Was to run Uonald Reagan as a moderat,2 candidate wi tb. no significant di.ffereni1es from Gerald Ford except charisma, to have Reagan win the New Ha pshire and Florida primaries, after which Gerald Ford was supposed to **withdraw** as a candidate as Lyndon Johnson did after his earl;' setback in New llainpshire in 19613. when this plan did.n't materialize, Sears had no alternate strategy.

The **on\7** reason Reagan's campaign picked up momentum after tbe first disastrous Tuesdays was because local and independent conserva tive Republicans took the campaign into their own hand.s, made maximUI!l use of dedicated volunteers, and successfully insisted on Reagan's taking a strong stand on issues such ,as the Panama Canal, Henry Kissinger, detente, and the Human Life .Amendment. This enabled Reagan to score brilliant victories in N9rth Carolina, Texas, Indiana, N'el:;raska, and Missouri.

Unfortunately, tbe delays and the general snafus of Sears• national organization, including the mishandling of getting Reagan's name and Reagan delegates on the ballot, proved unsurmountable handi caps in Ohio and New Jersey. Illinois was lost by the glaring early failure to appeal to the voters to elect a native son as President. k.U:lcdB: Hardly a handful of voters know that neagan was born and attended school and college in Illinois.

Reagan's best chance to win the nomination was to lock it up early through victories in the primaries, as Carter did. In the last weeks before the Convention, Gerald Ford holds all the aces in the game of phoning and. meeti.ng with delegates on a one by one basis. Reagan couldn't invite delegates to dinner at the white House to meet the ueen of England, as Ford could and did.

Ford's campaign was just as devoid of a coherent strategy as Reagan's, but Ford didn't need a stra_tegy since he could deal from his power-base in the \v'"tlite Rouse.

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