What a difference a day makes. Before 9/11, the Supreme Court was divided over how much suspicion is necessary to justify an investigatory stop of someone. Beginning with the Warren Court, the Court had tied the hands of officers trying to avert crime by stopping suspicious-looking individuals.
In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated an investigatory stop along the Mexican-American border in Arizona. United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2000). The court excluded from evidence the discovery of illegal drugs that resulted from stopping a minivan.
Relying on a combination of his hunches and intuition, the border patrol officer believed that the minivan was suspicious. The car was obeying traffic rules, but characteristics relating to its movement and actions by its occupants triggered alarms in the officer's mind.
Hunches and impressions based on difficult-to-describe factors are used all the time in our judicial system. Jurors and judges assess credibility of witnesses based on eye contact and gestures; lawyers excuse potential jurors based on feelings and intuition. But the Supreme Court has frustrated attempts by law enforcement officers to do likewise.
In Arvizu, the Ninth Circuit parsed each of the factors cited for stopping the vehicle and individually dismissed each one. These included: an unusual route taken by an unrecognizable minivan; the incident occurred about the time of the changing of border patrol shifts; the driver slowed down after seeing a border patrol vehicle; the driver failed to acknowledge the border patrol officer; the children in the car engaged in methodical and prolonged waving to the officer; and drug smuggling had been detected under similar circumstances only a month earlier.
Nevertheless the Ninth Circuit invalidated this stop, holding that the officer lacked adequate grounds for suspicion. But common sense tells us that actions that may be innocent when viewed separately can rise to criminal likelihood when in combination. One example would be four young male foreigners paying cash for one-way airplane tickets and then boarding the plane as a group.
The Arvizu appeal reached the Supreme Court after 9/11 when the political climate was very different. The Court then displayed little respect for the Ninth Circuit's analysis.
In unprecedented unanimity on this issue, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision. The Justices held that facts, even if innocuous in isolation, may rise to the level of adequate suspicion when viewed in the aggregate. United States v. Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002).
The Court agreed that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" prevents baseless investigatory stops of persons or vehicles. Relying on Warren Court precedent, the Supreme Court affirmed that a "hunch" alone is insufficient basis to justify an investigatory stop. The Court explained that an investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.
But the Supreme Court expressly rejected the Court of Appeals' "divide-and-conquer" analysis of the patrol officer's basis for stopping the minivan.
The Court emphasized that the "totality of the circumstances" must be used in assessing whether an investigatory stop is proper. The likelihood of criminal behavior need not be greater than 50%, and can fall far short of that probability. Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the writing of this decision to himself, perhaps enjoying his ultimate triumph in halting decades of erosion of law enforcement investigatory power.