Many call it the most important decision in education in nearly 50 years. On the last day of its term, the Supreme Court affirmed by 5-4 the constitutionality of school vouchers in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4885 (June 27, 2002).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, as is his custom, took the honors of writing this landmark decision for the Court. He artfully recounted the many precedents that have accumulated over the years in this area, and applied them in favor of the Cleveland voucher law at issue before the court.
The City of Cleveland has had one of the worst performing public school systems in the country. In response to this crisis, Ohio enacted legislation enabling poor families to escape the system and attend better schools.
Specifically, families with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are eligible to receive 90% of private school tuition up to $2,250, beyond which participating private schools may not charge a co-pay in excess of $250. If scholarships remain available after the low-income families enroll in the program, then other families may apply for up to 75% of tuition costs (up to $ 1,875), with no co-payment cap.
For parents transferring their children from public to private schools, checks are made payable to the parents for endorsement to the chosen school. Public schools in districts adjacent to Cleveland can also accept student transfers, but none would.
Participation by private schools was limited to those agreeing not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to "advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion."
While the vast majority of private schools in the program are religiously affiliated, not all are. In fact, several nonreligious schools have been created in response to the Cleveland voucher program, while no religiously affiliated schools have been so founded.
This case was hotly litigated for years. Teachers' unions oppose vouchers as a threat to their jobs. But all the political reasons to oppose vouchers were, in the end, little match for logic.
Chief Justice Rehnquist simply held that the Cleveland voucher program is one "of true private choice" and consistent with "an unbroken line of decisions rejecting challenges to similar programs." "It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious."
The task fell to Justice Thomas, in a brilliant concurrence, to demonstrate how baseless the constitutional objections to vouchers are. He quoted Brown v. Board of Education for the principle that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." From there Justice Thomas proceeded to observe that "[w]hen rights are incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain, individual liberty."
After all, any attempt to apply the Establishment Clause against States must rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, because the Bill of Rights themselves apply directly only against the federal government. How illogical, Justice Thomas observed, for anyone to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the educational choice of poor students trapped in a failing school system.
At the other end of the spectrum was Justice Stevens, the Justice most hostile to religion. In a separate dissent, he declared that "we should ignore three factual matters that are discussed at length by my colleagues" and instead invalidate the Cleveland program simply because public funds were ending up supporting religiously affiliated schools.