The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court recently decided to exclude New York law in a case stemming from terrorist attacks on foreign soil. The appellate court held that Israeli law should instead be used in New York courts. Elmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., 2013 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5802 (Sept. 17, 2013).
The case was brought by people affected by deadly terrorist attacks in Israel in 2005 to 2007. The plaintiffs claim that Bank of China (BOC) bears liability for the attacks, because of implicated money transfers made by its customers. The plaintiffs brought their lawsuit in New York, since Bank of China had allegedly processed relevant wire transfers at offices in New York.
The case would not proceed in federal court, because the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that federal courts generally don't have jurisdiction over foreign disputes such as this one. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). But since the plaintiffs went to state court, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision does not apply.
Without foreign law, a finding of liability would be unlikely. The appellate court wrote, "[w]e certainly acknowledge the general rule that '[b]anks do not owe non-customers a duty to protect them from the intentional torts of their customers.'" But Israeli law could lead to a finding of liability, and the court observed that "the differences between the New York and Israeli laws . . . could affect the trial's outcome, perhaps significantly."
By imposing Israeli law, the New York appellate court explicitly broke with the decision of the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in a similar case dealing with terrorism against Israel. The appellate court summarized the Second Circuit's ruling against American Express Bank as holding that "because the challenged conduct of AmEx Bank took place in New York, AmEx Bank is headquartered in New York and it administered its correspondent banking services in New York . . . New York had the greatest interest in the litigation."
The New York appellate court's only response to the Second Circuit's argument was to note that it did not address a standard set forth in a 1985 decision. That decision's statement, "the locus . . . is determined by where the plaintiffs' injuries occurred," would set Israel as "the locus" in the case at hand. But it was entirely reasonable for the Second Circuit not to address the 1985 definition of "locus," because the two jurisdictions involved in the old case were the neighboring states of New York and New Jersey. The New York appellate court took a sensible standard for resolving jurisdictional conflicts within the United States, and recklessly applied it to use the law of a country across the globe.
Replacing New York law with foreign law is bad enough. But the appellate court's decision got even worse. After forcing Israeli law upon New York, the court stated that "a straightforward reading of the Israeli enactments would lead to the conclusion that they concern conduct that is broader in scope than most of what BOC is alleged to have done."
First the court replaced the law of New York with that of another nation. Then it acknowledged that even the foreign law was not good enough for the plaintiffs, so it turned to "opinions written by experts in Israeli law," which said that the allegations would imply BOC liability. The court's acceptance of foreign law is already out of control, and there is no end in sight.