Court Monitor • May 8, 2005

Shootout with Gun Manufacturers

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The decision of City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corporation comes like a breath of fresh air from the judiciary. In November 2004, a public uproar against Illinois judges set the stage for its Supreme Court to unanimously embrace judicial restraint and the rights of firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. Â The City of Chicago and Cook County tried to recover a big award from gun suppliers for damages caused by crime, under a theory of "public nuisance." That legal concept is vague and malleable, meaning an unreasonable interference with a right enjoyed by the public. Those wanting judges to legislate from the bench are fond of suing for "nuisance." "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance,'" a leading legal authority observed. "It has meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition." W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984). Plaintiffs filed their original lawsuit against the gun suppliers back in 1998 in a local court thought to be friendly to their cause, but the court dismissed the action. In March 2000 the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, but the court dismissed it again. Judicial activism reared its ugly head on appeal, however, as the appellate court reinstated the lawsuit. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 337 Ill. App. 3d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which surprised everyone by using judicial restraint and dismissing the lawsuit. Justice Garman went out of her away to overlook procedural defects in order to dispose of the case on its merits. 213 Ill. 2d 351, 369-370 (2004). Justice Garman recognized the difference between the criminal use of guns, and the manufacture or sale of guns. The Court recognized "the unfairness of imposing liability for the acts of another." Indirect liability would be both unjust and economically inefficient, as profits would succumb to the whim of trial attorneys and juries seeking to redistribute wealth. Even more noteworthy than the Court's rejection of indirect liability was its repudiation of judicial activism. Justice Garman repeatedly chided the plaintiffs and amici for suggesting that the court overstep its bounds by writing new law. Justice Garman wrote, "Any change of this magnitude in the law affecting a highly regulated industry must be the work of the legislature, brought about by the political process, not the work of the courts. In response to the suggestion of amici that we are abdicating our responsibility to declare the common law, we point to the virtue of judicial restraint." Justice Garman and the Supreme Court of Illinois deserve congratulations for standing up to the trial attorneys and their demand for judicial activism.