Court Monitor • Sep 14, 2003

High Court Baffled on Business Speech

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"Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted." With those words, the Supreme Court confessed that it had erred in agreeing to hear an appeal. Those words are rarely spoken. Yet that is exactly how the Court ruled in the most important business case of this past Term: Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5015 (June 26, 2003). The Justices squabbled until the very last day on this case. Nike had been publicly accused of mistreating and underpaying workers at its foreign facilities. The issue was whether misleading denials by Nike would constitute free speech or false advertising. The Court was stumped by the intersection of free speech and business regulation. An irresistible force had met an immovable object, baffling the Court about which should prevail. The irresistible force was free speech. Nike had vigorously defended itself about a matter of public concern - whether it was using foreign sweatshops to make its goods. It insisted, and virtually the entire business community agreed, that a corporation need not quietly become a punching bag for its enemies. Corporate America deserves the same right of free speech that its assailants enjoy in attacking it. That logic compelled the Court initially to accept the case. The California Supreme Court had denied a full right of free speech to Nike, and the U.S. Supreme Court seemed poised to flex some First Amendment muscle in reversing. But after oral argument and reflecting on the many briefs and implications, the Court found an immovable object on the other side. Much of government, particularly the federal government, exists for the very purpose of restraining commercial speech. The Securities and Exchange Commission, for example, is a venerable watchdog of what corporations may say, may not say, or even must say to the public. If Nike enjoys free speech in responding to critics, then so would Martha Stewart and every other corporate officer who rebuts criticism and thereby allegedly props up company stock value. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter wrote that "if the allegations of the complaint are true, direct communications with customers and potential customers that were intended to generate sales - and possibly to maintain or enhance the market value of Nike's stock - contained significant factual misstatements. The regulatory interest in protecting market participants from being misled by such misstatements is of the highest order." Id. at *15 - *16 On the other hand, the conservative wing of the Court - Justices Scalia and Thomas and the Chief Justice - did not join this praise of regulation. Nor did they want any part in deciding this case, probably out of their respect for federalism. The more principled justices on the political right and left joined in a majority decision not to decide. Since the appeal was from a preliminary ruling by a state court on a complaint that asserted only violations of California business law, the federal courts should not have heard this dispute in the first instance, and the Supreme Court should stay out of it at least until a final judgment is rendered. The four moderate Justices - Souter, Breyer, O'Connor and Kennedy - disagreed with that basic limitation on federal appellate jurisdiction, but they were outvoted on the federalism issue. Justice Souter then joined the majority to reject the appeal by 6-3. On Sept. 12, Nike agreed to pay $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association. The surprise settlement left hanging the issue of whether Nike’s ads were protected by the First Amendment.