Court Monitor • Dec 9, 2001

Supreme Court Tackles School Monopoly

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Our mammoth public school system is a recent development in American history. Throughout most of the 1800s, in contrast to today, the average American only spent about two years in formal schooling. Abraham Lincoln, perhaps our brightest president, spent only about six months in formal schooling. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was taught at home until high school. Relatively insignificant a hundred years ago, the public school system has rapidly grown to where it now surpasses the world's largest corporations in both revenue and personnel. While Clinton attempted to break up Microsoft's monopoly, he never lifted a finger to reform the growing public school monopoly. Rather, he spent eight years promoting this monopoly, whose employees constitute about 10% of the delegates to the Democratic National Conventions. In Ohio, Republicans injected some competition into public schools by allowing about 3,700 Cleveland families to receive vouchers to spend at the schools of their choice. Although this program assisted only a small fraction of public school students, it did directly challenge the monopoly. Predictably, a flood of litigation followed, leading to the Sixth Circuit invalidating the Cleveland program in a 2-1 decision. Simmons-Harris et al. v. Zelman (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000) The panel majority did not acknowledge the rampant failures of public school education or its extraordinary monopoly power. Nor did the panel majority accommodate principles of judicial restraint and defer to the legislative will of Ohioans. Instead, the two-judge majority invoked the Establishment Clause of the Constitution to invalidate the voucher program. Even though parents themselves selected their schools, the court held that private decisions in favor of religiously affiliated schools were impermissible. In so holding, the court resurrected the late Chief Justice Warren Burger's three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): a statute satisfies the Establishment Clause only if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) does not, as a primary effect, advance religion, and (3) avoids entanglement with religion. . . . The second part, which speculates about effect, could invalidate countless laws, from federal holidays to Sabbath observances. Privately, Chief Justice Burger later lamented that his test was misconstrued against religion. Justice Thomas, speaking for four justices, all but ended the misuse in his holding last year in Mitchell v. Helms (2000). There, Justice Thomas held that the critical issue in cases of government aid to religious schools is whether the assistance is neutral. Neutrality, he held, is determined based on whether there are genuinely independent and private choices of individual parents (which is the circumstance in the Cleveland school voucher program). Justice O'Connor, however, equivocated in supporting this principle, and the Eighth Circuit panel majority seized on her ambiguity to invalidate the program. Because the big majority of the Cleveland parents decided to spend their vouchers on sectarian schools, the panel majority held it to violate the Lemon test. The dissent, adhering to the logic of Justice Thomas, locked horns in a bitter exchange with the panel majority for invalidating the program based on the religious nature of schools selected by parents. The dissent described that view as "nativist bigotry," to which the panel majority responded by deploring "gratuitous insults." This bitterness now moves to the Supreme Court, which will hear the arguments again and issue a decision in the spring.