Court Monitor • Jun 11, 2002

Is Computerized Child Pornography Legal?

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Many Americans were shocked by news of a Supreme Court decision in favor of child pornography. On April 16, the Court declared that computer-generated child pornography is entitled to protection as free speech under the First Amendment. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (Apr. 16, 2002). At issue was the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), which prohibited simulated child pornographic images. The ban of the CPPA applied when the images were generated without using actual children. Four federal appellate courts had upheld the CPPA against legal challenge, but the liberal Ninth Circuit invalidated this ban against simulated child pornography. That created a conflict among the appellate courts for the Supreme Court to resolve, and it sided with the Ninth Circuit. Historically, child pornography has been one of several categories of communication deemed unworthy of First Amendment protection. Other types of speech outside of constitutional protection include incitement and the defamation of private persons. Commercial speech, unauthorized use of copyright works, and campaign donations are also denied the same rights as traditional political speech. But the rise of media influence has created pressure for the Court to confer on lewd films, and even child pornography, full First Amendment protection. R-rated movies featuring sex are heavily marketed to children under the age of 17, creating problems for Hollywood if teenage sex is not considered free speech. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, cited recent Academy Award honors for movies depicting sex by minors as precedent for declaring child pornography to be entitled to full constitutional protection. Stodgy Supreme Court precedent was no match for the glitter of Hollywood, which was cited approvingly by all Supreme Court Justices except Clarence Thomas. It mattered little that nine Supreme Court Justices had previously declared child pornography to be unworthy of First Amendment protection in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). "The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Id. at 762. But the Court, in holding computer-generated child pornography to be protected speech, simply declared that precedent to be flawed. Justice Kennedy could not persuade Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia or O'Connor to join his majority decision. They felt, for various reasons, that it may be lawful to ban computer-generated child pornography. In a terse concurrence, Justice Thomas found the majority decision to be too sweeping, and hinted that the Administration's arguments in defense of the CPPA could have been stronger. He said that government may have a compelling interest that justifies prohibitions on computer-simulated child pornography, but that burden has not yet been demonstrated. Justices Rehnquist and Scalia objected to the strawmen arguments of hypothetical prosecutions concerning classics like Romeo & Juliet. Such far-fetched arguments permeate modern jurisprudence about pornography, despite lack of any evidence of harmful prosecutions. Perhaps the best analysis was by Congressman Christopher Cox, once proposed to be a Ninth Circuit judge himself. He wondered how could it be lawful to restrict political speech within 30 days of an election, yet not lawful to prohibit child pornography.