Court Monitor • Mar 24, 2002

Dancing Around Campaign Finance Laws

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At the same time that Congress was rushing to pass campaign finance reform, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit invalidated a ban on corporate campaign contributions and expenditures. Beaumont v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), 278 F. 3d 261 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2002). Judge Wilkinson, a potential Supreme Court nominee, wrote the Court's opinion to allow political contributions and expenditures by North Carolina Right to Life Inc (NCRL). He walked a tightrope of allowing the small nonprofit advocacy corporation to donate, while continuing the prohibition on political contributions by for-profit corporations. Since 1907, federal law has prohibited corporations from contributing directly to federal candidates, although corporations may establish Political Action Committees (PACs) for that purpose, as well as contribute large sums to national party committees, the so-called "soft money" that the campaign finance reform law will prohibit. Senator Mitch McConnell has promised to litigate this ban all the way to the Supreme Court. Many Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), have invalidated certain campaign finance restrictions in the name of free speech. Until now, however, Congress has been allowed to prohibit donations to candidates by corporations. After all, as the Fourth Circuit observed, corporations have state-created advantages that enhance their ability to attract capital, exist in perpetuity, and limit liability. Unrestricted corporate donations to campaigns could lead to corruption and a distorted use of capital accumulated for non-political purposes. The Supreme Court upheld a state statute banning direct political contributions by the Michigan State of Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corporation having a business purpose. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). But the Fourth Circuit was unwilling to allow the FEC to ban political contributions and expenditures by the NCRL, which instead has an overtly political purpose. NCRL engages in the type of fundraising that lies "at the expressive heart of our political life": garage sales, bake sales, raffles, picnics, public prayer services, marches, testimony, and a newsletter. While corporations are free to set up a separate PAC, the costly regulatory burdens for a PAC preclude that option for a small entity such as NCRL. Judge Wilkinson limited his holding to small nonprofit advocacy corporations such as NCRL and declined the opportunity to allow campaign donations by every type of corporation. He was even criticized by a fellow judge for implying that such bans on for-profit corporations are constitutional. The third judge on the panel dissented from allowing NCRL to make campaign contributions, although he agreed to allow its independent campaign expenditures. He relied on applicable precedents in demarcating between contributing money to candidates and spending it independently on behalf of a candidate, and wrote in favor of allowing only the latter.